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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the importance of incentive schemes or personnel policies in
three distinct labor markets.
The first essay answers the following question: How important are patient and physician-
specific factors in explaining persistent prescription behavior? A wide range of research has
suggested that prescription behavior is highly persistent and an important barrier to realizing
cost savings, but the sources of this persistence are not well understood. I quantify the
importance of physician and patient factors in physician prescription behavior by exploiting
a policy mandate in Belgium requiring physicians to prescribe a minimum percentage of
cheap drugs, using detailed administrative data on 24 million prescription drugs dispensed
to 152,000 patients. First, I show that physicians increase the prescription rate of generics
for first-time users of an active ingredient by 10 percentage points. They do so without
compromising on quality of dispensed drugs. Second, I find that first-time patients are more
likely to receive a generic than long-time patient are likely to be switched from a branded
to a generic drug, suggesting physicians consider the latter costly to switch. I find that
switching a patient indeed comes at a cost, measured in decreased medication adherence.
Building on this reduced form evidence, I develop and estimate a structural model. I use the
model estimates to simulate the entry of generics and find physician and patient factors are
about equally important in explaining the slow adoption of generics. Requiring pharmacists
to only dispense generics decreases welfare, unless patient considerations are decreased by
at least 60%.
In a second essay, I estimate the effect of domestic outsourcing events on wages of work-
ers remaining in outsourcing establishments. I use employer-employee linked data from
xiii
Germany that includes detailed administrative information on earnings, industry and oc-
cupation of employment. I exploit outsourcing event as my main source of identification
and find substantial effects on the wages of workers that stay: holding worker ability con-
stant, high skilled workers receive, on average, an immediate wage increase of about five log
points, while low skilled worker face a wage cut of about one log points. On average, wage
increases enjoyed by high skilled workers are positively correlated with changes in the skill
ratio within the establishment. I propose a new theoretical model of wage setting in which
fairness considerations generate spillover effects that are consistent with these two empirical
findings. Taken together, these results indicate fairness considerations may play a role in
wage setting.
In a third essay, co-authored with Kevin Stange and Brian Jacob, we investigate the
role of instructors in promoting student success. We explore this issue in the context of
the University of Phoenix, a large for-profit university that offers both online and in-person
courses in a wide array of fields and degree programs. We focus on instructors in the college
algebra course that is required for all BA degree program students. We find substantial
variation in student performance across instructors both in the current class and subsequent
classes. Variation is larger for in-person classes, but is still substantial for online courses.
Effectiveness grows modestly with course-specific teaching experience, but is unrelated to
pay. Our results suggest that personnel policies for recruiting, developing, motivating, and




Quantifying Sources of Persistent Prescription
Behavior: Evidence from Belgium
1.1 Introduction
Physicians frequently prescribe costly treatments even when cheaper alternatives become
available or are recommended by clinical practice guidelines (Chandra, Cutler and Song,
2011). Policymakers who have tried to address this behavior to reduce health care costs
have achieved limited success: studies consistently show that physician behavior is highly
persistent and difficult to change.1 One example is the use of generic prescription drugs that
offer the same therapeutic value as their branded equivalents, but at a lower cost.2 “Generic
substitution,” moving patients from branded to equally effective generic prescription drugs,
could substantially reduce prescription drug costs – the fastest-growing segment of health
care spending worth $325 billion annually in the US and $1.2 trillion worldwide (CMS,
2015; IQVIA, 2019). Specifically, estimates suggest that generic substitution could save the
US 11% and EU more than 20% on overall prescription drug spending (Haas et al., 2005;
Carone, Schwierz and Xavier, 2012; Choudhry, Denberg and Qaseem, 2016). A large body
1Persistence refers to a tendency in prescribing behavior not explained by patient illness characteristics,
demographics, or indicators of preferences (Phelps, 2000). Grimshaw et al. (2012), Ivers et al. (2012) and
Wilensky (2016) review policies.
2The active ingredient is the chemical in the compound producing the biological or chemical effect. After
patent expiration, generic manufacturers can enter the market and manufacture the same (and equally
effective) active ingredient.
1
of research argues, however, that persistent prescribing behavior is an important barrier to
realizing these cost savings. Yet, the sources of this persistence are not well understood
(Hellerstein, 1998; Kesselheim, Avorn and Sarpatwari, 2016).
In this paper, I study the importance of physician and patient factors in the persistence
of physician prescribing decisions. On the one hand, physicians may prescribe the more
expensive drug because of their habits (Hellerstein, 1998), preferences (Shrank et al., 2011),
or financial incentives from physician dispensing or detailing (Iizuka, 2012; Grennan et al.,
2018). This is often referred to as partial altruism, as physicians only partially act in the
patient’s best interest (Ellis and McGuire, 1986). On the other hand, physicians may take
patients’ needs or preferences into account, and as such, resist switching between equally
effective drugs for patient-specific reasons. Patients exhibit brand loyalty (Sinkinson and
Starc, 2018) or rely on pill appearance in their medication regimen (Sarpatwari et al., 2019).
Changing a patient’s prescription may lead to confusion and worse medication adherence
(Kesselheim et al., 2014), possibly resulting in higher hospitalization rates and healthcare
costs (Sokol et al., 2005; Bosworth et al., 2011). In such cases, persistence in prescription
behavior may not be wasteful. Quantifying the relative importance of both provider and
patient factors in physician treatment decisions, along with understanding their welfare
effects, is critical for designing policy efforts aimed at containing healthcare costs while
maintaining the quality of care. Nevertheless, empirical evidence on this question is limited.
I quantify the relative importance of physician and patient factors in prescribing decisions
of primary care physicians (PCPs) in Belgium by exploiting a national policy mandating a
change in prescribing habits. The mandate required PCPs to prescribe a minimum percent-
age of cheap or generic drugs. It was announced in June 2005 and went into effect starting
2006. The minimum prescription rate was set to 27% for PCPs, up from an average pre-
scription rate of 18% in 2004. Physicians had to meet this quote over the course of a full
year, and the mandate was binding for almost all PCPs.3
3Non-compliance resulted in physicians having to justify their decisions before the Order of Physicians.
See section 1.2.3.
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The analysis in this paper is organized in two parts. As a first step, I present reduced
form evidence of physician and patient factors in PCPs’ prescribing decisions. I document
physicians’ tendency to prescribe brand name drugs without quality or therapeutic justifica-
tions to do so. I refer to this tendency as physician bias, but do not take a stand on whether
this bias is driven by habits, inattention, preferences or industry interactions. Additionally,
I show that changing a patient’s prescription drug decreases their medication adherence, and
that physicians take this behavior into account. Patients who are prescribed a drug for the
first time (“starters”) are therefore more likely to receive a generic than patients who were
using a brand name before (“longstanding patients”). I refer to this as patient considera-
tions. As a second step, I develop and estimate a structural model to quantify the relative
importance of both factors and to analyze counterfactual policies.
The Belgian healthcare market serves as a useful setting for several reasons. First, uni-
versal insurance alleviates concerns that physicians face uncertainty over differences in for-
mularies or insurance plans, and rules out the possibility that patients might choose different
plans (or none at all) in response to the policy mandate. This also simplifies modeling as-
sumptions. Second, direct-to-consumer-advertising (DTCA) is not allowed. As a result,
patients rarely request generics when they are prescribed a drug for the first time, and few
patients can differentiate between branded and generic versions of the same prescription
drug (Fraeyman et al., 2015).4 Changes in the demand for generics among starters therefore
capture physician bias. Third, physicians prescribe on product name and pharmaceutical
substitution is not allowed (i.e. pharmacists dispense as written).5 Detailed transaction
data from pharmacies, stored in a central database to operationalize reimbursements in the
healthcare system, therefore reflect physician prescribing behavior.
I draw rich and novel administrative data on 26 million dispensed prescription drugs
between 2004 and 2009 for 152,000 randomly selected patients from this central database
4Physicians and healthcare officials confirmed patients rarely request branded drugs during an initial
visit.
5See Section 1.2.2 for details on the absence of pharmaceutical substitution in Belgium at the time of the
policy mandate.
3
to compute these patients’ prescription profiles. For a random subset of 300 distinct PCPs,
the dataset also records all 6 million prescriptions dispensed to their patients, which I use
to track their average prescription rate of generics over time across different patients and
prescription drugs. I merge this data with detailed drug characteristics, such as daily doses,
potency, and extended release version, based on the product’s unique barcode that is scanned
upon dispensing in the pharmacy. Finally, I link census demographic records using unique
patient and physician identifiers to precisely characterize the demographic profile of patients
and physicians.
Physicians exhibit bias, as they respond to the mandate by increasing the prescription
rate of generics without compromising on the quality of dispensed drugs. To isolate this
bias, I focus solely on prescriptions for starters. Starters are unlikely to request a branded
prescription drug, so limiting the analysis to these patients allows me to address concerns
of unobservable demand factors or costs related to switching between drugs. The mandate
increased the average prescription rate of generics for starters by about 10 percentage points,
up from a pre-mandate average of 35%. PCPs far from the threshold (“low prescribers”)
responded more. PCPs did not decrease the use of (possibly superior) on-patent prescription
drugs to comply with the mandate, with no discernible differences across high and low
prescribers.6 Assuming generic and branded versions of the same active ingredients are
equally effective, this is evidence of physician bias.7 I further strengthen this claim by
showing no changes in other quality characteristics of dispensed drugs, such as administration
method (e.g. pill or injection) or extended release formulation.
I show evidence of patient considerations by contrasting how PCPs respond to the man-
date for starters and longstanding patients. I find that PCPs increase the switching rate
for longstanding patients by about 1 to 2 percentage points, which is substantially lower
than the 10 percentage point increase for starters described above. These differences imply
6On-patent drugs face no generic competition and are typically newer, so may be superior to older drugs
with competition.
7See Kesselheim et al. (2008) and (Choudhry, Denberg and Qaseem, 2016) for meta-analyses on the equal
clinical effectiveness of generics.
4
that it is less costly for a patient who needs a new prescription to receive a generic than for
a longstanding patient to switch, and that PCPs take these costs into account. This lines
up with previous work that finds physicians differentiate between starters and longstanding
patients (Dickstein, 2011b; Sinkinson and Starc, 2018; Shapiro, 2018a; Feng, 2019).
Leveraging the quasi-experimental design of the mandate, I develop an instrumental
variables framework and show that switching a patient from a brand-name to generic version
of the same prescription drug indeed comes at a cost, measured with decreased medication
adherence. I instrument the endogenous decision to switch a longstanding patient with
exogenous variation in the timing of the mandate and whether the patient visits a low
prescriber. I find that a switch causally reduces medication adherence by about 30%, and
that a naive OLS estimate would understate the effect by a factor of two. A patient in my
sample refills their prescription, on average, every two months, so a change in prescription
drugs increases the time between refills by about three to four weeks. This decrease in
medication adherence is short-lived and does not generate persistent reductions in adherence,
suggesting an initiation cost to switching prescription drugs for longstanding patients. These
costs are likely driven by patient behavior, such as confusion or mistrust, and can therefore
be interpreted as an increase in “behavioral hazard” as defined by Baicker, Mullainathan
and Schwartzstein (2015).
I complement this IV approach with a complier analysis where I investigate which patient
observables predict an increase in switching probability in response to the policy mandate. I
use linear probability models and non-parametric machine learning methods. Patients using
an active ingredient for only 6 months are equally likely to be switched as those using it for
at least 1.5 years, i.e. evidence of lock-in effects. Furthermore, PCPs are unlikely to switch
older patients who take multiple prescription drugs. These results support the hypothesis
that patient behavior likely drives patient switching costs.
To quantify the relative importance of physician bias and patient considerations, and
understand the impact of counterfactual policies, I develop a structural choice model of
5
physician prescribing behavior. I first model the demand for generic drugs, and then model
how the policy mandate affects physician behavior. In my demand model, PCPs are decision-
makers maximizing transaction utility by choosing either a brand name or a generic drug.8
They take into account the patient’s copay but also derive (private) utility from prescribing
the brand-name drug, giving rise to physician bias. For longstanding patients, the PCP
observes the cost of changing a patient’s prescription drug. For chronic starters, I assume an
exclusion restriction imposing this switching cost is zero, motivated by the absence of patient
considerations for these patients and the inability of pharmaceutical companies to steer
demand through changes in DTCA.9 It is typically difficult to separately identify switching
costs from persistent preferences (such as physician bias); it is unclear whether the lack
of switching is due to high switching costs or strong persistent preferences.10 I identify
both sources of persistence separately by exploiting the exclusion restriction on starters,
along with the introduction of the policy mandate. I use a difference-in-difference type
argument to identify switching costs: the difference between the change in the generic share
for longstanding patients and starters identifies the switching cost. Additionally, the post-
policy share of generic drugs among starters identifies post-policy physician biases. Similarly,
pre-policy shares identify the pre-policy fixed effects.
I use the model to simulate the adoption of generics over a five-year period under three
different scenarios. In one scenario, only the copay differential and physician bias affect
PCPs’ prescription decisions; in a second scenario, only the copay differential and patient
considerations do. Finally, I simulate the adoption of generics in a scenario where the
copay differential, physician bias and patient considerations all drive prescription decisions.
Generics only achieve a market share of about 60% and 70% in scenarios one and two
respectively. The market share in the final scenario plateaus at about 50%. The outcomes
for scenario one and two are very similar, so physician bias and patient considerations seem
8This binary simplification is reasonable, as generic markets for a drug are typically dominated by one
or two manufacturers.
9See, for instance, Sinkinson and Starc (2018) who show DTCA may impact demand for starters.
10See (Heckman, 1981) and (Torgovitsky, 2019) for more detailed discussions of these challenges.
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to be almost equally important in the slow dissemination of generics in the prescription drug
market. The steady inflow of chronic starters, however, does decrease the importance of
patient considerations in the longer run.
Finally, I use the model estimates to simulate the introduction of a Mandatory Generic
Substitution (MGS) policy, in which pharmacies are required to dispense the generic drug
whenever possible – effectively overruling physician decisions. I assume that patient welfare
can be characterized by the copay sensitivity and switching costs in the transaction utility.11
I find that an MGS policy is predicted to decrease total insurance expenditures by 20%,
but that it also leads to a welfare loss in patient considerations. The weight the social
planner puts on patient considerations therefore guide whether an MGS policy increases
overall welfare. I use the Minimum Prescription Rate policy mandate to calculate that the
Belgian health care system is willing to accept a e1.5 increase in prescription drug costs for
a e1 decrease in patient considerations (or less). This welfare weight suggests that the MGS
for the Belgian health care system is welfare-decreasing. However, complementary policies
that reduce patient switching costs by at least 60% could make the introduction of an MGS
policy welfare-increasing.
These model simulations therefore suggest two take-aways for policy design. First, it
highlights important trade-offs in the continuity of care. Policymakers increasingly consider
policies that override physician decisions and pharmacies around the world regularly change
generic suppliers depending on the cost. My results suggest these policies might result in
costs for patients – especially since welfare losses are incurred on longstanding patients, who
typically represent the majority of patients. Second, combining such policies with attempts
to mitigate these negative effects (e.g. by making it easier to switch between prescription
drugs) could increase overall welfare, and is therefore a promising area for future research.
These concerns are particularly salient as chronic care accounts for about 75% of the overall
health care budget (CMS, 2018).
11In other words, patient welfare is the utility derived from the transaction taking out the physician bias.
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The magnitude of this tradeoff in other healthcare markets, however, depends on how the
results in this study extrapolate to these markets. The unique setting in Belgium allows for
a transparent interpretation of how physician and patient factors interact, and what their
relative importance is. By minimizing and eliminating several important confounding factors,
I provide some of the first evidence that physicians take patient behavior and medication
adherence into account in their decisions, and show this factor is quantitatively important
(relative to physician biases). Nevertheless, healthcare markets where these confounding
factors are present will therefore face different tradeoffs, and the direction of these effects is
not always clear ex ante.12 Understanding these interactions is a promising area for future
research.
This paper adds to a rich literature on factors influencing physician prescribing behavior.
I suggest medication adherence and patient behavior as novel factors driving persistence of
prescription decisions that are not necessarily wasteful (Sokol et al., 2005; Chandra, Handel
and Schwartzstein, 2018). To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to do so.
In contrast, researchers have studied other influencing factors such as physicians learning
about the (static) match quality between a patient and an active ingredient (Crawford and
Shum, 2005; Dickstein, 2011a), or the extent to which physicians act on (possibly perverse)
financial incentives – typically referred to as agency (Iizuka, 2012; Rischatsch, Trottmann
and Zweifel, 2013; Grennan et al., 2018). Other papers have considered the role of physician
habits (Hellerstein, 1998; Janakiraman et al., 2008; Emanuel et al., 2016), or direct-to-
consumer advertising of prescription drugs to patients (Sinkinson and Starc, 2018; Shapiro,
2018b). Furthermore, in contrast to other studies of medication adherence, the sample of
patients in this study is also remarkably representative.13
This paper also speaks to a broader literature on persistent physician behavior and treat-
ment choices (Phelps, 2000; Chandra, Cutler and Song, 2011). The clean identification of
12DTCA, for instance, may affect demand for, especially for starters (Sinkinson and Starc, 2018), and the
perceived effectiveness of generics – and therefore medication adherence after a switch.
13Other studies typically rely on smaller samples from specific pharmacies, providers, or regions in the US
or other countries (Glombiewski et al., 2012; Lam and Fresco, 2015).
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patient switching costs in the presence of persistent physician bias addresses challenges sur-
veyed by Farrell and Klemperer (2007).14 Researchers’ inability to observe initial choices in
micro-level panel datasets confounds their ability to separately identify switching costs from
persistent preferences. I exploit rich micro-level panel data covering six years of prescrip-
tions over different prescription drugs, to observe active choices for starters before and after
the policy mandate, and contrast them to choices for longstanding patients. This allows
me to disentangle switching costs from persistent preferences, and quantify their relative
importance. Other studies rely on controlling for patient characteristics and stated prefer-
ences (Baicker et al., 2004; O’Hare et al., 2010), or exploiting moving Medicare beneficiaries
(Finkelstein, Gentzkow and Williams, 2016). To a lesser extent, my paper also provides a
view of health care services as credence goods – complex products or services sold on mar-
kets with information asymmetries between informed experts and uninformed buyers. I show
that one may overstate the extent to which expert advice is biased if patient face switching
costs (Darby and Karni, 1973). One may also interpret this as extending the literature on
consumers facing switching costs (Klemperer, 1995) to allow for these consumers to visit
biased experts.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 presents the policy studied in this paper and
highlights several key features of the Belgian healthcare market. Section 1.3 presents the data
sources that are used, while section 1.4 presents the reduced form results. Section 1.5 presents
the structural model. Section 1.6 presents the decompositions and policy counterfactuals,
while section 1.7 concludes.
14Thus, this paper also relates to the literature separating persistent preferences from switching costs
surveyed in this paper.
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1.2 The Minimum Prescription Rate (MPR)
1.2.1 Setting
Belgium counts about 11 million inhabitants and 11,000 certified and active primary care
physicians, making its health care market comparable to Michigan, Pennsylvania, or Ohio.15
The healthcare system in Belgium is organized through a tightly regulated health insurance
market providing universal health insurance.16 Universal health coverage is achieved by
requiring every eligible person to acquire Mandatory Health Insurance (MHI) by enrolling
at one of several competing health insurance providers (called “sickness funds”) that are set
up as not-for-profit organizations.17
The National Institute for Health and Disability Insurance (NIHDI) specifies the services
that are covered in the standard MHI plan, and negotiates prices for these services. Prices
are set nationally, with certain well-defined demographic groups receiving “increased reim-
bursements,” which I will denote as IR patients in this paper.18 As a result, the plan is
homogenous across sickness funds, and competition is therefore mostly on service.19 Sick-
ness funds are reimbursed for their costs using risk-adjustment formulas similar in spirit to
15Belgian population statistics for 2011 and retrieved from ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database on
11/2/2017. Healthcare statistics reported for 2005 and obtained from Roberfroid et al. (2008). Popu-
lation and physician workforce statistics for Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Ohio retrieved from Center for
Workforce Studies (2013).
16The Belgian model is sometimes classified as a “social insurance” or “Bismarck” system, with similar
systems being used in Germany, the Netherlands, France, Japan and Switzerland (Reid, 2010).
17One is eligible if over 25 years of age, or if 25 years of age or younger but employed or
receiving unemployment insurance. People younger than 25 are insured through their parents.
Source: https://www.vlaanderen.be/nl/gezin-welzijn-en-gezondheid/gezondheidszorg/ziekteverzekering, ac-
cessed 01/27/2018. In 2016, there were 53 mutual funds that were grouped into five national associations,
who have deep political and ideological roots. The five national associations are the Christian Mutalities,
the Socialist Mutualities, the Liberal Mutualities, the Independent Sickness Funds, and the Neutral Sickness
Funds. Entry (or exit) into the MHI market is not allowed.
18These demographic groups are orphans, persons with disabilities, widows, pensioners, or people on
unemployment insurance. Prices for prescription drugs could in principle change every month, and can be
consulted online.
19Mutual funds can differentiate by including services that are not part of the standard MHI plan. This
supplementary insurance has become more popular in recent decades, and this market is fully competitive
– mutual funds and private insurers compete in a fully competitive market. As Schokkaert, Guillaume and
Van de Voorde (2017) point out, supplementary insurance schemes are typically used for ambulatory services,
not prescription drugs, and this therefore does not affect the design of this study.
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Medicare reimbursements to offset the cost for non-selective contracting (Schokkaert, Guil-
laume and Van de Voorde, 2017).20 The system is financed through employer and employee
contributions (Grosse-Tebbe and Figueras, 2005).21
Taken together, the Belgian healthcare market provides a setting where patients do not
face insurance plan choices for prescription drugs and there is no outside option (as non-
insurance is not allowed). There are no economic incentives to prefer one sickness fund over
another, so switching between these funds is rare – about 1% of enrollees switch in any given
year (Schokkaert, Guillaume and Van de Voorde, 2017). Furthermore, physicians face no
uncertainty regarding the plan a certain patient is on or which prices they face, as patients
with higher reimbursement rates are typically easily identified by physicians (Farfan-Portet
et al., 2012).
1.2.2 The Market for Physicians and Prescription Drugs
Physicians. Enrollees are free to choose their primary care physician.22 Even though the
state enforces strict regulation on the insurance market and that products in the standard
MHI plan, there is a long tradition of physician autonomy in how they choose to treat their
patients. Physicians receive a flat fee for a visit, and if, during the course of this visit,
they decide to prescribe a certain drug (or set of drugs), this prescription is provided free
of charge.23 There are no direct financial incentives embedded in the health care system for
physicians to prescribe a generic (or a brand name) drug.
Prescription Filling. Figure 1.1 provides an example of a prescription. The bar code
20For a variety of reasons, including political ones, there are no direct steps to move towards selective
contracting in the near future (Schokkaert, Guillaume and Van de Voorde, 2017).
21See Appendix A.1 for a short discussion and additional references.
22In other words, there are no networks that differ across sickness funds as in the US. The profession
of physician is regulated through a licensing-type system for “Free Professions,” where there is a strong
focus on autonomous decision-making with little direct state involvement (see Appendix A.1.3). Unlicensed
physicians are not be reimbursed by the NIHDI.
23In most cases, patients pay the full amount and then use a pay slip to receive the reimbursement directly
from his or her mutual fund. Patients receiving higher reimbursements (if they are part of the well-defined
at-risk groups discussed above) only pay the required copay and the physician directly bills their sickness
fund.
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on top uniquely identifies the physician who prescribes the exact product to be dispensed
in the text box indicated by the number 5 on figure 1.1b. A physician will write down the
branded or generic name (with manufacturer), potency, size and number of packages.24 The
patient then takes this prescription to the pharmacy, where the pharmacist dispenses the
product exactly as prescribed by the physician.25. An electronic health insurance card that
is inserted into a chip reader identifies the patient and associated insurance plan. Patients
generally pay the full price, and the recover the reimbursement by handing the prescription
over to their mutual fund, along with a sticker that identifies the patient.26 Prescription
drugs are dispensed in the original packaging produced by the manufacturer, that can differ
across manufacturers (see Figure 1.2 for an example).
Prescription Drug Markets and Pricing. Within a market for an active ingredient,
almost all transactions (99%) make use of one single active ingredient, and the two largest
manufacturers capture about 85-90% of the market. Appendix A.2.3 describes this in larger
detail.
The Belgian healthcare system uses a reference pricing system (RPS) for prescription
drugs, introduced in 2001 (Farfan-Portet et al., 2012; Cornelis, 2013).27 An RPS consists of
a set of drug clusters and the reference prices that applies to these clusters. The clusters
are groups of prescription drugs that the policymaker considers to be equivalent, while the
reference price is the maximum price manufacturers can charge within a cluster. Belgium
has a “generic RPS” where all drugs with the exact same active ingredient form one cluster
(Vrijens et al., 2010; Farfan-Portet et al., 2012).
The reference price is based on a well-defined estimate of the production cost of the
24A program to prescribe active ingredients rather than product name was available during this period,
but not used.
25Suggesting (or dispensing) an alternative but equivalent prescription drug was, in fact, illegal (Farfan-
Portet et al., 2012). In practice, pharmacists may send patients to another pharmacy, or dispense a generic
of a different make (e.g. Sandoz rather than Mylan) if the prescribed generic brand is not in stock.
26Exceptions are made for (typically expensive) drugs and patients on an IR plan, where only the copay
is charged.
27RPSs are used in other countries, as discussed in Dylst, Vulto and Simoens (2012), Simoens (2012) and
Farfan-Portet et al. (2012).
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branded drug. If a branded prescription drug charges the reference price, it is considered
cheap. The NIHDI then also only covers the reimbursement based on this reference price
(i.e. they cover (1 − c) × P where c is the copay rate and P is the reference price). If
the branded drug charges more than the reference price, it is considered expensive and the
patient pays the remaining amount. While there some changes in the RPS in Belgium, the
copay differential between branded and generic prescription drugs remained largely constant
and the mandate did not affect tis gap, as is further detailed in Appendix A.1.5.
Prescription Drug Advertising and Detailing. Direct-to-consumer advertising
(DTCA) for prescription drugs is not allowed in Belgium (Rekenhof, 2013).28 As a re-
sult, patients typically cannot tell brand name and generic drugs apart and are unlikely
to request the branded version when they are prescribed a prescription drug for the very
first time (Fraeyman et al., 2015). Detailing, the process through which pharmaceutical
companies inform physicians about their products, is strictly regulated. Pharmaceutical
companies can disseminate scientific information through publications and visits of repre-
sentatives, but regulations require the content be sufficiently scientific. Similarly, conferences
to which physicians can be invited need to have sufficient scientific merit, and costs need to
“reasonable.”29
Take-away. Given the institutional features described above, the Belgian healthcare
market provides a setting where dispensed drugs closely reflect physician decisions. Further-
more, the generic market for a given active ingredient is typically dominated by one or two
manufacturers, indicating the choice between generics is not a first-order concern. Patients
are unlikely to request the brand name drug during an initial diagnosis and there are no
(direct) financial incentives for physicians to prescribe a generic or a brand-name drug. De-
tailing is allowed, but regulations limit the extent to which pharmaceutical companies can
respond to a policy requiring physicians to change their prescription practices.
28There are provisions for exceptions regarding campaigns of public interest (such as vaccination program).
Advertising (non-prescription) over-the-counter drugs is legal.
29“Reasonable” as specified in the Royal Decree of 7 April 1995. In practice, such events are typically a
presentation including scientific results, followed by a dinner or event.
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1.2.3 The Minimum Prescription Rate (MPR)
Historically, the take-up of generics drugs in Belgium has been low, and expenditures on
prescription drugs rose at faster rates than healthcare expenditures during the 1990s and
early 2000s (Cornelis, 2013).30 Cheap drugs – brand name drugs that match the price of
generics – were also very uncommon. In fact, the market share of generics and cheap drugs,
measured in Defined Daily Dosage (DDD), was only about 12 and 15 percent respectively
in 2004.31
In response, the government and NIHDI announced the introduction of a Minimum Pre-
scription Rate (MPR) in 2005: physicians were required to prescribe a minimum percentage
of generic or cheap drugs, but were free in how to comply with this percentage. Physician
organizations resisted, as there was a strong tradition of independence in their decision-
making.32 At the same time, NIHDI was aware that abrupt changes to prescription behavior
could be detrimental to patient health and industry relations.33 After several weeks of dis-
cussion, this percentage was set at 27 percent for primary care physicians, and announced
at the end of June 2005, and went into effect starting in January 2006.34
Knowing the exact prescription rate throughout the year, however, is challenging for
physicians. They were not informed about their prescription rate in 2004 or 2005 before
30Drivers of cross-country differences in the adoption generic drugs are complex. See Costa-Font, McGuire
and Varol (2014) and Wouters, Kanavos and McKee (2017) for a discussion. Important determinants include,
but are not limited to, price regulation, the organization of the health care sector (e.g. the use of generic
substitution at the pharmacy) and the cost differential between generics and brand-name drugs. However,
Wouters, Kanavos and McKee (2017) point out that there are substantial methodological challenges in
reliably calculating these differences across countries.
31DDD is a well-defined quantity measure used by the World Health Organization to capture a typical
daily dose. While this quantity-measure is well-defined, physicians are not fully familiar are aware of its
magnitude. See https://www.whocc.no/ddd/ for further information. Website accessed 01/31/2018.
32This tradition was, in part, reason for the relative freedom the mandate afforded physicians in how to
comply.
33Possible adverse effects on patients were a concern when discussing the threshold in the MPR: policy-
makers I talked to specifically mentioned this as a reason to not set the threshold too high and why thresholds
were set by specialty.
34In practice, NIHDI had calculated the average share of cheap drugs by specialty in 2004 (in DDD),
multiplied this number by 1.25, and set this number to be the MPR for the relevant specialty. Physicians
prescribing less than 200 packs of prescription drugs on an annual basis are precluded from the minimum
threshold. This exemption largely targeted older physicians that had effectively retired, but still prescribed
some prescription drugs for home and family use.
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the mandate went into effect. There was no way for them to track it in real-time, and the
volume measure (DDD) was not typically used by physicians. The NIHDI, however, did
recognize the need to inform physicians and sent out reports with the 2005 prescription rate
in 2006. If a physician did not meet the MPR threshold, he or she was required to prepare
documentation and defend their prescription behavior in person to the Order of Physicians,
located in Brussels.35 Ultimately, the majority of physicians complied with the mandate,
and no physicians were ever called upon to defend her prescription behavior.36
This policy mandate therefore provides a unique opportunity to understand how physi-
cians make prescription decisions, how costly it is to adjust their prescription practices, and
whether these costs differ across different types of patients. Furthermore, this mandate also
provides a unique opportunity to try and evaluate whether switching longstanding patients
can actually results in worse health outcomes or not.
1.3 IMA Farmanet: Transaction-Level Prescription Data
I use two novel datasets drawn from Farmanet, a database maintained by the NIHDI
that links physicians and patients to prescription drugs dispensed in public pharmacies in
Belgium, and merge them to a rich set of physician and patient-level demographics and vital
statistics.37 At the transaction level, pharmacists scan the prescription bar code (containing
a unique physician identifier as shown in figure 1.1), and the product bar from the packag-
ing. Patients insert their health insurance card (containing a unique patient identifier) that
automatically calculates the copay based on the patients’ insurance plan. The patient and
35The Order of Physicians in Belgium can be compared to the American Medical Association, in that it
decides, among other things, the number of medical profession jobs that open up each year and continuing
education for physicians. Physicians that are charged with misconduct or professional violations go through a
similar first step, therefore, these costs can be considered significant in terms of effort, stigma and reputation.
In contrast to misconduct charges, however, it was not made clear what additional steps would be taken
after an unsatisfactory defense.
36They were, in part, helped by a substantial shift of brand name multisource drugs that matched the
reference price and became cheap. However, these changes were difficult to anticipate.
37Figure A.5 provides a graphical overview, but see RIZIV/INAMI (2009) for a detailed discussion on data
collection and processing. Hospital pharmacies are excluded from this data source, as are drugs not eligible
for reimbursement.
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physician identifier are based on their National Registry Identification Number and there-
fore consistently track the same individual over time, and the data undergo extensive quality
review at different points in time.
NIHDI. The first dataset is provided by NIHDI and draws a 10% random sample of
physicians and provides their full transaction history from January 2004 through December
2009. Physician-level information includes anonymized identifiers, sex, age, year of degree,
and province of residence. NIHDI has collected these data on all prescription drug trans-
actions in pharmacies since January 2004. At the patient level, there is information on the
insurance plan, age, and sex of the patient, but no patient identifiers. Barcode identifiers
at the product level allow me to match hand-collected product-level information, including
dosage and strength of the drug, DDD of the transaction, brand and manufacturer name,
along with the exact active chemical element as denoted by the ATC (Anatomical Therapeu-
tic Chemical) Classification System.38 This dataset is primarily used for descriptive statistics
and to compute prices and determine when generic prescription drugs were introduced.
IMA. The second dataset is provided by the InterMutualistic Agency (IMA), a joint
research venture created by several mutual funds, that augments the Farmanet data described
above with patient identifiers that I use to merge on patient-specific zip code, demographics,
healthcare information and vital statistics.39 I randomly sample 300 physicians, select all
patients they see between January 2004 and December 2009 that are over 35 years old in
2006, and obtain the full transaction history of these patients.40
This sampling frame provides three distinct advantages. First, patient-specific anonymized
identifiers consistently track patients over time and across prescriptions, which is crucial to
38The ATC system classifies active ingredients of prescription drugs, and consists of five levels. At the most
detailed level, drugs have the exact same active chemical ingredient. The fourth level suggests therapeutic
equivalence.
39All mutual funds participate in this effort.
40Therefore, the dataset contains both prescriptions written by physicians that are part of the 3% random
sample, and physicians that are not part of this random sample but were seen by the patients in question.
This sampling frame was, in part, motivated by proportionality requirements put forward by the privacy
review that set forward a maximum number of patients that could be part of the study. The physicians in
the IMA dataset cannot be linked to the physicians in the NIHDI dataset.
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identify patients that are prescribed a prescription drug for the first time and get a full
picture of patients’ prescription profile (e.g. the number of different prescription drugs a
patient is taking). Second, it allows me to describe detailed prescription profiles of patients
incorporating information from all prescriptions and visits, even when physicians are not
part of the original 3% random sample. Third, I can measure the impact on, among others,
healthcare expenditures or number of days the person was incapacitated for work, and can
take into account a rich set of demographics (such as whether the person is part of a one-
person household or receives welfare) or regional information using the NIS code (which is
roughly comparable to a US zip code).
Limitations. Both datasets, however, exhibit some limitations that are worth noting.
First, the data cover prescriptions that are filled and dispensed at pharmacies, not all that
are written. Therefore, the transaction data only provide a proxy of the actual prescription
behavior. Second, hospital pharmacies and drugs that are not covered by health insurance
are not included in the dataset. Third, while most patients are prescribed their first chronic
prescription drugs at older ages, the sampling frame does not include patients that are
prescribed chronic drugs at early ages (i.e. under 35 years old).41
Additional data. Finally, I hand-collect several additional datasets with detailed prod-
uct information at the product barcode level. A first dataset collects product details such
as ATC code, manufacturer, number of daily doses per pack, number of pills, strength of
the pill, and mode of administration. A second dataset was hand-collected and provides the
exact date of introduction of all prescription drugs in Belgium. This information is available
for prescription drugs with differences in dosage, method of administration, active chemical
and manufacturer. A third, and final dataset, differentiates between two types of generics:
“copies” and generics. The latter refers to standard generic prescription drugs, that differ
in inactive ingredients and are therefore tested rigorously before making it onto the market.
The former are exact copies of the brand name drugs, based on the specific manufacturing
41Given the age restriction, this study will not focus on anticonceptive prescription drugs.
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process of the brand name manufacturer. As a result, they require less extensive testing and
documentation.
1.3.1 Defining Starters and Patient Profiles
I compute several measures that capture the disease and risk profile of the patient re-
ceiving a prescription. First, I define starters as patients that have been using an active
ingredient for 3 months or less, as patients typically refill their prescription drugs every 2
months (see below).42 Second, I compute a polypharmacy measure that counts the number
of prescription drugs the patient regularly takes.43
Third, I describe how well a patient follows the prescriptions of a physician by computing
an adherence measure. Specifically, I compute the ratio of the number of daily doses pre-
scribed in a transaction by the number of days between the current and the next prescription
fill, which is formally written out in equation 1.1, where j indexes the patient, p indexes the





An adherence measure below one suggests the patient does not follow the prescriptions as
ordered, where a measure of one reflects perfect adherence.45
42Figure A.9 in appendix A.2.4 discusses censoring issues when using this definition in the data: it is
impossible to distinguish between starters and longstanding patients in the first three months of the dataset.
Therefore, I only employ this definition for starters after April 2004, and denote all transactions in the first
three months of 2004 as written for longstanding patients.
43The specific measure is the number of different ATCs the patient takes in 2004. I restrict to active
ingredients of which the patient picks up a minimum of 100 daily doses in 2004, and visits a pharmacy for
this specific prescription drug at least on three different dates in that year – this to exclude small one-time
medications that are not taken regularly. This polypharmacy measure is computed using prescriptions across
all physicians (not only the core sample).
44I compute this difference in days at the patient by active ingredient level.
45I correct for some outliers, and only compute this measure if there are at least (most) 7 (500) days
between filling. Adherence measures for patients who were prescribed large daily dosage amounts (over 200
daily doses) were also set to missing.
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1.3.2 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
Sample Selection. The IMA dataset consists of 6,440,115 dispensed transactions that
are written by the core sample of 300 physicians for 152,589 patients that are at least 35
years old in 2006. The full dataset, containing other physicians these patients see, consists of
25,449,736 dispensed transactions and covers 44,872 physicians. Further details on sample
selection and statistics on merging are discussed in Appendix A.2.1. The NIHDI dataset
contains 42,398,960 transactions. The primary use of this dataset is to compute the full
price that is paid for a prescription drug to a pharmaceutical company, along with the copay
and the reimbursement. Details on sample selection are reported in Appendix A.2.2.
Descriptive Statistics. This section describes key features of patients and physicians in
the analysis sample. Table 1.2 compares the overall physician population in Belgium (column
one and two) to the physicians in the NIHDI dataset (column three and four) and the IMA
dataset (column five and six). Overall, physicians in the IMA and NIHDI datasets are
comparable and representative of the wider physician population.46 On average, physicians
in the baseline year (2004) are about 45 years old with about 20 years of experience. About
three out of four physicians in the sample is male. The baseline prescription rate of generics
is 12.2 percent, while it is 17.2 percent for cheap drugs.
Table 1.3 describes the IMA prescription dataset in 2004. The left panel covers all
dispensed prescription drugs, while the right panel focuses on active ingredients for which a
generic equivalent was available. Physicians prescribe an on-patent prescription drug (that
has no generic equivalent) about half of the time. Prescription drugs intended to treat
chronic conditions make up the bulk of transactions (about 75 to 80% for both off-patent
and on-patent prescriptions).47 A typical patient receiving a prescription drug is about 65
years of age and slightly more likely to be female. About one transaction in four is intended
46The total number of daily doses in the IMA sample is lower, as patients under 35 years old are not
included.
47I determine whether an active ingredient is a chronic drug using the classification suggested by Huber
et al. (2013).
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for a patient on an increased reimbursement schedule, one transaction in seven is intended
for a starter. A prescription typically covers about 45 DDDs or approximately a 1.5 month
supply. Patients refill their prescriptions just over every month and a half. Adherence
therefore centers around 1, and a patient takes, on average, about 3.5 active ingredients on
a regular basis.48
Baseline Prescription Behavior of Physicians. Physicians exhibit variation in the
prescription rate of generics, as highlighted in Figure 1.3. As is often documented in the
literature, differences in patient characteristics or disease profiles do not explain this vari-
ation. Appendix A.3.1 documents these findings in more detail. Appendix A.3.1 also doc-
uments that a physician prescribing high levels of generics for one prescription drug does
not necessarily prescribe high rates of generics for another prescription drug. In fact, the
within-physician correlation of the prescription rate across prescription drugs is typically in
the 0.2-0.4 range.
1.3.3 Descriptive Evidence on the MPR
Figure 1.3 shows the (smoothed) distribution of prescription rates of generics in 2004
(before the announcement of the mandate) and in 2006 (after the introduction of the policy
mandate). It shows a clear shift towards a higher prescription rate of generics. Appendix
A.3.2 discusses the distribution of generic prescription rates in more detail, and shows that
physicians primarily increased the use of generic prescription drugs where they were prescrib-
ing low shares in 2004. Furthermore, Appendix A.3.1 also shows that the prescription rate of
generics was relatively stable between 2000 and 2004, with a sudden increase in 2005-2006.
In Figure 1.4, I investigate this further by zooming in on the fraction of generic drugs
prescribed to starters and the switching rate of brand name drugs to generic drugs for long-
48There are three reasons for the missing values in adherence measures. First, these are not computed for
prescription drugs intended for non-chronic conditions. Second, the first time a chronic patient shows up
in the data, no adherence measure can be computed, as the previous date cannot be observed in the data.
Relatedly, the measure exhibits many outliers in the first three months, that are therefore excluded. Finally,
there are additional restrictions described above.
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standing patients.49 The upper panel shows the overall effect for starters (Figure 1.4a) and
longstanding patients (Figure 1.4b). In both graphs, the prescription rates are stable before
the announcement of the mandate and exhibit an increase after the mandate is announced.
The prescription rate for starters remains high after the mandate goes into effect, while the
rate of switching longstanding patients from brand name to generic goes up in response to
the mandate, and returns to its initial levels after about a year. Additionally, the switching
rate from generic to brand name drugs is stable for chronic longstanding patients, suggesting
that physicians did not decide to switch patients back from generic to brand name drugs
after the mandate was announced.
The lower panel of Figure 1.4 breaks these graphs down by physicians far from and close
to the threshold (I refer to these as “low” and “high” prescribers respectively). Specifically,
a low prescriber’s prescription rate of generics in 2004 was in the bottom quartile of the
distribution of generic prescription rates in 2004, while high prescribers had one in the top
quartile.50 The graphs display stable prescription and switching rates before the mandate is
announced, supporting the common trends among high and low prescribers. Furthermore,
they also display a narrowing of the gap between high and low prescribers.
1.4 Reduced Form Evidence on the introduction of MPR
The descriptive evidence above suggests that the mandate was effective in changing the
prescription behavior of physicians, but it is silent on whether this changed the quality of
drugs that were prescribed and why physicians might treat starters and chronic longstanding
patients differently. This section exploits the quasi-experimental variation of the mandate
and provides reduced form evidence on four key research questions that, taken together, help
to understand how important physician bias and patient considerations are.
49I again focus on the choice within active ingredients for which a generic is available before the mandate
is announced.
50The physicians in the middle are therefore dropped.
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1.4.1 Do Physicians Switch to Generics?
I estimate the treatment effect of the law on the fraction of generics prescribed for non-





βτ I{q(t)− q(t∗) = τ}+ δip + φXijpt + εijpt (1.2)
The outcome variable gijpt is an indicator that takes on value one if a generic is prescribed
by physician i for chemical p in period t for patient j, and value zero if not. I run these
regressions separately for non-chronic drugs, chronic starters, and chronic longstanding pa-
tients. The indicators I{q(t) − q(t∗) = τ} are quarter-level fixed effects that capture the
average prescription rate of generics just before and after the announcement of the mandate
in quarter q(t∗) (the third quarter of 2005). The coefficients on indicators βτ capture the
dynamic time path of the fraction of generics prescribed conditional on a set of controls
Xijpt and physician by chemical fixed effects δip. Allowing for physicians to exhibit different
biases across different prescription drugs makes sense, given the descriptive evidence of base-
line prescription behavior presented in section 1.3.3. As a full set quarter fixed effects are
perfectly collinear, I leave out indicator of the announcement month q(t∗) to normalize the
coefficients to the announcement of the mandate. The identifying assumption for this model
to capture the causal effect of the mandate and εipt to be an idiosyncratic error term, is that
there are no contemporaneous changes in prescribing behavior at the time of the policy that
are not caused by the policy. Standard errors are clustered at the physician level to allow
for arbitrary correlation across observations at the physician level.
I include the price differential between generic and multisource drugs and an indicator
variable for the gender of the patients. The price differential is the copay for a daily dose, and
is calculated at the active ingredient by month level.52 Additionally, I include an indicator
51The results for non-chronic drugs are included in appendix A.3.
52Prices are typically set at the monthly level. I calculate the average price (defined as copay per daily
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that takes on value one if the person is on an increased reimbursement plan and an interaction
between this indicator and the price differential to test for differences in price sensitivity
across these two different patient groups. I run these regressions separately for chronic
starters and longstanding patients.
The βτ coefficients from regression 1.2 along with their cluster-robust 95% confidence in-
tervals are shown in Figure 1.5. They suggest that the prescription rate of generics increased
by about 10 percentage points for chronic starters, but only by about 1 to 2 percentage points
for chronic longstanding patients. For chronic starters, the effect persists well beyond the
introduction of the mandate. The prescription rate of generics among longstanding chronic
patients, however, only increases by about one percentage point, an effect that only lasts for
about a year. The prescription rates are relatively stable before the announcement of the
mandate. There is some anticipation in the quarter before the exact mandate was announced,
likely the result from public discussions in the two months leading up to the mandate.53 I
also obtained additional aggregate pre-data from NIHDI that shows the prescribing behavior
was relatively stable before the policy mandate (see Appendix A.1.2).
These regression results suggest that the mandate resulted in physicians adjusting their
behavior towards prescribing a higher share of generics. The substantial difference in switch-
ing rates between the two types of patients, however, highlights that physicians consider
longstanding patients costlier to switch than chronic starters. This is consistent with other
recent studies investigating prescription behavior of physicians that find treatment decisions
for starters are more prone to respond to physician incentives (Sinkinson and Starc, 2018;
Feng, 2019).
Dose-Response Model. In order to exploit the variation in baseline prescription rates,
I use the distance to the mandated threshold to estimate dose-response models.54 I split
dose) by calculating the average across all products at the active ingredient level, following Iizuka (2012).
53As noted before, it was clear about two or three months before the actual mandate was announced that
a minimum percentage would be mandated, even though the exact percentages were still being discussed
between key stakeholders such as the NIHDI and the Order of Physicians.
54Difference-in-Difference models are not appropriate in this setting, as most physicians had prescription
rates well below the threshold, leaving few control units. Furthermore, those physicians above the threshold
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physicians into “high” and “low” prescribers based on their baseline prescription rate of
cheap drugs, and use the median as a cutoff (i.e. physician above the median are “high”
prescribers and vice versa). As before, physicians are indexed by i, patients by j, active
ingredients by p and time by t. Standard errors are clustered at the physician level.
gijpt = β1Postt + β2Postt ×Highi + δip + δm(t) + φXijpt + εijpt (1.3)
The results for these Dose-Response model are reported in table 1.5 and highlight that physi-
cians further from the threshold indeed respond by prescribing higher shares of generics for
patients, both for chronic starters and longstanding patients. Furthermore, most switching
among longstanding patients happens among physicians that are further from the threshold,
which will be a useful result that will be exploited below.
Robustness Checks. One possible concern is that patients respond to the mandate by
changing their physicians when these physicians start prescribing higher levels of generics.
I show in Appendix A.2 that such physician shopping is not a concern when examining the
data.
The empirical strategy in this section assumes physicians exhibit biases at the chemical
level, and considers patients as chronic starters when they switch the active ingredient they
use. In Appendix A.2, I show that the results are robust to including physician by therapeutic
fixed effects (rather than physician by chemical ones).55 Changes to the definition of starters
also do not substantively change the results. For instance, changing the 90-day window to 60
or 120 days does not change results, nor does defining chronic starters at the therapeutic level
rather than at the active ingredient level. I also exploit the physician response to non-chronic
prescription drugs as a robustness check, as prescription decisions for non-chronic drugs are
essentially very similar to those for starters. In appendix A.2, I confirm that the mandate
response is indeed very similar across both prescription types. I also show that allowing for
faced some uncertainty over their prescription rates for the reasons mentioned in section 1.2.3.
55This is not surprising, as the vast majority of important prescription drug groups (e.g. statins or ACE
inhibitors) over the sample period are dominated by one single off-patent active ingredient.
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flexible patient demographic controls does not alter the magnitude of the findings in this
section.
1.4.2 Do Physicians Move Away from On-Patent Drugs?
While the results above provide clear evidence that physicians switched to generic drugs
for chronic starters, this result alone does not provide conclusive evidence that physicians
exhibit bias. If the mandate induced physicians to switch from on-patent drugs to generic
off-patent drugs, patients are now less likely to receive newer treatments that are possibly
superior. If on-patent drugs are more effective or result in fewer side effects, the mandate
has then lowered patient welfare. In order to test whether the mandate caused physicians
to switch from on-patent drugs to generics, I use an empirical specification similar in spirit
to Equation 1.2. It tests whether physicians, when deciding on a therapeutic class of drugs
c (e.g. beta blockers or diuretics) were more likely to choose those active ingredients that




βτ I{q(t)− q(t∗) = τ}+ δic + φXijct + εijct (1.4)
The variable OnPatentijct is an indicator that takes on value one if physician i prescribes
a on-patent drug for patient j at time t, and zero if not. The subscript c indexes the
therapeutic class, therefore the variation exploited is the choice for an on-patent or off-
patent active ingredient within a therapeutic class. The coefficients βτ in this regression
capture the dynamic time path of the fraction of multisource drugs prescribed conditional
on a set of controls Xijpt and physician by therapeutic class fixed effects δic. The vector of
controls includes the price differential between on-patent and off-patent active ingredients
and indicator for female patients. As before, standard errors are clustered at the physician
level.
The βτ coefficients along with their cluster-robust 95% confidence intervals are shown
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in Figure 1.6a. First, I restrict the analysis to salient and important therapeutic classes
that are not part of the “Other” product category in table 1.1. The event study coefficients
suggest that the mandate had little effect on the prescription rate of on-patent prescription
drugs. If anything, it trended up slightly over the analysis period.
Second, I include therapeutic classes that fall under the “Other” product category, and
find suggestive evidence that some new (patented) prescription drugs entered the market in
2006 in lesser-used therapeutic classes, as I now document a small and sudden increase. One
might therefore worry that low prescribers – that were further from the threshold – did not
adopt these on-patent prescription drugs at the same rate as high prescribers. Therefore, I
run equation 1.4 separately for high and low prescribers. Figure 1.6b suggests that are no
discernible differences in how high and low prescribers adopt on-patent drugs: they both
exhibit a similar, increasing proclivity over time to prescribe on-patent drugs.
Robustness Checks. I provide additional evidence that physicians did not compromise
on the quality of dispensed drugs using a range of other product characteristics (discussed in
Appendix A.4). Physicians did not decrease their use of extended release versions, change the
administration method (which may interfere with how people absorb the active ingredient),
or adjust the potency of the prescription. Additionally, there is a subset of drugs that have
a Narrow Therapeutic Index, which means small changes in dosage or absorption can have
large effects on effectiveness or side effects. I again find no evidence that physicians responded
to the mandate on this margin. In other words, the quality of dispensed prescription drugs
was not affected by the introduction of the policy mandate. Allergies to inactive ingredients
(also known as excipients) can also not explain these results, as allergies to them are rare
and idiosyncratic.56
Taken together, these results suggest that the low initial prescription rates of generics in
56See Kelso (2014) and Page and Etherton-Beer (2017) for reviews. Recent research does suggest more
attention should be given to allergies and excipients as they are often not reported on prescription drug
ingredient lists. (Reker et al., 2019b). Additionally, given the low initial prescription rate of generics, the
mandate might have resulted in better patient matches to excipients, as patients now get a wider mix of
possible prescription drugs.
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2004 are driven by physician biases or habits. Physicians opted to not prescribe a generic
when choosing an off-patent drug, but rather prescribed the more expensive off-patent brand
name drug. They also did not compromise on a range of other product characteristics.
1.4.3 Is Switching Longstanding Patients Costly for Health Outcomes?
The results in section 1.4.1 illustrated that physicians consider it less costly to prescribe
a generic for a chronic starter, than to prescribe a generic for a longstanding patient who has
been using a brand name drug. This section leverages the quasi-experimental design of the
mandate to investigate whether switching a patient’s prescription drug comes at a health
cost. In order to asses the cost of switching a prescription drug, one could run the following
regression, where I use some outcome variable for patient j taking prescription drug p at
time t.
Outcomejpt = α + βSwitchjpt + εjpt (1.5)
However, results from estimating equation 1.5 using an OLS estimator will likely bias the
estimate of β, as the identifying assumption E[εjptSwitchjpt] = 0 is likely not met. Patients
that can cope with a switch more easily and are not as easily confused, exhibit a residual
error εjpt that is above (below) zero, and are more likely to be switched. If these determinants
are unobservable to the econometrician, this induces endogeneity and omitted variable bias
that understates the effect of switching on health outcomes.
The health outcome of interest in my specification is medication adherence, as measured
in equation 1.1, which measures how well a patient follows the treatment plan prescribed by
the physician. Changes in this measure are associated with substantial changes in the risk
of hospitalization and increased health care costs (Sokol et al., 2005). This outcome is also
a first order concern of physicians in the use of prescription drugs and correlational evidence
suggests that it is negatively impacted by switching (Kesselheim et al., 2014).
In order to estimate the causal effect of switching a patient’s prescription drugs on health
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outcomes, I exploit the quasi-experimental variation induced by the mandate in an Instru-
mental Variables (IV) framework. In particular, I split the sample in physicians that are
close and far away from the threshold. As shown in the reduced form section, physicians far
from the threshold are more likely to switch longstanding patients from a brand-name drug
to a generic drug in response to the mandate. I then instrument the probability of being
switched using differences in the type of physician a patient sees (close or far away from the
threshold). As a result, the full estimating equation therefore can be written as
Adherencejpt = α + βSwitchjpt + δpt + γxjt + εjpt (1.6)
where the outcome of interest is medication adherence at time t for patient j taking pre-
scription drug p. Active ingredient by month fixed effects control for level differences across
active ingredients, and differences in the availability or use of boxes of different size over
time.57 A vector of patient-level observable characteristics xjt is also controlled for.
IV Assumptions. The three key assumptions I maintain for the IV estimation, are the
exclusion restriction, the relevance condition, and the monotonicity assumption. The latter
two are motivated by the reduced form evidence. The exclusion restriction imposes that
switching only affects medication adherence through the switch, and not through the type
of physician patients see, i.e. physicians closer to the threshold are not “better” at switching
their patients without affecting their medication adherence. This assumption is maintained
for the analysis, and investigated in the interpretation of the results.
1.4.4 2SLS Results
I estimate the Instrumenal Variable regressions using a 2 Stage Least Squares (2SLS)
and report the results in Table 1.6. The upper panel shows the results from the full sample
57The use of these fixed effects exploits cross-sectional variation in physicians that are close to or far from
the threshold. Not controlling for idiosyncratic changes at the monthly level would easily overstate the effect
of medication adherence, as the probability of switching (which is in the denominator of the Wald estimator)
is relatively small (physicians typically switch longstanding patients at differential rates of about 1 to 2
percentage points).
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where I split up patients by whether their physician is in the top or bottom median of
prescribing generics in 2004. The lower panel shows the results from a sample where I split
up patients by whether their physician is in the top or bottom quarter of prescribing generics
in 2004 (and drop the middle). Employing the full analysis sample has the added value of
using more data and obtaining more precise estimates, whereas the restricted sample has
the added value of a starker contrast between high and low prescribers.
The first two columns of the upper panel report the coefficients on the switching indicator
from estimating equation 1.6 using an OLS estimator. The first column controls for patient
and product characteristics, while the second column controls for patient characteristics
and active ingredient by month fixed effects. The estimates are fairly similar across both
specifications. Focusing on the OLS coefficient in column 2, the coefficient estimate suggests
that a patient who normally refills their prescription every two months, will take about 2.5
months to refill their prescription after being switched.
Columns 3 and 4 provide IV estimates of equation 1.6 using 2SLS, and where I use two
strategies that exploit the quasi-experimental variation of the mandate to instrument for
whether a patient is switched or not. Column 3 interacts an indicator taking on value one if
the patient sees a physician far from or close to the threshold and indicator for quarters after
the mandate is announced. Column 4 interacts the physician type with a post indicator.
Both columns include an interaction between an indicator taking on value one when the
mandate is announced and zero if not, and an indicator indicating whether a patient was
prescribed a generic during the previous visit. The first stage F-tests are well above the
suggested critical values (Staiger and Stock, 1997). In order to ensure weak instruments are
detected, I follow Kleibergen and Paap (2006) and allow for arbitrary correlations at the
patient level and obtain a robust F test statistic.
The estimated coefficients using an IV strategy (Column 3 and 4) highlight that the
causal effect of switching is about -0.3, suggesting the causal effect of switching a patient’s
prescription drugs on their medication adherence is substantially more negative than the OLS
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estimate that is biased upwards. This suggests that physicians target patients that are likely
to benefit (or, at least, suffer less negative consequences) from switching prescription drugs.
The coefficient magnitude suggests that a patient typically refilling every two months, would
take about three months to refill their prescription after being switched from one prescription
drug to another.
The estimated effects reported in column 3 and 4 are contemporaneous. Therefore, I
explore whether these effects persist by looking at the effect of switching on future medication
adherence. Overall, the estimates suggest that the negative effect of switching a patients’
prescription drugs is short-lived and does not persist in the future. Figure 1.7 provides a
graphical overview. The evidence therefore suggests that there is an initiation cost to moving
a patient to a new prescription drug.
These IV results warrant four short remarks. First, comparing OLS and IV estimates
suggest that physicians take the drop in medication adherence into account and seek out
patients that stand to benefit from a switch. Interpreting results through a Local Average
Treatment Effect framework suggests these results likely understate the Average Treatment
Effect.58 Second, the similarity of IV estimates across panels A and B supports the exclusion
restriction: high prescribers do not exhibit a comparative advantage in switching patients’
prescription drugs. As physicians play a limited role in how patients use their prescription
drugs at home, this is reasonable. This result is also useful in interpreting welfare effects
when considering counterfactual policies, as welfare effects do not depend on the type of
physician patients see.
Third, several factors impact medication adherence. Their lower cost makes it easier
for patients to follow their treatment plan, but switching may also result in mistrust and
confusion. I therefore estimate the net effect of switching on medication adherence. The
negative effect suggest that mistrust and confusion dominate, and is in line with other
research. Financial costs, while important, are not unlikely to be mentioned as an crucial
58Both the contemporaneous and the persistence effects may be understated, as the policy mandate may
result in physicians paying more attention to adherence and a better follow-up with their patients.
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reason for medication non-adherence in the EU.59 Finally, the results are consistent with
a change in actual adherence, with patients decreasing the number of pills they refill (and
take). Persistent side effects or quality differences fail to explain the short-lived effects. I also
address the concern that patients may have stockpiled pills in the past, and now use their
stock before refilling their new generic prescriptions. I show that the drop in medication
adherence does not depend on whether the patient was exhibited high or low medication
adherence before the mandate, with the details reported in Appendix A.3.6.
1.4.5 Which Longstanding Patients are Costly to Switch?
The results in section 1.4.3 show that switching a patient’s prescription drug decreases
medication adherence, and suggest that physicians take this behavior into account. In this
section, I investigate heterogeneity in which patients physicians decide to switch. In other
words, who are the compliers in this setting?
I start with a simple parametric regression that pools starters and longstanding patients.
In particular, I use the following regression framework
gijpt = α1Sjpt + α2Ljpt + β1Sjpt × Postt + β2Postt + δip + φXijpt + εijpt (1.7)
where, as before, i indexes the physician. Recall that gijpt indicates whether patient j
receives a generic for product p. Variable Sjpt is an indicator taking on value one if patient
j is a chronic starter for active ingredient j at time t, whereas Ljpt indicates longstanding
patients. Indicator Postt switches on once the mandate is announced.
60 Thus, this regression
framework pools the split-sample regressions from Equation 1.2 and imposes a parametric
assumption on the treatment effect for starters and longstanding patients. Parameters α1
59Morgan and Lee (2017) provide cross-country survey evidence. In the EU, only 1.6 and 4% of patients
report financial costs as reason for low medication adherence. While the copay gap between branded and
generic drugs in the US is typically larger than in the EU, only 16.3% of US patients mention financial costs
as a primary reason for non-adherence.
60In order to match the reduced form evidence from section 1.4.1 I set Postt to be one throughout for
starters, and Postt to switch on between months 18 and 36 for chronic longstanding (β2). For notational
simplicity, however, I use Postt for both.
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and α2 capture the average prescription rate of generics for starters and chronic longstanding
patients before the mandate is announced respectively, while parameters β1 and β2 capture
the increased prescription rate for generics after the mandate is announced for chronic starters
and longstanding patients respectively. Interacting the Postts × Ljpt indicator with various
patient-level demographics then provides evidence on which patients are more likely to be
switched after the mandate is announced. The parametric assumption, that assumes a level
shift for both starters and longstanding patients is supported by the reduced form evidence
in section 1.4.1. Standard errors are clustered at the patient level.
I primarily focus on three patient characteristics: the amount of time a longstanding
patient has been using a drug (“user experience”), the number of prescription drugs a pa-
tient is using (“polypharmacy”), and age. The first characteristic primarily tests whether
patients exhibit endogenous brand loyalty, as patients using a drug for a longer time might
be unwilling to switch.61 The second and third characteristic are expected to be predictive
of switching in response to the mandate if physicians worry about a decrease in medication
adherence.
The results of these regressions are reported in Table 1.7 and Figure 1.8. The results
suggest that compliers are mostly younger patients using few prescription drugs, as older
patients using multiple prescription drugs are less likely to be switched in response to the
mandate. I find evidence of immediate lock-in effects, but do not find evidence that user
experience predicts an increase in switching in response to the mandate among longstanding
patients. A more detailed discussion is also available in appendix A.3.7.
One concern with these results is that the parametric restrictions are driving the results.
I address this concern by relying on non-linear machine learning methods to see whether
these predictors also hold up when we allow for more flexible parametric restrictions. In
particular, I use regression tree and random forest models.62 Whereas the actual decision
61Bronnenberg, Dubé and Gentzkow (2012) discuss endogenous brand loyalty. Exogenous brand loyalty is
unlikely to play a major role in Belgium as DCTA for prescription drugs is not allowed and brand awareness
is low.
62LASSO regressions would be another feature selection model that could be used. However, LASSO
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rules are difficult to back out from these models, both feature selection methods provide
estimates of how important the different variables are in predicting the outcome of interest.
The specific results are discussed in Appendix A.3.8, but confirm the results of the parametric
regressions.
Taken together, the results from the parametric regressions and feature selection methods
suggest that age and polypharmacy are important determinants of whether a physician
switches a patient’s prescription drugs or not. As a patient takes more prescription drugs, it
may be more difficult to keep track of which pill to take (e.g. because of changes in the look
of the pill). Older patients may be more easily confused when their prescription drugs are
switched and the appearance of their prescription drugs change. Duration of use (which may
indicate brand loyalty) seems to be less important. A parsimonious model may therefore
primarily focus on polypharmacy and age as important sources of heterogeneity in patient
considerations.
1.4.6 Discussion of Reduced Form Results
This section presented four key facts that suggest physician bias and patient considera-
tions are both important. On the one hand, physicians increase their generic prescription
rate for chronic starters without moving away from on-patent drugs or compromising the
quality of for these patients. Thus, physicians exhibit a bias towards prescribing brand name
drugs without therapeutic justification and physician bias plays a role.
On the other hand, the substantial difference in switching between chronic starters and
longstanding patients suggests physicians consider the latter costlier to switch. The change
in switching rates (in response to the mandate) is relatively lower for older patients using
multiple prescription drugs, which is suggestive evidence that the reluctance to switch long-
regressions typically still impose fairly strong linear assumptions and are useful in scenarios where a large
number of features (or regressors) is available. In my specific scenario, I am particularly interested in non-
linearities in the decision-making process of physicians. Furthermore, regression trees and random forests do
not require me to bin the age and polypharmacy variables. As a result, the number of features (regressors)
are therefore manageable, making regression trees and random forests an excellent model to use in my specific
context.
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standing patients is – at least in part – driven by risks of confusing patients and negative
interactions with other prescription drugs, rather than by brand loyalty. I complement this
suggestive evidence with causal estimates of the effect of switching on medication adherence,
where I document that switching a longstanding patient indeed seems to have (short-lived)
effects on medication adherence.
In order to quantify the importance of these two different sources of persistence, put a
monetary value on these switching costs, or analyze the welfare effects of introducing different
policies aimed at promoting the use of generics, it is necessary to set up a structural model
of prescription behavior that allow me to recover the key primitives of the model. I turn to
this in the next section.
1.5 A Structural Model of Prescription Behavior under the MPR
Mandate
This section develops a structural model of static prescription decisions by physicians
facing the MPR incentive scheme. I motivate the key modeling assumptions by relying on
the reduced form results and the institutional features of the Belgian healthcare market.
The goal of the model is to twofold: on the one hand, quantify the importance of patient
considerations, and, on the other hand, strip out these patient considerations to recover the
levels of bias before the introduction of the mandate. In a first step, I consider a discrete
choice model of a physician’s prescription behavior, building on the work of Hellerstein
(1998). In a second step, I model the introduction of the MPR, show how it creates a trade-
off for physicians between the cost of adjusting their own bias and the cost of switching a
patient, and highlight how the model allows me to map differences in prescription rates into
patient considerations. This can then be used to recover levels of physician bias before and
after the introduction of the mandate.
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1.5.1 Set-up
The healthcare market consists of a set of physicians I, indexed by i, who prescribe
different prescription drugs indexed by p. During period t, each physician sees a set of
patients Jipt indexed by j. As is standard, I assume the physician is the decision maker.
This physician diagnoses what active ingredient a patient needs, and, if this active ingredient
is off-patent, then decides between a multisource or generic drug. I do not model the choice
for active ingredient, as the reduced form results highlighted that physicians did not adjust
their prescription rate of on-patent drugs: therefore, physicians faced costs to switch from
brand name drugs to generics within chemical, not across chemicals.63 For simplicity, I
consider the simple binary decision between a brand-name and generic drug, and do not
model product choice within generics.64 If physician i chooses a generic drug for patient j
at time t for a product group p, then the indicator gijpt takes on value 1, and 0 if not.
1.5.2 The physician’s prescription decision
1.5.2.1 Utility for Starters
As a starting point, I focus on the utility of a chronic starter, i.e. a patient who is
prescribed a prescription drug for the first time. Following other work in this literature, I
allow a physician to derive utility from prescribing a certain prescription drug (and term
this physician bias), and allow her to take into account patient utility (Hellerstein, 1998;
Dickstein, 2011a; Iizuka, 2012). At time t, physician i decides to prescribe a product p for
patient j, deciding between a branded and generic drug. As a result, I assume physician
63Nevertheless, the chemical choice is an important margin that has been studied in numerous papers:
Crawford and Shum (2005) and Dickstein (2011a) provide models for how physicians would diagnose and
learn about patient-drug match across chemicals.
64Typically, multiple generic alternatives are available for an active ingredient, especially for the more
standard prescription drugs (such as beta blockers, ACE inhibitors, etc.). However, markets are mostly
dominated by one or two manufacturers.
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where k ∈ {B,G} (1.8)
I model patient utility as a linear function of the copay ckpt with the coefficient αj capturing
the price sensitivity of the physician. Motivated by the reduced form evidence, I allow the
price sensitivity to depend on patient characteristics.65
The term ξkip0 captures the utility physician i derives from one particular prescription
drug type (brand-name or generic) and is modeled in a reduced form way as is standard in
the literature (Hellerstein, 1998). If ξBip0 > ξ
G
ip0, physicians prefer to prescribe a brand-name
rather than a generic drug, resulting in a higher likelihood that the physician will prescribe
a brand-name drug even though a cheaper but equally effective product is available. This
creates agency issues analyzed by Hellerstein (1998) and Iizuka (2012). In line with the
reduced form section, I refer to ξip0 ≡ ξBip0 − ξGip0 > 0 as physician bias.66
I allow for idiosyncratic shocks εkijpt, such as person-specific idiosyncratic allergies to a
specific excipient or temporary shortages at the local pharmacy, to drive differential choices
holding copay and physician bias fixed.67 These idiosyncratic shocks follow the standard
type I Extreme-Value distribution.
65One can interpret αj as ω×α∗j where α∗j represents the patient’s “true” price sensitivity and ω represents
the weight a physician puts on the patient’s utility. If ω = 0, the physician does not take into account the
patient’s utility and is not altruistic, if γ → ∞, the physician only cares about the patient’s utility and
is fully altruistic. Hellerstein (1998) and Dickstein (2011a) model it this way, but highlight identification
challenges. As a result, I simply interpret αj as the price sensitivity of a physician to the price a patient
pays.
66This utility differential could be the result of habits, detailing (or marketing to physician by represen-
tatives) by pharmaceutical companies, preferences, or other underlying mechanisms that are not specifically
modeled here.
67While excipients are typically inactive ingredients for the majority of patients, certain people may have
allergic reactions to excipients such as peanut oil (Reker et al., 2019b).
36
1.5.2.2 Introducing Switching Costs
The reduced form evidence clearly demonstrated that PCPs take into account whether the
patient was previously prescribed a brand-name or prescription drug when making a decision
for a longstanding patient. I model these patient considerations as an instantaneous switching
cost the physician incurs upon moving a patient from a brand name to a generic drug CB→Gjpt
or upon moving a patient from a generic to a brand name drug CG→Bjpt .
68 Such switching costs
can be the result of pushback from patients or the risk of decreasing medication adherence
when switching longstanding patients. As patient j’s status between chronic starter and
longstanding can change over time, these switching costs are index by j and t. While I allow
for this switching cost to depend on the type of drug a patient is switched to, the goal of
this study will be to estimate CB→Gjpt .
69
I incorporate these patient considerations by describing the value function for physician
i making a prescription drug choice for patient j who needs a prescription drug in product
group p at time t, where the physician takes the previous choice k′ ∈ {B,G} for this patient
as a predetermined state variable. Physicians now do not only consider the instantaneous
utility U(G) and U(B), which depend on the vector of copay levels and physician bias, but
also the cost of switching a patient. I model switching costs to be additively linear. These
switching costs do not depend on i, maintaining the exclusion restriction assumed in section
1.4.3. This gives rise to the following expression for the value function V (k′; cpt, ξip0) where
the vectors cpt and ξip0 contain the copay levels and physician bias for both brand name and
68I model this cost as immediate, with no future costs paid. One could think of this as a Net Present
Value (NPV) of the flow of costs to be paid in the future. Again, an altruism parameter ω indicating the
weight a physician assigns to patient welfare could be included. The same rationale I presented for the price
sensitivity parameter holds here.
69The switching cost CG→Bjpt cannot easily be uncovered using the mandate. However, testing the equality
of these costs is the topic of future work.
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generic drugs.
V (k′; cpt, ξip0) = max{Utility Brand Name,Utility Generic} (1.9)
= max
−αjcBpt + ξBip0 + εBijpt︸ ︷︷ ︸
U(B)
−CG→Bjpt × I{k′ = G}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Switching Cost
,
−αjcGpt + ξGip0 + εGijpt︸ ︷︷ ︸
U(G)
−CB→Gjpt × I{k′ = B}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Switching Cost

It is now possible to write the probability physician i prescribes a generic for patient j and
prescription drug p at time t (i.e. gijpt = 1) as
P (gijpt = 1;gijpt−1, cpt, ξip0) = P (Utility Brand Name < Utility Generic) (1.10)
= P
(
−αjcBpt + ξBip0 + εBijpt − CG→Bjpt × gijpt−1




− αj (cBpt − cGpt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡∆cpt

















−αj∆cpt + γgijpt−t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Observable




< εGijpt − εBijpt︸ ︷︷ ︸
∼ Logit

where gijpt−1 is an indicator equal to one if a generic was chosen during the previous visit
(and zero if not), ∆cpt ≡ cBpt − cGpt and εijpt ≡ εBijpt − εGijpt. I assume, for simplicity, that the






is a constant, although I will discuss and
relax this assumption during the estimation of the model. The final line in equation 1.10
highlights that, if patient considerations are important, it is difficult to separately identify
the importance of physician bias (ξip0) from patient considerations (C
B→G
jpt ): both terms are
unobservable to the econometrician, not idiosyncratic, and persistent over time.
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1.5.2.3 Aggregation
Using the distributional assumption on εkijpt, the fraction of generics that physician i
prescribes for prescription drug p during period t, which I denote by sGipt can now be charac-
terized by aggregating the probabilities at the appropriate level.








−αj∆cpt + γgijpt−t + ξip0 + CB→Gjpt
) (1.11)
where gipt−1 is a vector containing the lagged choice for all |Jipt| patients that physician i
sees at time t for prescription drug p. Finally, these market shares also depend on physician
bias (ξip0) and the vector of copay levels (cpt).
1.5.2.4 Patient Considerations for Chronic Starters
I assume switching costs arise for longstanding patients, or, in other words, that patient
considerations do not factor into decisions for chronic starters, i.e. CG→Bjpt = C
B→G
jpt = 0
for these patients. Three features of the Belgian healthcare market motivate why ex-ante
patient preferences are unlikely to play an important role in this specific setting. First,
the advertising ban for prescription drugs is strictly enforced. As a result, patients are
unlikely to know the name brand-name drug over the name of the generic drugs (Fraeyman
et al., 2015).70 Second, physicians typically make their prescription decision for the initial
choice at the time of diagnosis, making it difficult for the patient to assess whether the
prescription is written for the brand name drug or the generic equivalent at the time of
prescription.71 Third, even if some patients specifically request a brand-name drug at the
time of prescription, the model would capture physicians’ prescription decision as long as
70Furthermore, other European countries have similar bans on advertising for prescription drugs (only
New-Zealand and the United States allow direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription drugs). Healthcare
professionals and researchers in Belgium indeed confirmed patients are not necessarily familiar with the
names of brand name prescription drugs before receiving their first prescriptions.
71If the patient decides to do so afterwards and request a switch to the brand-name drug, the physician
would need to provide a new prescription which comes at a cost (a new physician visit). Again, this is rare
in practice.
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tastes (or distastes) for generics are distributed i.i.d. across physicians. This assumption is
reasonable in this setting, as the advertising ban rules out regional or temporal variation in
advertising that may drive such preferences (Sinkinson and Starc, 2018).72
Furthermore, I assume away (unobserved) quality differences between a brand name
drug and its generic equivalent. The active ingredient of a multisource and generic drug are
identical in terms of product quality, and several studies have documented no substantial
differences between the quality of generics and brand name drugs when used in controlled
environments (Kesselheim et al., 2008; Gagne et al., 2014). While it is possible that patients
are allergic to excipients (the inactive ingredients), such allergies are typically rare and
highly idiosyncratic between patients and can therefore not account for large average quality
differences (Kelso, 2014; Page and Etherton-Beer, 2018).73 Therefore, the difference between
ξBip0 and ξ
G
ip0 represent a physician’s bias towards brand-name drugs.
74
1.5.2.5 Additional Modeling Assumptions
The model is parsimonious, yet leaves sufficient flexibility to capture physician bias and
patient considerations. Furthermore, much of the simplifying assumptions are motivated by
the institutional setting and empirical facts. Yet, some additional modeling decisions deserve
discussion.
Physician Myopia. Physicians are modeled as myopic in prices and only consider
current prices, similar to Handel (2013) and Polyakova (2016). Put differently, prices are
72It, for instance, allows patients to talk to each other about which drugs are brand-name and which are
generics so chronic starters are aware of which type they are receiving at the time of the initial diagnosis, but
does not allow for this to vary systematically across physicians with different prescription rates of generics.
If such tastes are not distributed with a zero mean, this mean cannot be identified from the average level
of physician bias, and the assumption that patient considerations are zero for the initial choice amount to a
normalization.
73Excipients are, among others, the binding agents and coating. Sometimes certain oils (such as peanut
oils) or chemicals can cause allergies. Nevertheless, researchers nevertheless have recently started acknowl-
edging a better understanding of these inactive ingredients would be useful (Reker et al., 2019a).
74Some recent concerns regarding the quality of generics being produced in China or India have been
raised in recent years. However, in the setting I study, production of prescription drugs was by and large
located in Belgium. Additionally, brand name drugs also increasingly outsource their production to India
and China, so it’s unclear whether offshoring really affects the quality of generics as such, or affects the
quality of prescription drugs overall.
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assumed to follow an AR(1) process. Illanes (2016) studies inertia with forward-looking
patients in pension plan decisions in Chile, and finds that not including them may lead to
biased estimates. In this setting, the modeling assumption requires that beliefs about future
changes in the price differential between generics and brand name multisource drugs are not
systematically related differences in baseline physician bias – different beliefs about price
levels are therefore not necessarily problematic. Given a transparent pricing system that is
common knowledge, this assumption therefore seems reasonable.
Prescription Drug History. Similarly, I assume that conditioning on a patient’s pre-
vious prescription decision is sufficient to capture the choice between a generic and a mul-
tisource drug. Past trajectories with longer histories are often found to be quantitatively
important in papers that consider prescription decisions across different chemicals and active
ingredients, where the quality of treatment choices is not necessarily held constant (Craw-
ford and Shum, 2005; Dickstein, 2011a). However, bioequivalence between multisource and
generic drugs makes conditioning on a single previous choice a parsimonious and tractable
assumption.
1.5.3 The MPR Mandate
The section above sets up a parsimonious discrete choice model describing how physicians
choose between brand name and generic drugs when treating a patient and highlighted the
challenges in separately identifying physician bias from patient considerations. This section
models the introduction of the MPR mandate and shows how it introduces a clear tradeoff
for physicians between these two sources of persistence, and how the differences in switching
response across patients can be mapped into patient considerations.
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1.5.3.1 The Minimum Prescription Rate
The fraction of brand-name drugs physician i will prescribe at time t can be written as


















−αj∆cpt + γgijpt−t + ξip0 + CB→Gjpt
) (1.13)
where p indexes the different drugs and ct, git−1 and ξi0 are the vectors containing the
variables cpt, gipt−1 and ξip0 across all prescription drugs.
75 A physician can adjust her bias
ξip0 by some amount aip, incurring some adjustment cost c(aip).
76 Denoting ai as the vector







such that SGi,2006(ct, git−1, ξi0 − ai) ≥ q + ν
The parameter q is the mandated minimum prescription rate (in this case 23%). As detailed
before, it is difficult for physicians to exactly hit this target. The mandate was specified in
DDD – a unit that is not exactly known by physicians – and PCPs can not monitor their
prescription rate throughout the year. Additionally, there was uncertainty about which
drugs were cheap and which drugs would change status from expensive to cheap. As a
result, physicians did not “bunch” on the mandate: the random variable ν captures this
uncertainty as a mean-zero forecasting error independently distributed.
75For simplicity, I abstract away from weighting the decisions by DDD.
76I assume the cost of effort is independent across product group, ie. there are no spillovers across
prescription drugs. If bias is driven by not knowing the name of the generic chemicals, the physician still
needs to look up the name for all separate generics. If a physician believes generics are less effective and
wants to look up which ones are effective, this process again will require work for every separate prescription
drug.
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1.5.3.2 Solution to adjusting physician bias
Before the mandate goes into effect, q = 0 and the constraint does not bind (as the
fraction of generics prescribed cannot be strictly negative). After the mandate goes into
effect, however, q = 0.23 > 0: the restriction binds and (most) PCPs need to exert effort
in order to meet the threshold. A PCP will then adjust her bias by solving a first order








f(−αj∆cpt + γgijpt−1 + ξip0 − a∗ip + ψzjpt) (1.15)
where f(.) is the logit pdf and λ is the shadow value of the constraint for the physician. This
shadow value will be higher for physicians that are far away from the threshold, and smaller
for physicians that are close to meeting the requirement. The effort exerted by physicians is
correlated, but only through the distance from the threshold.
1.5.3.3 The Post-Mandate probability of Prescribing a Generic
It is now possible to combine the demand model and the adjustment induced by the
mandate to describe the probability a generic is prescribed after the mandate is announced.
P (gijpt = 1; gijpt−1, cpt, ξip0−a∗ip) = P
(
−αj∆cpt + γgijpt−t + ξip0 − a∗ip + CB→Gjpt < εGijpt − εBijpt
)
The unique adjustment of PCPs therefore eliminates the concern to directly model the ad-
justment using parametric assumptions on how physicians adjust their prescribing behavior
post-mandate. In contrast, physician bias can be backed out before and after the man-
date, and the difference between these two will then identify a∗ip. Additionally, this is also
crucial in estimating patient considerations after the mandate is announced. I turn to the
identification and estimation strategy in more detail in the following section.
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1.5.4 Identification and Estimation
1.5.4.1 Parameterization
Building on the reduced form evidence presented in section 1.4.5, I model the switching
cost as a linear cost of patient characteristics CB→Gjpt = ψzjpt×Postt. I include the interaction
with a post-indicator, as these patient considerations can only be properly identified after
the announcement of the mandate.
In its simplest form, I assume a fixed cost for longstanding patients, i.e. zjpt is a single
variable LSjpt indicating whether a patient is longstanding (1) or not (0). However, I allow
for heterogeneity in switching costs by introducing age and polypharmacy bins.
Building on the reduced form evidence presented in section 1.4.1, I model the price
sensitivity αj of patient j as a function of whether the patient is longstanding (LSjpt = 1),
and whether the patient receives an increased reimbursement (IRjt = 1). In particular,
αj = α1 + α2LSjpt + α3IRjt + α4IRjt × LSjpt = αXCjpt (1.16)
The coefficient α1 here captures the price sensitivity of chronic starters, while α1+α2 captures
the price sensitivity of longstanding patients. Coefficients α3 and α4 capture the additional
price sensitivity for patients on an increased reimbursement plan.
I include a set of control variables. Motivated by the theoretical section, I include an
indicator whether the patient was prescribed a generic during the previous visit (gijpt−1).
However, I also include the vector of patient characteristics zjpt as these could introduce
omitted variable bias if not included in the structural regression. Finally, I also include an
indicator for whether the patient is on an increased reimbursement plan. As a result, the set
of control variables takes the form
βxijpt = γgijpt−1 + β1IRjt + β2zjpt (1.17)
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1.5.4.2 Identification and Normalization
Motivated by the reduced form results, my model incorporates unobserved heterogeneity
of physicians (physician bias) and patient-level switching costs (patient considerations). A
large literature dating back to Heckman (1981) has discussed the challenges of disentangling
unobserved heterogeneity from switching costs.77. Farrell and Klemperer (2007) discuss
different specific empirical examples and highlight the challenge in finding micro-data where
initial choices can be compared to choices affected by switching costs.
In this specific setting, I therefore exploit the prescription behavior of physicians across
two sets of patients: chronic longstanding patients who are on branded drugs and chronic
starters. The former are affected by switching costs, the latter are not. Analyzing the pre-
scription behavior among chronic starters therefore identifies physician bias, while differences
in response across patients identify patient considerations.
Patient Considerations. Patient switching costs are identified by comparing the differ-
ence in response across chronic starters and longstanding patients using prescription drugs.
For simplicity, I abstract away from copay here to convey the key identification ideas.
P (ξip0 − a∗ip|Starter)− P (ξip0|Starter)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in prescription rate
for chronic starters
−P (ξip0 − a∗ip|gijpt−1 = 0)− P (ξip0|gijpt−1 = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in prescription rate
for chronic longstanding patients
(1.18)
Maintaining the assumption that the bias a physician exhibits is the same across all patients,
the difference in the change of generics across chronic starters and chronic longstanding
patients is attributed to patient switching costs. It is possible to consider heterogeneity in
switching costs by considering how the change on the right hand side depends on patient
77See Torgovitsky (2019) for a recent discussion and advances in the non-parametric identification of state
dependence in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity
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characteristics zjpt as follows.
P (ξip0−a∗ip|Starters)−P (ξip0|Starter)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in prescription rate
for chronic starters
−P (ξip0−a∗ip|gijpt−1 =0, zjpt)−P (ξip0|gijpt−1 =0, zjpt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in prescription rate
for chronic longstanding patients
(1.19)
Physician Bias. Physician bias – and the policy-induced change in effort – is identified
by comparing the prescription rate of physicians before and after the mandate for chronic
starters. As especially chronic starters are not impacted by switching costs, the bias terms
are primarily identified off of initial choices made for patients. Copay levels are uniform
across patients (conditional on whether they are receiving an increased reimbursement or
not) and temporal variation at the prescription drug level identifies the copay sensitivity.
Any residual proclivity of a physician to prescribe a generic or brand name drug then is set
to match the actual prescription rate of generics before and after the mandate.78
The levels of ξBip0 and ξ
G
ip0 are not identified. I therefore normalize ξ
G
ip0, the utility the
physician derives from prescribing a generic to a generic starter (for a certain prescription
drug), to be zero. The difference ξip0 is then identified as discussed above during the pre-
mandate period, while ξip0 − a∗ip is then identified during the post-mandate period.
1.5.4.3 Estimation
Collecting the theoretical results and the parameterization, I now turn to estimating the
parameters θ = {α, β, ψ} and physician biases {ξip0, ξip0− a∗ip} for all i, p. I model the biases
78It is important to note, however, that I do not make use of the contraction mapping proposed in Berry,
Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) during the estimation.
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(before and after the mandate) as Fixed Effects. The estimating equation reduces to
P (gijpt = 1; gijpt−1, cpt, ξip0, X
C









− a∗ip × Postt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Post-Mandate
Adjustment
+ψzjpt × Postt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Patient
Considerations
+ βxijpt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Control
Variables
< εGijpt − εBijpt

In order to ensure there are sufficient observations to adequately estimate these fixed effects,
I focus on active ingredients where the number of patients is sufficiently large. In essence, I
focus on prescriptions for active ingredients that are in the main product group categories
posted in table 1.1 (i.e. I exclude ”Z: Other”) and where the physicians prescribed a strictly
positive share of generics both before and after the introduction of the mandate.79
I use two different ways to estimate this model. In the first method, I estimate a condi-
tional logistic regression using Maximum Likelihood to recover the parameters θ = {α, β, ψ}
and then use the contraction mapping proposed by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) to
recover the bias before and after the announcement of the mandate. The bias terms I es-
timate are then essentially deviations from zero that match the predicted market shares
to the actual market shares, conditional on the parameters estimated in a first step using
Maximum Likelihood. In particular, given the vector of MLE estimates θ̂, the contraction
mapping solves the following moment condition.
SGijpt(cpt, gipt−1, θ̂; ξip0 − a∗ip × Postt) = sGipt (1.20)
In this moment condition, the right hand side sGipt is the empirical market share observed
in the data, before and after the announcement of the mandate. The left hand side is the
essentially the equation in 1.11, where the observable characteristics and the MLE parameters
79This induces some selection in the analysis sample. This is currently being worked out in greater detail
in a follow-up study that focuses on the adjustment cost of physicians.
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θ̂ are used. This leaves the physician unobservables free to match the model-implied market
shares to match the empirical market shares.80
In a second approach, I directly estimate all parameters (including the Fixed Effects)
using Maximum Likelihood to complement and verify the estimates of the first estimation
method. This is computationally more intensive than conditional logistic regression. Never-
theless, the parameter estimates are highly similar across the different estimation methods.
The results presented in the next section (and used in the decomposition and counterfactual
analyses) draw from the second method. Additional details on the estimation and the two
different methods are discussed in the Appendix.
1.5.4.4 Results
The results of the structural estimation are posted in table 1.8. The estimated coefficients
line up with the reduced form evidence, lending credibility to the structural model. The
price elasticities suggest that physicians are price sensitive, especially for chronic starters.
Similar to the reduced form results, I find some evidence that they are more price sensitive
for patients on an increased reimbursement plan – especially for starters. The results also
suggest (as extensively documented in the reduced form evidence) that the previous choice
is highly predictive of the current choice of prescription drug.
When looking at the patient consideration parameters, Column 1 shows that longstanding
patients are more likely to be kept on a brand name drug after the mandate is announced.
Column 2 shows that patients with higher levels of polypharmacy are somewhat less likely
to be switched, even though the numbers are a bit smaller than in the linear probability
model results in section 1.4.5. Column 3 highlights that older patients are less likely to be
switched, somewhat more starkly than in the reduced form section. Including both measures
of polypharmacy and age, these results and interpretations persist.
Furthermore, it is possible to back out the physician biases before and after the mandate.
80I use a tolerance of 10e− 9 to match these market shares.
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These results are shown graphically in figure 1.9. As expected, we find a decrease in physician
bias. Furthermore, the average decrease in bias is somewhat bigger than the parameter
estimate for patient considerations, in line with the empirical finding that longstanding
patients are likely to be switched, but in quite small numbers.
Using these structural parameters, I now turn to quantify the importance of physicians
and patients using a decomposition exercise, and analyze the hypothetical introduction of a
Mandatory Generic Substitution policy.
1.6 Decomposition and Policy Counterfactuals
1.6.1 Decomposition
Short-term. A simple decomposition of the treatment effect in the short term suggests
that patient considerations dominate the importance of physician bias: the overall treatment
effect is only about a third of the treatment effect on chronic starters. I use that about 1
in 7 prescriptions is written for starters and the approximate treatment effects recovered in
section 1.4 to show
∆SG = F S︸︷︷︸
Fraction
Starters














≈ 10%− 0.86× (10%− 2%)
= 3.12%
Long-term. Nevertheless, as the composition of patients changes over time, and a steady
flow of starters arrives, the short term effect likely overstates the importance of patient
considerations and is unlikely equal to the long-term effect. In order to get a better sense
of these long-term effects, I perform the following decomposition exercise. I set prices at
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the active ingredient level and physician bias to its 2004 levels (i.e. I set them to be ξip0).
I simulate the generic prescription rate assuming all drugs in the sample were on-patent
until 2004, and go off-patent in January 2005. I assume all patients return every quarter
to pick up a new prescription and have the model run for 5 years (or 20 quarters). It is
worth noting that this is the market share for prescription drugs where a generic alternative
is available: on-patent drugs are not included in this analysis. The predicted market shares
can be analyzed in four scenarios.
1. Only copay differentials in transaction utility
2. Copay differentials and physician bias in transaction utility
3. Copay differentials and patient considerations in transaction utility
4. Copay differentials, patient considerations, and physician bias in transaction utility
The resulting take-up rates of generics are posted as market shares over time in Figure 1.10.
Scenario 1 suggests a fast penetration rate of generics if only copay differentials matter,
with the market share stabilizing at about 90 percent after about 2 years (or 8 quarters).
Scenario 2 plateaus at about 60 percent, while scenario 3 leads to an adoption rate of about
70% after 5 years (but does not plateau to the same extent). It takes about 2 to 3 years for
physician bias to actually become more important than patient considerations in the slow
adoption rate of generics over time. If both physician bias and patient considerations matter,
the market share stabilizes at about 50 percent. Therefore, taking a longer term view on
the decomposition suggests that physician bias and patient considerations are about equally
important.
1.6.2 Counterfactuals
Given the reduced form results and the decomposition exercises posted above, it is reason-
able to analyze different policies that aim to reduce physician bias or reduce the importance
of patient considerations. One particular type of policy that has gained popularity is to
override physician authority by allowing or requiring pharmacies to dispense the cheaper
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generic when a physician has failed to prescribe this cheaper option even when available.
Several variations on this policy are possible, but I will simulate the introduction of a strin-
gent Mandatory Generic Substitution (MGS) policy that forcefully requires the pharmacy to
overrule the physician decision and dispense the generic option with no possible exception.
Set-up and assumptions. As in the decomposition exercise, I set prices (copay differ-
entials and reimbursement amounts) and physician bias equal to their 2004 levels. Therefore,
these welfare analyses should be thought of as partial equilibrium exercises, as pharmaceu-
tical companies are likely to adjust their pricing strategies in response to such a policy.81 I
focus on the short-term introduction of a policy and select all longstanding patients that pick
up a prescription in 2004. Over the course of four quarters of 2005, I select the patients that
are chronic starters in that quarter. I assume, as before, that the patient comes back every
three months to pick up another prescription.82 Therefore, initial choices for longstanding
patients in January 2004 and the actual incoming starters over the year 2005 along with
physician bias levels are based on actual data and structural estimates, as shown in figure
1.11.
I make two important assumptions on the patient considerations estimated in the struc-
tural estimation. On the one hand, I assume that patient considerations are actual welfare
costs that a social planner would worry about (such as decreased medication adherence re-
sulting in lower productivity and higher healthcare expenditures) and that none of these
patient considerations are “wasteful” (resistance from patients that exhibit brand loyalty to-
wards the box they receive or a general unwillingness to be switched). While I can’t rule out
such “wasteful” considerations are at play, the IV estimates from section 1.4.3 suggest that
indeed these patient considerations indeed include important actual welfare considerations.
On the other hand, I assume that physicians perceive these costs correctly such that I can
81These strategies could include both on-patent brand name drugs and those with generic competition. I
leave this is a useful avenue for future research to consider.
82As in the decomposition, I therefore ignore the contemporaneous budgetary effect of switching on med-
ication adherence. This will overstate the budget savings, as longstanding patients that are switched will
pick up fewer prescription drugs in the months after being switched.
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use the structural estimates are correct estimates of these welfare costs.
I assume the following social welfare objective where τ is the (relative) weight the so-
cial planner places on patient considerations over reimbursements. I use the compensating
variation as the welfare measuring capturing patient considerations. I assume that the so-
cial planner does not care about physician bias and considers it wasteful; it is therefore not
included as a part of patient welfare.83
















ln (1 + exp (−αj∆cpt + ψzjpt + βxijpt))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Compensating Variation Patient j
(1.22)
I run a model with 2004 prices and bias levels to calculate the baseline reimbursement rates
and patient welfare levels. I now turn to two alternative scenarios that I then compare to
this baseline scenario to see what the impact of such policies would be.
1.6.2.1 Mandatory Generic Substitution
I simulate the introduction of a mandatory generic substitution (MGS) policy, in which
pharmacies are (legally) required to dispense the generic drug when a brand name with the
same active ingredient is prescribed. Essentially, all starters that come in over the year
2005 are provided with a generic as initial choice, and the only welfare cost is incurred
by those longstanding patients that were previously using brand name drugs. Under these
assumptions, the healthcare system would stand to save 205 millione on their prescription
expenditures, or about a 9% overall decrease in prescription drug spending. Figure 1.12a
provides a graphical overview of the welfare effect of such a policy. The x axis analyzes
83In other words, the social planner maintains the assumption I use in this paper, namely that a branded
and generic version of the same active ingredient are therapeutically and clinically equivalent. These biases
do not represent private information of the physician on the quality of one version over another.
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the change in overall welfare for different welfare weights. The graph shows that, for a
healthcare system putting little weight on patient welfare, the policy would be welfare-
increasing. However, if the healthcare system values puts a weight of more than 0.7 on patient
welfare (comparable to valuing 1e in patient welfare at about 3e in reimbursements), the
policy is welfare-decreasing. In order to get some estimate of the welfare weight in Belgium,
I run a simulation of the MPR and find that the Belgian healthcare system employs a weight
on patient welfare of about 0.7.84
1.6.2.2 Focusing on physicians and Patients
As the Belgian healthcare system seems to put a large weight on patient welfare, it is
useful to consider under what circumstances the introduction of an MGS could be welfare-
increasing. I analyze different scenarios in which I decrease the importance of patient con-
siderations, and I find that combining an MGS with a decrease in patient considerations of
at least 60% would result in a welfare-increasing policy under a patient welfare weight of 0.7.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate physician and patient-specific factors in the demand for pre-
scription drugs that give rise to persistence. I do so by studying the impact of a national
mandate that required PCPs to adjust their prescribing behavior. In particular, I first focus
on the proclivity of physicians to prescribe a brand name drug when equally effective alterna-
tives are available, and whether they adjust this behavior in response to the mandate. I refer
to as physician bias. Second, I also investigate whether physicians switch different patient
types at different rates. I find that physicians switch chronic starters at much higher rates
than chronic longstanding patients, which indicates that physicians consider prescribing a
84One should not necessarily take this weight as the “true” welfare weight, as this is an analysis taking the
current copay structures as given. A more rigorous estimation of welfare weights should take into account
both margins that are set by the social planner. However, this estimate does provide some guidance as to
where the weight is likely situated
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generic to be less costly for a patient receiving a prescription drug for the first time, than
for a chronic longstanding patient to switch, and that they take these costs into considera-
tion. I refer to this as patient considerations. As these changes hold the active ingredient
constant, these costs may be behavioral in nature. I investigate this hypothesis in two steps.
I find physicians are particularly unlikely to switch older longstanding patients that take
multiple prescription drugs. Leveraging the quasi-experimental design of the policy, I find
that switching a patient’s prescription drug from a branded to a generic version of the same
active ingredient indeed comes at a health cost, measured by medication adherence.
Motivated by these reduced form results, I set out to quantify the relative importance of
physician bias and patient considerations. I simulate the patent expiration of brand name
drugs and the adoption of generics over a five year period under different scenarios, and find
that physician bias and patient considerations are about equally important. I then use the
model to simulate the introduction of a Mandatory Generic Substitution policy, in which
pharmacies only dispense the generic version of an active ingredient. I assume all physician
bias is wasteful (and therefore do not include in my welfare measure) and assume that the
perceived cost of switching a patient is fully driven by the risk of decreasing medication
adherence (and therefore fully include it in my welfare measure). I find that such policy
may decrease overall welfare. Taking active steps to mitigate patient considerations would,
however, increase overall welfare.
These results suggest that policymakers should carefully consider the effect of policies
that target physician behavior and reallocate patients between treatments if the way they
use care is subject to behavioral hazard. A better understanding of how patients use care,























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.2: Physician Descriptives.
Overall Sample NIHDI Sample IMA Sample
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age (in 2004) 46.839 10.824 47.371 10.787 44.343 10.110
Experience (in 2004) 20.616 10.787 21.166 10.795 — —
Female 0.288 0.453 0.258 0.438 0.153 0.361
In Group Practice — — — — 0.160 0.367
Generic Prescription Rate — — 0.122 0.072 0.147 0.077
(in 2004)
Cheap Prescription Rate 0.186 0.060 0.172 0.066 0.201 0.074
(in 2004)
Total DDD (in 2004) 236,334 166,169 214,241 156,561 137,819 104,703
10th percentile 38,349 34,233 16,575
90th percentile 459,117 424,318 293,887
# Transactions (in 2004) 5,764 4,134 3,301 2,435
10th percentile 1,016 480
90th percentile 11,287 6,922
Number of Patients 249 148
10th percentile 74
90th percentile 448
Observations 10,800 1,065 300
Source: Tabulation of NIHDI and IMA Analyses Samples. The baseline generic prescription rate
is calculated as the prescription rate of generics (at the physician level) in 2004.
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Table 1.3: Summary Statistics for Patients and Precriptions
Full Sample Generic Competition
Mean SD N Mean SD N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Off Patent 0.484 0.500 963,716
Generic 0.107 0.304 963,716 0.221 0.407 466,843
Cheap 0.151 0.358 963,716 0.309 0.462 466,843
Chronic 0.774 0.419 963,716 0.789 0.408 466,843
Branded Copay 0.281 0.324 466,840
Generic Copay 0.150 0.208 397,920
Copay Difference 0.133 0.179 397,917
Age (in 2004) 64.664 12.81 963,716 64.497 12.71 466,843
Female 0.616 0.486 963,716 0.616 0.486 466,843
Increased 0.283 0.450 963,716 0.263 0.440 466,843
Reimbursement
Starter 0.267 0.442 963,716 0.244 0.429 466,843
Daily Dose (DDD) 41.767 38.927 963,716 44.772 39.629 466,843
Polypharmacy 3.604 2.368 963,716 3.493 2.298 466,843
Days Between Refill 52.882 44.343 617,888 55.243 45.018 303,349
Adherence 1.043 0.798 424,838 1.040 0.796 242,350
Notes: Tabulation of IMA Analysis sample. All copay variables per DDD unit.
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Table 1.4: Split Sample Reduced Form Coefficients
Chronic Starters Longstanding
Generic Generic Generic Generic
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Copay Differential 0.034** 0.117*** 0.005** 0.008***
(0.016) (0.019) (0.002) (0.003)
Increased Reimbursement (IR) -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Copay Differential × IR 0.028* 0.042** 0.009** 0.012***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.004) (0.003)
Female 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Generict−1 0.876*** 0.901***
(0.004) (0.004)
Mean Generic (Pre-Mandate) 0.310 0.310 0.023 0.023
N 242,019 242,019 951,707 951,707
N Clusters 300 300 300 300
Physician × Chemical FE X X
Physician × Therapeutic FE X X
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The outcomes for this regression are whether
a physician prescribes a generic prescription drug. The independent variables included in
the regressions are discussed in section 1.4.1, and the estimates on the quarterly dummies
before and after the announcement of the mandate are shown graphically in Figure 1.5. The
analysis sample restricts attention to cases where a generic is available. The first two columns
use the sample of prescriptions dispensed for chronic starters, columns three through four
focus on prescriptions for chronic longstanding patients. Controls not listed in the table are
two indicators for Calcium Channel Blockers and Analeptics in the first 8 months of the
sample, as generics were not yet available for these groups at this point. Regressions are
weighted by DDD, while standard errors are clustered at the physician level.
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Table 1.5: Dose-Response Models





Median Quart. Below 15% Median Quartile
Generic Generic Generic Generic Generic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post 0.105*** 0.110*** 0.118*** 0.018*** 0.020***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.002) (0.003)
Post × High -0.018* -0.032** -0.056** -0.008*** -0.013***
(0.009) (0.015) (0.026) (0.003) (0.004)
Controls X X X X X
Physician by Chemical FE X X X X X
N Clusters 300 198 100 300 198
N 221,588 130,582 59,034 951,707 565,276
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The outcomes for this regression are whether
a physician prescribes a generic prescription drug. The analysis sample restricts attention to
cases where a generic is available. The first two columns use the sample of chronic starters,
the final two columns chronic longstanding patients. Controls are the copay differential (at
the active ingredient level), an indicator that takes on value on if the patient is on a increased
reimbursement schedule, one indicator for female patients, and an interaction between patients
on a increased reimbursement schedule and the copay differential. Regressions are weighted by

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.7: Pooled Chronic Drugs Reduced Form Results
Generic Generic Generic Generic Generic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Starter × Post 0.111*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.092*** 0.092***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)




(First Prescription after 04/2004) (0.001)
Age ∈ [35, 50) 0.014***
(0.003)
Age ∈ [50, 60) 0.015***
(0.004)
Age ∈ [60, 70) 0.012***
(0.003)
Age ∈ [70, 80) 0.012***
(0.003)
Age ∈ [80,∞) 0.010***
(0.003)
Polypharmacy : 0 0.020***
(0.005)
Polypharmacy : 1− 2 0.014***
(0.003)
Polypharmacy : 3− 4 0.012***
(0.003)
Polypharmacy : 5− 6 0.011***
(0.003)
Polypharmacy : 7+ 0.010***
(0.003)
LS × gijpt−1 0.839*** 0.803*** 0.803*** 0.803*** 0.803***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Controls X X X X
Physician by Chemical FE X X X X X
N 1,1957,92 1,139,504 1,139,504 1,139,504 1,139,504
N Clusters 59,572 58,890 58,890 58,890 58,890
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The outcomes for this regression are whether
a physician prescribes a generic prescription drug. The analysis sample restricts attention to
chronic drugs and cases where a generic is available. Controls include the copay differential, the
copay differential interacted with an indicator for longstanding patients, patient on an increased
reimbursement plan, the copay differential interacted with an indicator for patients on an increased
reimbursement plan, an indicator for female patients, and two indicators for Calcium Channel
Blockers and Analeptics in the first 8 months of the sample, as generics were not yet available for
these groups at this point. Regressions are weighted by DDD, while standard errors are clustered
at the patient level.
61
Table 1.8: Structural Parameter Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Price Sensitivity
∆ Copay -0.72 0.02 -0.74 0.02 -0.76 0.02 -0.77 0.02
× Longstanding 0.54 0.03 0.60 0.03 0.63 0.03 0.67 0.03
× Increased -0.16 0.03 -0.14 0.03 -0.07 0.03 -0.06 0.032
Reimbursement (IR)
× IR × Longstanding 0.07 0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.13 0.04 -0.18 0.04
Controls
Female 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00
IR 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00
Longstanding 2.15 0.00 2.04 0.01 2.10 0.01 2.01 0.01
g(t-1) -5.87 0.00 -5.87 0.00 -5.87 0.00 -5.87 0.00
Patient Considerations
Longstanding × Post 0.27 0.01 0.24 0.01 0.22 0.01 0.20 0.01
× Polypharmacy (2-4 Drugs) 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01
× Polypharmacy (5-6 Drugs) 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.01
× Polypharmacy (7+ Drugs) 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01
× Age ∈ [60− 80) 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.01
× Age ∈ [80−∞) 0.20 0.01 0.19 0.01
N 270,987 270,987 270,987 270,987
Physician by Chemical FE X X X X
Baseline Controls X X X
Notes: Coefficients and standard errors are estimated using the strategy discussed in section
1.5.4.3. The model is estimated on a sample of chronic and non-chronic drugs, where baseline
information (on generic use and polypharmacy) is available for chronic longstanding patients.
Additionally, I introduce a dummy variable for prescription drugs with atc’s starting with C08
and N06 in the first 8 months of 2004, since a generic was not yet available for these product
groups.
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Figure 1.1: Example of Prescription Note in Belgium
(a) Blank Prescription Note (b) Prescription Note with Explanatory Codes
Notes: The left panel shows a simple blank prescription note as used in the Belgian healthcare
market. On the right hand side, the numbers refer to the following explanations. 1: Bar
code identifying the prescribing physician. 2: Box where prescribing physician writes her
or his own name. 3: Box where prescribing physician writes down the name of the patient.
4: Box reserved for patient vignette for administrative purposes. 5: Box where prescribing
physician details the name of the drug, the dosage, and the number of packs. Only one drug
chemical per prescription is allowed. 6: Box for medical justification for using an brand name
prescription when a generic is available (introduced in 2013). 7: Box for an official stamp of
the prescribing physicians. 8: Date of prescription. 9: Date when the prescription goes into
effect (optional and used when prescription should be explicitly used after a certain date).
10: Area where pharmacies with sufficient ICT infrastructure can print a pharmacy-specific
barcode.
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Figure 1.2: Differences between Brand Name and Generic Drugs
(a) Brand Name Package (Zocor) (b) Generic Package (Brand: EuroGenerics)
(c) Brand Pill (Zocor 5 mg) (d) Generic Pill (Brand: Accord 5 mg)
Notes: Image from Zocor package retried from https://www.medibib.be/producten/zocor-40-mg-98-tabletten.
Image from Eurogenerics Simvastatine package retrieved from
https://www.multipharma.be/be fr/eurogenerics-simvastatine-eg-comp-pell-98-x-40mg-98-pc.html.
Image from Zocor pill retrieved from https://www.drugs.com/imprints/zocor-msd-726-431.html. Image from
generic pill retried from https://www.drugs.com/imprints/s1-22732.html. (all websites accessed 02/02/2018)
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Figure 1.3: Distribution of Physician Generic Prescription Rates in 2004 and 2006
Notes: Kernel density of the (overall) prescription rate of generics at the physician
level (N=300) before and after the announcement of the Minimum Prescription Rate
policy mandate.
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Figure 1.4: Descriptive Graphs: Prescription and Switching Rate of Generics
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Physicians in Top Third Physicians in Bottom Third
Chronic Longstanding
Fraction of Transactions for which Generic is Prescribed
Notes: This data is a graph of the average prescription rate of generics for different
types of patients (chronic starters and longstanding). I show the overall prescription
rate (upper panel) and averages across physicians that are in the top/bottom quartile
(bottom panel). Overall, the figures display a sudden increase upon announcement
of the mandate, with physicians far from the threshold responding more.
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Time to Announcement (in Quarters)
Longstanding Starters
Event Study Coefficient for Chronic Drugs
Notes: The regression coefficients and details for these event study coefficients are
discussed in section 1.4.1 and table 1.4.
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Event Study Coefficient for On-Patent Drugs (Heterogeneity)
Notes: The regression coefficients and details for these event study coefficients are
discussed in section 1.4.2.
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Notes: This graph shows the IV estimates reported in table 1.6 where t is the first time a
patient refills their prescription drug after being switched from a branded to a generic version
of the same active ingredient. The OLS estimate is reported for time t. The Cluster-Robust
1st Stage F-Statistic and implied change in mean medication adherence are reported below
the graph. Additional details are discussed in Section 1.4.3.
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     User Experience              Age Category                      Polypharmacy (# Drugs)
                                                                                                                                                                     
Differences in Switching Response across Longstanding PaRents
Notes: The estimates reported in this Figure are obtained with the empirical strategy dis-
cussed in section 1.4.5 and the coefficient estimates are reported in table 1.7. Sample sizes,
controls and clustering details are also found in this section and table.
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Figure 1.9: Structurally Estimated Physician Bias Before and After Mandate
Notes: This figure shows the smoothed density of physician bias, before and after the man-
date. The bias is scaled by the price sensitivity for chronic starters.
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Figure 1.10: Adoption Rate of Generics (over 5 years)
Notes: This figure shows the adoption of generics upon patent expiration in the four scenarios
discussed in section 1.6. The details of the implementation are discussed in section 1.6 and
is based on the structural estimates obtained in the structural estimation.
72
Figure 1.11: Framework for Policy Simulations
2004 Jan-Mar	05 Apr-Jun	05 Jul-Sep	05 Oct-Dec	05
Frequence:	 Data
Prob(Gen): Model
Previous	Choice Data Model Model Model Model











Figure 1.12: Policy Simulations
(a) Mandatory Generic Substitution (MGS)
(b) MGS with Decreases in Patient Considerations
Notes: These two graphs show the welfare effect of introducing a Mandatory Generic Sub-
stitution (MGS) policy in pharmacies (Figure 1.12a) and the welfare effects of combining
a MGS policy with decreases in Patient considerations. Only scenarios with decreases of
30 and 60% are reported. The welfare calculations depend on the welfare weight (x-axis),




Fairness Considerations in Wage Setting: Evidence
from Domestic Outsourcing Events in Germany
2.1 Introduction
The impact of fairness considerations in the labor market has been a topic of interest
in economics since the seminal paper by Akerlof and Yellen (1988).1 Ever since, empirical
evidence in economics has focused on how these considerations affect job satisfaction (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999; Hamermesh, 2001; Card et al., 2012), job search effort (Card et al.,
2012), and labor supply decisions (Cohn et al., 2011; Breza, Kaur and Shamdasani, 2018).
It is unclear, however, to what extent employers and firms take these fairness considerations
into account when setting wages, and how this can affect labor market outcomes.
In this paper, I fill this gap by studying whether fairness considerations play a role in
wage setting. To do so, I investigate the effect of domestic outcourcing events on workers
that remain in establishments after these domestic outsourcing events occur.2 Domestic
outsourcing is generally defined as the decision of firms to buy local services (such as clean-
ing or security services) on the market, instead of producing them in-house. I study this
question in Germany, where I employ administrative earnings data with detailed occupation
and industry codes that links employers to their employees. Using these detailed industry
1This paper built on a rich tradition in psychology, sociology, and organizational behavior. Durkheim
(1895) is considered one of the seminal studies in sociology, while Bicchieri and Muldoon (2011) provides a
recent review of this literature.
2The definition of domestic outsourcing events in this paper is similar to that used in Goldschmidt and
Schmieder (2015).
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and occupation identifiers, I define domestic outsourcing events when employment in four
occupation categories at the establishment level drop to zero. I focus on occupations in
security, catering, cleaning, or logistics services.
The main empirical strategy in this paper exploits the timing of these domestic outsourc-
ing events in an event study framework: I compare establishment and worker-level outcomes
before and after these events. I find three main results. First, domestic outsourcing events
result in an immediate change in the skill ratio in the outsourcing establishment. This ratio
is stable both before and after the outsourcing events. On average, outsourcing establish-
ments become more high-skill intensive. Second, holding workers’ individual ability constant
– using worker-level fixed effects – I find that high skilled workers receive a wage increase of
about 5 log points, where low skilled workers face a wage cut of about 1 log point. These
changes are not accompanied by changes in investments – suggesting that changes in wages
are not explained by substitution or complementarity effects with new investments. Third,
these differences are more pronounced in smaller establishments, where workers are more
likely to interact with each other.
These empirical findings are consistent with a new theoretical model that describes the
outsourcing decision for an employer that faces fairness considerations acros skill groups in
the wage setting process.3 More specifically, low skilled workers care about the ratio of high
skill to low skill wages, and exert less effort when high skill wages increase relative to low skill
wages (ie. when this ratio increases). Employers, who produce goods using a CES production
function with imperfect substitution between low and high skilled workers, are constrained
in how they can set wages for their workers. Domestic outsourcing allows these employers
to not only save on the production of services that are being outsourced, but also to change
wage setting as the organizational set-up of the establishment is altered. As establishments
become more high skilled, they increase the wages of high skilled workers relative to low
3There are other theoretical ways to model fairness in the workplace. This model simply takes a stand on
a specific type of fairness considerations where the relative wage gap between different skill groups matters,
and does not discard other forms of fairness (such as “internal” fairness norms as in Akerlof and Yellen
(1988)).
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skilled workers. As a result, domestic outsourcing can increase within-establishment wage
inequality among workers who remain in outsourcing establishments.
Several studies have documented that rising assortativeness has been related to the in-
crease in wage inequality in several OECD countries – such as the United Kingdom (Faggio,
Salvanes and Van Reenen, 2010; Mueller, Ouimet and Simintzi, 2017), Germany (Card, Hein-
ing and Kline, 2013), Sweden (H̊akanson, Lindqvist and Vlachos, 2015), Brazil (Helpman
et al., 2017), the United States (Song et al., 2019), and studied the role between domestic
outsourcing and increasing wage inequality across establishments. Building on the work
of Dube and Kaplan (2010), Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2015) look at how domestic out-
sourcing relates to the resorting of workers to different establishments. However, these papers
typically do not assess whether there is a role for domestic outsourcing in rising wage in-
equality within establishments or firms through how employers set wages in response to how
these events change the organizational nature of the firm or establishment.
This paper therefore makes two distinct contributions. First, it contributes to our under-
standing of how fairness considerations play a role in the labor market by looking at how it
affects the wage setting process in the labor market. As noted before, much of the previous
evidence has focused on how fairness considerations affect worker behavior – either in terms
of job satisfaction (Card et al., 2012), job search behavior (Card et al., 2012), or labor supply
(Breza, Kaur and Shamdasani, 2018). This paper is one of the first to examine how these
fairness considerations play out in how employer set wages and organize their production.
This channel also provides an additional motivation for employers to use domestic outsourc-
ing. Apart from the direct cost savings which have typically received most attention in
economics research (Dube and Kaplan, 2010; Goldschmidt and Schmieder, 2015), employers
can also readjust their wages for workers they decided not to outsource and affect their effort
levels.
The second contribution is that it analyzes the potential role of domestic outsourcing in
rising within-firm or within-establishment wage inequality. Whereas the increasing impor-
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tance of assortativeness in the wage inequality has naturally led researchers to investigate
the reallocative effects of domestic outsourcing (Faggio, Salvanes and Van Reenen, 2010;
Card, Heining and Kline, 2013; H̊akanson, Lindqvist and Vlachos, 2015; Mueller, Ouimet
and Simintzi, 2017; Helpman et al., 2017; Song et al., 2019), this paper highlights how do-
mestic outsourcing can change organizational workplace features that affect wage setting and
within-establishment or within-firm wage inequality.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the use of domestic
outsourcing in several labor markets over time and discusses how these relate to the research
questions in this paper. Section 2.3 presents the model, while section 2.4 discusses the data
and the setting of the German labor market. Section 2.5 presents how domestic outsourcing
is measured for the purposes of this paper and section 2.6 presents the results. Section 2.7
shows the results are robustness to various concerns, while Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Background
The increased use of domestic outsourcing services in recent decades has changed the
employment relationship in the labor market in important ways, as employers increasingly
rely on outside contractors rather than employed workers in the production process. Do-
mestic outsourcing is generally defined as the decision of firms to buy local services (such as
cleaning or security) on the market from other firms, instead of producing them in-house.
The GDP share of these services almost doubled from 7 to 12 percent between 1982 and
2009 (Yuskavage, Strassner and Medeiros, 2008), and about half of the workers used in the
production of manufacturing products are currently employed outside of the manufacturing
sector (Houseman, 2014).
Outsourcing firms typically pay higher wages than smaller firms that workers are being
outsourced to (Abraham, 1990; Dube and Kaplan, 2010; Goldschmidt and Schmieder, 2015).
In particular, recent evidence shows that the outsourced workers on average face substantial
wage losses of about 10 to 20 percent (Dube and Kaplan, 2010; Goldschmidt and Schmieder,
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2015). This is consistent with the finding that high (low) wage workers are increasingly
sorted into high (low) wage firms (Card, Heining and Kline, 2013; Song et al., 2019). In fact,
the domestic outsourcing of cleaning, catering, security and logistics services alone explains
about 10 percent of the rise in wage inequality in Germany (Goldschmidt and Schmieder,
2015).
While these changes may result in changes in wages through how workers are allocated
across employers, it is unclear whether these domestic outsourcing events have impacts on
wages through how employers set wages in response to organizational changes. There has
been an active and longstanding interest in sociology, psychology and organizational behavior
into how workplace organization may drive wage setting. Nevertheless, empirical evidence in
economics has largely focused on how fairness considerations drive decisions on the worker
side.
Nevertheless, there is descriptive evidence on organizational features possibly playing a
role in explaining the rise in wage inequality. Several papers have documented that increasing
occupational and education concentration in production units are related to higher levels
of wage inequality (Kremer and Maskin, 1996; Handwerker and Spletzer, 2015; H̊akanson,
Lindqvist and Vlachos, 2015). The underlying drivers of these empirical facts, however, are
not that well understood.
2.3 Theoretical Framework
In this section, I build a static model of domestic outsourcing decisions that allows for
fairness considerations to impact the on-the-job effort of workers (and hence their marginal
productivity). The model has an establishment choosing between two types of labor (high
skill and low skill) that each have their labor supply. I follow a recent literature that draws
on the IO literature on diversified products to model establishments that offer different wage
tuples because of differences in productivity across establishments (Card et al., 2016).
In a first step, I model establishments as cost-minimizers that offer wage tuples to high
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and low skill workers as the result of underlying differences in productvitiy. The establish-
ment employs high and low skill workers both directly (in-house) and through purchasing
services on the market (outsourcing). For in-house labor, they face a static labor supply
as a result of these differences in wages. Workers observe the wages establishments set for
their skill group, but only discover the wages of other skill groups in this establishment
once employed.4 This has an effect on their productivity in the establishment through fair-
ness considerations: low-skill workers exert less effort on the job when the wage differential
between low-skill and high-skill workers is large.
2.3.1 Labor Supply
There are two types of worker on the labor market: high skilled workers (type 1) and
low skilled workers (type 2). A type s worker gets an indirect utility from working at an
establishment j that offers wage wjs that is given by
νijs = σwjs + εijs (2.1)
where εijs is some idiosyncratic error term that follows a type I extreme value distribution.
It is important to note here the worker does not necessarily observe the wages for other types
of workers. Each firm has some degree of market power as workers have some unobserved
taste shock. Conditional on wages, these taste shocks as assumed to be independent.5 If the
number of establishments J is sufficiently large, Card et al. (2016) show these logit choice
probabilities simplify to
P (νijs ≥ νiks ∀ k 6= j) ≈ λs exp(σwjs) (2.2)
4Alternatively, the decision for low-skill workers to work for an establishment depends solely on the wage
low-skill workers get, but their effort once hired depends on both the low-skill and high-skill wages.
5Compared to other labor markets, such as the United States, the majority of benefits in Germany is
captured through wages. While company cars and other amenities do exist, important benefits such as
401(k)’s are not used in Germany. As a result, the assumption that labor supply decisions can – in large
part – be characterized by wage levels and idiosyncratic shocks, is reasonable in this context.
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where λs is some constant that is different across skill groups.
6 Finally, the labor supply
function an establishment faces can then be written as
ln(Ljs(wjs)) = ln(Isλs) + σ ln(wjs) (2.3)
The assumption that the number of establishments is sufficiently large implies a partial
equilibrium framework where there are no strategic interactions between establishments.
Given that the fraction of firms deciding to outsourcing is low in any given year, this seems
like a reasonable assumption.
Additionally, market conditions allow establishment j to hire some high and low skill
labor on the market — L̄j1 and L̄j2 respectively. The extent to which the establishment uses
such services will depend on transaction costs, the availability of different services in local
market, and other environmental factors. For these reasons, the firm largely is assumed to
take these numbers as given.
2.3.2 Firm Problem
Firms are cost-minimizers that produce a final good using high and low skill labor and
need to set wages in order to meet the demand for their product. It is reasonable to allow for
low and high skill workers to be imperfect substitutes. Therefore, I model this production
function fj = f(Lj1(wj1), Lj2(wj2)) as a CES production function with two inputs. Following
Card et al. (2016), I allow for a productivity shifter Tj that differs across establishments and
captures differential technological innovations. A1 and A2 capture differential productivity
shifters across high and low skill workers.7
Following Akerlof and Yellen (1988) and Rees (1993), I assume high wage differentials
within the establishment can negatively affect the effort (and hence marginal product) of
6It is possible to distinguish for different labor supply elasticities σs for different skill groups. Since I
am not aware of any studies that highlight these elasticties are dramatically different across skill groups, I
choose to simplify in this specific model.
7These three productivity shifters are not separately identified, but this notation may clarify how different
technological shocks may impact wages. Therefore, I opt to use this notation.
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workers. Most research (see, e.g., Card et al. (2012) or Rees (1993)) has suggested that
fairness considerations mainly affect workers earning below the mean or the median within
the establishment.8 As low skill workers typically earn less than high skill workers, I assume
the productivity of both these workers is affected by large wage differentials, following the
empirical literature (Card et al., 2012). In particular, the productivity wedge can be written
as τ(wj1, wj2) where τ1(., .) < 0 and τ2(., .) > 0.
9 The cost minimization problem when
producing the business service in-house can be written as
Vj(wj1, wj2) = min
wj1,wj2









τ(wj1, wj2)L2(wj2) + L̄j2
]ρ} 1ρ ≥ Yj1 (2.5)
It is worth noting that in this context, differential skills are important for two reasons. On
the one hand, there are different productivity levels associated to workers of different skill.
On the other hand, they offer one way in which workers differ in wage levels, generating
fairness considerations. Other reference groups are possible, but using difference in skill
levels has the benefit it is a relatively clean and objective measure.
Firms or establishments will decide to outsource when new opportunities make it viable,
i.e. when there is a shock to or change in C(L̄j1, L̄j2). When the outsourcing environment
for an establishment changes in such a way that outsourcing becomes cheaper and outside
labor can be contracted, an establishment can alter its employment by increasing the level
of outside workers L̄j1 and L̄j2.
8In Card et al. (2012), the median is calculated at the department level, which could be thought of as an
establishment. What workers exactly see as their reference group is not something that is clearly laid out in
the fairness literature. Therefore, I assume the reference group of interest is the establishment.
9Here, τ1(w1, w2) is shorthand for
∂τ(w1,ws)
∂w1






In any one time period, the firm minimizes the objective function, leading to the following
first order conditions. I suppress the firm subscripts for brevity.






























1−ρ {A2τ2(w1, w2)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fairness effect
(2.7)
where µ is the Lagrange multipliers on the production constraint in equation 2.5. For
simplicity, L1 = L1(w1) + L̄1 and L2 = τ(w1, w2)L2(w2) + L̄2 represent the effective labor
units in terms of high and low skill labor. This can be thought of as the amount of work that
needs to be performed. There is perfect substitution between the actual work being done,
which is arguably a reasonable assumption for several outsourcing services, such as catering
workers, security guards, and cleaning workers.
In the absence of fairness considerations, τ(., .) = 1, τ1(., .) = 0 and τ2(., .) = 0. Therefore,
all fairness effects simply drop out, and we are left with the leading terms in all equations. If
τ1(., .) < 0 and τ2(., .) > 0 as assumed, the left hand side of equation 2.6 is driven downwards
compared to the scenario when there are no fairness considerations, while the right hand
side of equations 2.7 and 2.6 are driven up. Therefore, the effect of fairness considerations
predicts wage compression, a prediction that is often hypothesized as an effect of fairness
considerations (Bernhardt et al., 2016).
Furthermore, fairness considerations operate as a tax that is carried by high skill workers.
This follows from the assumption that workers are paid more (i.e. high skill workers) are
typically not affected by fairness considerations (Card et al., 2012). Establishments inter-
nalize this knowledge and therefore levy the tax on these high skill workers. However, this
model can easily be extended to a scenario where the morale of high skill workers is affected
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and this decreases overall productivity at the establishment. This could be modeled by an
overall productivity wedge for the establishment. However, as long as low skill workers and
their morale are affected more by fairness considerations, the main intuitions of the model
go through.
Additionally, the labor composition of the establishment also determines the extent to
which fairness considerations affect the establishment. If the ratio of low to high skill workers
is high, fairness considerations are expected to depress the wage of high skill workers more,
as high skill workers need to carry a larger burden.
2.3.4 Assumptions on Fairness and Demand.
I follow Card et al. (2016) and assume firms face an inverse demand function of Pj =
P 0j (Yj1)
− 1
ε . Here, ε is a market wide-parameter.
In order to get more traction on the effect of fairness considerations, I assume some





where a > 0. If a = 0, there are no fairness effects.10 This
parameterization need not be a deep structural relationship, but can be thought of as a local
approximation of the effect of fairness considerations on the marginal productivity of low
skilled workers.
2.3.5 Comparative Statics.
When establishments decide to outsource, the wages that the establishment sets will
change. Denote the wages before outsourcing as {w1, w2}, whereas the wages after outsourc-
ing are {w′1, w′2}. Taking logs and substracting wages pre-outsourcing from post-outsourcing
10If a < 0 low skill workers become more productive as their wages is further away from high skill workers.
This is not supported by any empirical work, therefore assuming a ≥ 0 seems relatively innocuous.
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Under the assumption that “effective” labor units (i.e. L1 and L2) are constant, two key
predictions arise.
1. Wages of high skill and low skill workers move in opposite directions.
This prediction is derived from equation 2.9 in conjunction with the assumptions that
a > 0 and the effective labor units are constant.
2. High skill wages increase more when an employer becomes more skill in-
tensive
This prediction is derived from equation 2.8 and discussed in more detail in the ap-
pendix. Intuitively, however, it results from all terms within the brackets of the second
and third ln terms in equation 2.8 being constant, apart from the labor supply quan-
tities before and after the domestic outsourcing event.
The assumption that effective labor units are constant is a reasonable assumption where
services provided are relatively homogenous, easy to provide, and not part of the core business
of the establishment. Cleaning or catering services, for instance, is a task where the quantity
is relatively well defined and constant where it is reasonable to assume that the amount of
cleaning does not change after outsourcing.12
11I assume that the functional form of the production function f does not change over time. Additionally,





12For high skill outsourcing, this assumption may be less clearcut. One may expect the change in effective
labor units to be relatively important (and increasing) for high skill workers. Under this assumption, we are
likely to understate fairness considerations, as part of the wage increase for high skill workers does not only
reflect this effect, but also the change in effective labor units after outsourcing.
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2.4 Data and Institutional Setting
2.4.1 Data
The data used in this paper combines two data sources from Germany, both made avail-
able by the Institute for Employment Research or IAB.13 The first data source is the Be-
triebspanel or Establishment Survey, a representative and yearly survey of establishments in
Germany, stratified according to establishment size, industry and federal state. The survey
provides each establishment with a unique identifier that is matched to the establishment
identification number (EID) that links this survey data to administrative employment data.
The sample spans years 1993 through 2010 and consists of about 5,000 establishments at
the start of the sample and about 15,000 establishments at the end of the sample.14 The
topics of the survey include, but are not limited to, employment development, production
outcomes, investment decisions, unionization information and personnel structure.
The second data source is the Linked IAB or LIAB, a linked employer-employee dataset
that augments the Betriebspanel with detailed administrative information from the Ger-
man Social Security system for every employee in those establishments that are part of the
survey. This data is matched using the unique EID identifier. The Social Security system
combines data for all establishments and individuals into the Integrated Employment Bi-
ographies (IEB), that is built on the integrated notification procedure for health insurance,
unemployment insurance, and the statutory pension scheme. Employers have to notify the
social security agencies for all employees in a calendar year, using their administrative EID.
They provide information on the employment spell (the exact starting and end date of their
job), the total earnings, and education, occupation, trainee status, employment type (i.e.
13For completeness, IAB stands for Institüt for Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung der Bundesagentur für
Arbeit. The data used in this study are also described in further detail in Alda, Bender and Gartner (2005)
or Heining et al. (2013).
14More specifically, the survey samples about 5,000 establishments from West Germany from 1993 until
1999 and about 10,000 establishments from West Germany from 2000 until 2010. The survey also samples
about 5,000 establishments from East Germany from 1996 until 2010. Data past 2010 are not available yet,
as the data reporting system underwent some changes. The IAB is working to make the post-2010 data
consistent, and information until 2014 should be available soon.
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part-time of full-time), and several demographics for each unique employee identifier.15 If the
employment spell lasts longer than one year, an annual report is set up and communicated
with social security agencies. In contrast to the IEB, the LIAB therefore does not cover the
universe of the German workforce, only those workers that are employed by establishments
sampled for the establishment surveys.
There are two models of the LIAB available, a cross-sectional model and a longitudinal
model. The cross-sectional model follows establishments and provides detailed information
of employment within all these establishments and only follows workers when they leave one
establishment for another that is surveyed. When the worker leaves for an establishment not
part of the survey, the workers is not in the cross-sectional LIAB any longer. In contrast, the
longitudinal model tracks fewer establishments, but follows workers even when they leave.
For the purposes of this paper, the cross-sectional model is used, as it maximizes the number
of establishments in the sample and provides detailed information to answer the research
questions of interest.
The EIDs are assigned by social security agencies on the basis of ownership, industry and
municipality. Hethey, Schmieder et al. (2010) discuss some important issues that arise when
using these EIDs. For instance, two manufacturing plants or restaurants owned by the same
firm, operating in the same authority district (Kreis) will receive one EID. A manufacturing
plant and a sales outlet that are run by one firm in the same Kreis, will receive two EIDs.
Additionally, new EIDs can be issued when establishments change ownership. One way in
which this could be important for my results is when an establishment breaks up in two
separate establishments, one “general industry” establishment and one “business service”
establishment, which would possibly lead to missing outsourcing events in the data. Mergers,
with subsequent outsourcing, could similarly bias my results. Another limitation of the data
is that there is top coding of the earnings information.
Appendix B.1 provides details on the data processing used in this paper. I restrict the
15This unique employee identifier is not only unique at the establishment level, but unique for Germany,
as it is based on social security numbers.
87
sample to observations that have non-missing establishment and person identifiers and focus
on workers that are between 20 and 60 years old. In order to adjust for top coding, I use im-
putation techniques that follow other papers that made use of this data (Dustmann, Ludsteck
and Schönberg, 2009; Card, Heining and Kline, 2013; Goldschmidt and Schmieder, 2015).
The precise details are discussed in appendix B.1.2. After imputing, I drop observations
with daily earnings below 10 Deutsche Mark or euros.
For the skill variable, the schooling variable is split up in high and low skill workers. Low
skill workers include those workers that have finished middle or high school, with or without
a vocational degree. High skill workers have finished either technical university or college.
The effects within these skill groups are relatively similar when estimating the models at
more granular levels of skill, so this grouping makes does not mask heterogeneous effects
across the different skill levels within groups (e.g. those low skill workers with or without a
vocational degree).
2.4.2 Institutional Setting
Labor relations and wage setting in Germany differ substantially from the US setting.16
Collective bargaining agreements are typically set at the industry level and negotiated be-
tween the industry and labor unions. Establishments can either agree – covering all workers
automatically – or they can deviate from these agreements and set up an agreement at the
firm or establishment level that union representatives at the establishment agree with and
sign off on. Even in the absence of such agreement, establishments can opt out of agreements.
When doing so, they are required to pay their existing employees according to previous wage
agreements, but need not follow these agreements for new hires.17
Unionization is different from the collective bargaining agreement, as workers decide
16For more complete discussions, Dustmann et al. (2014) and Fitzenberger, Kohn and Lembcke (2013)
provide a good overview
17Despite the apparent benefits of changing to firm-level agreements, Dustmann et al. (2014) show that the
union decline in Germany is primarily driven by firms going from industry level agreements to non-unionized
workplaces.
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individually to join the union. Workers that are covered by the industry or establishment
collective bargaining agreement are therefore not necessarily part of a union and vice versa.
Addtionally, when it comes to firing workers, Germany does not adhere to employment-at-
will which is common in the United States. There are specific laws protecting workers from
mass layoffs. There is an upper bound on the number of employees any one establishment
can fire within a 30-day period. Any layoffs above these thresholds need the authorization
of the employment office, also called the Agentur für Arbeit. The last revision to this law
was passed in 2008, with, for example, an upper bound of 5 employees for establishments
employing 21 to 59 employees (see Kündigungsschutzgesetz, Section 17).
2.5 Domestic Outsourcing
2.5.1 Measuring Domestic Outsourcing
Several methods to measure domestic outsourcing or contracting out have been used in
the literature, and all methods require detailed industry and occupational information to do
so. Abraham (1990) compares both high and low wage occupation workers across “general”
industries and “business service” industries. Another strand of literature has focused on
low skilled occupations such as janitorial or security services. The reason to focus on these
occupations is twofold (Goldschmidt and Schmieder, 2015). First, these occupations are
easily measured in the data and represent tasks that are fairly consistent over time. Second,
the employment share of these occupations in the labor market has remained relatively
constant. The employment of other occupations, such as typists or accountants, exhibits
strong trends and changing job contents. Dube and Kaplan (2010) use a fixed effects strategy
for people moving from a general to a business service industry, acknowledging that different
types of workers may sort into different industries. Both of these studies can be performed
using CPS or similar data. Both Abraham (1990) and Dube and Kaplan (2010) find that,
using this definition, workers take a pay cut of about 10 to 20% when they are outsourced.
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Linked employer-employee data provide other ways of measuring domestic outsourcing.
Similar to Dube and Kaplan (2010), Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2015) study catering,
cleaning, security and logistics (CCSL) occupations, but highlight the concern that the out-
sourcing decision in the previous definition is not necessarily exogenous from an individual’s
perspective, even when including worker fixed effects.18 Using the complete IEB covering all
German workers since 1975, they exploit the linked nature of their data, and identify events
where at least ten people leave one “general industry” establishment to then all show up at
a new “business service” establishment in the following year, something they coin on-site
outsourcing.19 They contrast this definition to the one used by Dube and Kaplan (2010) and
find similar results: workers take a pay cut of about 10 to 15% when they are outsourced.
Similar to Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2015), I exploit the linked character of my data
and focus on CCSL occupations, but define outsourcing events differently.20 I build on a set
of five descriptive facts, discussed in appendix B.2, to define outsourcing events at the estab-
lishment level rather than at the individual level. The first three panels of table B.3 describe
the stability of CCSL employment within establishments. First, simple establishment fixed
effects explain the majority of the variation in the employment level of these occupations.
Second, adding a AR(1) structure on the error component highlights that employment within
establishments is highly persistent, as the autocorrelation is close to one. Third, running
these regressions with employment shares rather than employment levels decreases the au-
tocorrelation coefficient considerably, indicating that the employment of these occupations
does not increase one-to-one with the size of the establishment. Fourth, the final panel of the
table highlights that, once the employment in these occupations drops to zero, it is highly
unlikely these occupations are insourced again. Finally, figure B.1 highlights that turnover
18See Gibbons and Katz (1992) for a more complete discussion.
19The precise restrictions they impose are the following. At least 10 workers leave a “general industry”
establishment and show up at a new “business service” establishment in the following year; the “general
industry” establishment does not close down in the following year; this worker flow represents at most 30%
of the initial workforce at the originating establishment; and this establishment initially has at least 50
full-time employees.
20I follow the codes used in Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2015). The precise occupational and industry
codes are presented in appendix B.2.1, tables B.1 and B.2.
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rates are highly stable for these occupations.
Building on this set of facts, I define an outsourcing event at the establishment level as
follows. First, the employment in the relevant occupation drops to zero, after it was positive
in the year immediately before. Second, the establishment industry code does not switch
to a business service or temp industry identifier after the outsourcing event.21 Third, the
flow of workers that are outsourced, constitute no more than 30% of employment at the
moment of outsourcing. Fourth, and finally, the outsourcing establishment employs at least
20 people. Figure 2.1 shows the outsourcing rates (i.e. the fraction of establishments making
the decision to outsource) are relatively stable across the sample period and the fraction of
establishments that are outsourcing under this definition.22 Overall, the even spread of
outsourcing events across the sample period also mitigates concerns of general equilibrium
effect in local labor markets.23
2.5.2 Summary Statistics
Table 2.1 provides some key summary statistics for establishments. The upper panel
focuses on establishments the year before outsourcing, while the lower panel focuses on
establishments that have never outsourced. Overall, employers that are about to outsource
are large and pay slightly higher wages than establishments that do not outsource, consistent
with the findings of Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2015). Additionally, they are more likely
to be covered by a collective bargaining agreement and tend to have somewhat higher levels
of education and productivity, but lower shares of part-time workers.
Table 2.2 provides some summary statistics for workers that remain in outsourcing estab-
lishments in the upper panel, and summary statistics for workers that work in establishments
that never outsource in the lower panel. Overall, the workers are relatively similar in terms
21I follow the industry codes used by Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2015), with the slight difference that I
don’t have access to 5 digit industry codes.
22This graph possibly underestimates the extent to which establishments are outsourcing. Establishments
that decided to outsource prior to 1993 show up as non-outsourcing.
23In order to analyze these effects in more detail, access to the full underlying administrative data would
be necessary and is a useful area for future research.
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of wages, education levels and demographics, such as age, gender, nationality and part-time
status. However, workers that stay in outsourcing establishments tend to have higher tenure.
2.6 Empirical Strategy and Results
2.6.1 Establishment-Level Outcomes and Structure
I examine the impact of outsourcing events on establishment outcomes using an event




δ∆I{t− t∗j = ∆}+ γXjt + ξj + θt + εjt (2.10)
where yjt is the outcome variable for establishment j at time t. The event study specification
measures the dynamic time path of the outcome variable before and after the outsourcing
event (which occurs at time t∗j) conditional on a set of fixed effects (θt and ξj respectively)
and a set of time-varying establishment controls.24 The sample for these establishment-level
regressions includes all establishments with an employment size of at least 20 people the year
before the outsourcing event takes place.25 The identifying assumption is that the timing of
the outsourcing event is random, which can be tested for by verifying that δ∆ = 0 for ∆ < 0.
Figures 2.2a and 2.2b highlight the impact of outsourcing events on the stucture of
outsourcing establishments by showing the δ∆ coefficients with 95% cluster-robust confidence
intervals for estimating equation 2.10. Both establishment size (measured in number of
workers employed) and number of (distinct) occupations employed are relatively constant
before and after the outsourcing event, but exhibit and clear and sudden drop in the wake
of an outsourcing event. The drop in size and occupations at the establishment highlights
that the domestic outsourcing event based on CCSL occupations seems to coincide with
24There are some cases where an establishments outsources an occupation twice using the definition in
this paper. As a result, I focus solely on the first time an establishment outsources this occupation.
25Running the regressions on a restricted sample of firms that only decide to outsource provide similar
results in terms of magnitude and statistical and economic significance.
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a large restructuring of the production process and organizational overhaul. Additionally,
the number of occupations decreases by almost 15 log points where total employment only
drops by about 10 log points. These numbers suggest that domestic outsourcing events
primarily lead to occupations that employ a (relatively) smaller number of workers within
the establishment are being purchased on the local labor market (rather than being produced
in-house).
Additionally, figure 2.3 shows the effects of domestic outsourcing events on the skill ratio
– defined as the number of high skill workers over the number of low skill workers – in
outsourcing establishments. On average, the skill ratio increases by about 5 percent. As
a result, outsourcing establishments typically become more intensive users of high skilled
labor, and outsourcing events result in a clear change in the organizational set-up of the
establishment. In the next section, I turn to investigating whether these organizational
changes affect the wages of workers employed in these outsourcing establishments. Whereas
the identifying assumptions do not seem to fully hold for the employment and occupation
regressions, the skill ratio is remarkably stable before and after the outsourcing event –
despite large changes in the number of workers and occupations highlighted in the previous
paragraph.
2.6.2 Worker-Level Results
I examine the impact of outsourcing events on worker outcomes using an event study




δ∆I{t− t∗j(i) = ∆}+ γXij(i)t + ξi + θt + εij(i)t (2.11)
Here, yij(i)t is the log wages worker i earns working at establishment j in year t, while t
∗
j
is the year the outsourcing decision is made at establishment j, with employment for the
occupation of interest dropping to zero in t∗j + 1. θt represents a year fixed effect, while ξi
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represents a worker fixed effect. Xij(i)t is a vector of time-varying controls.
The identifying assumption in these worker-level regression warrants a more detailed dis-
cussion. If the timing of the outsourcing event is random from the worker’s point of view,
any changes in wages are attributed to the outsourcing event. Worker fixed effects hold con-
stant the worker’s ability and productivity, so changes in wages do not reflect changes in the
pool of high or low skill workers. Nevertheless, one may be worried that workers strategically
move in (or are hired) just before the domestic outsourcing events occur. Therefore, I restrict
the sample to workers who have been at the establishment at least three years before the
outsourcing event. The sample here again includes all establishments with an employment
size of at least 20 people the year before the outsourcing event takes place.26 As before, I
focus only on the first domestic outsourcing event an establishment engages in.
Intuitively, the coefficients δ∆ represent the time path of log wages relative to the timing
of the outsourcing decision and conditional on the set of controls. One way to test the
identifying assumption is to verify that δ∆ = 0 for ∆ < 1. The estimation of equation
2.11 can be undertaken using standard panel data techniques, provided one of the indicators
I{t− t∗j = ∆} is normalized for some ∆, as the full set of indicators is perfectly collinear with
either the establishment or worker fixed effect. As is standard in this literature, I normalize
the indicator where ∆ = 0 to zero, as this is when the outsourcing decision is taken, so
post-decision coefficients can be interpreted as treatment effects.
An augmented version of equation 2.11 can be used to test for heterogeneity in the wage
setting process for the different skill groups. In particular, I test this hypothesis using the
following specification, where Educationi(e)t is an indicator variable that takes on value one
when individual j has education level e, and 0 if not. I collapse the results to three education
levels: middle or high school (with or without vocational degree), technical college and
26Running the regressions on a restricted sample of firms that only decide to outsource provide similar






δ∆I{t− t∗j(i) = ∆}+
2∑
e=1
αe×Educationi(e)t× I{t > t∗j(i)}+γXij(i)t+ ξi+ θt+εjt
(2.12)
The skill interactions in this regression are identified off of changes in the wages of workers
that have a certain skill level, and move from the non-outsourcing into the outsourcing
period within this establishment, controlling for fixed worker unobservable characteristics.
Therefore, these are not changes at the establishment across skill groups that are possibly
driven by composition, but rather represent wage increases and wage cuts at the individual
level. The relative pay increase or decrease for other skill groups is then captured by the
αe coefficients. Finally, the αe are not identified for both education groups simultaneously,
so the low skill workers are chosen as the omitted category. This means that the event
study coefficients δ∆ show the time path of wages for low skill workers, and the α1 coefficient
capture the level shift for high skill workers in the aftermath of an outsourcing event. I
cluster standard errors at the establishment level.
Figure 2.4a graphically presents the effect of domestic outsourcing on the wages of workers
that remain in outsourcing establishment and shows the δ∆ coefficients with 95% cluster-
robust confidence intervals for estimating equation 2.11. On average, there is little to no
evidence of spillover effects of domestic outsourcing events on the average wages of workers
that remain in the establishment. Nevertheless, these results mask substantial heterogeneity
across skill groups. Figure 2.4b graphically represents the effects for different education
groups, showing the δ∆ coefficients with 95% cluster-robust confidence intervals, but now for
estimating equation 2.11. Where low skill workers face wage losses of about one to two log
point, high skill workers receive immediate wage increases of about five log points.
Both these effects are not only statistically significant, but also economically significant.
27Similar regressions that distinguish between all six levels of education find relatively similar effects for
middle school (with or without vocational) and high school (with or without vocational). Also technical
college and college exhibit similar patterns motivating the decision to collapse the education variable to
these levels.
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Dustmann, Ludsteck and Schönberg (2009) provide a useful starting point to interpret the
magnitude of these effects. Using IAB data that also draw from the IEB files, they find
that wages at the 15th (85th) percentile of the wage distribution decreased (increased) by
about six (ten) percentage points from 1993 to 2010. The immediate effects of domestic
outsourcing on the wages of workers staying in establishments represent about a third to a
half of this increase. Domestic outsourcing events therefore lead to the same workers being
paid substantially different wages just before and after the outsourcing event.
These results, by and large, confirm the first prediction of the model – that in response to
an outsourcing event and a change in skill composition, the changes in wages for high and low
skill workers move in opposite directions. Finally, it is reasonable to combine medium and
high skill workers into one group, as the effect on these two groups is similar and statistically
indistinguishable.
2.6.3 Importance of Change in Structure
I augment equation 2.12 by pooling the medium and high skill workers into one group
(“High Skill”) and regress the change in wages on the change in the ratio of high to low
skill workers. This is an explicit test of the first comparative static – that wage increases for
high skill workers will be proportional to the change in the skill ratio. As this is essentially
an equilibrium relationship, these results should not be interpreted as a causal relationship.
However, there is no reason to find a correlation like this in the data if the underlying
mechanism is not related to fairness considerations. Table 2.3 presents the results from this
empirical appraoch. The first column shows the estimation results from running specifica-
tion 2.12, whereas the second column presents the relationship between the change in skill
intensity at the establishment and the changes in wages for low and high skill workers. The
third column presents the relationship between the change in skill intensity and the increase
in wages for high skill workers only. The results show a (marginally) significant relationship
between the change in skill intensity and both high and low skill wages. As wages for high
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and low skill workers are expected to move in opposite directions, the different sign on the
coefficients is in line with the theoretical model. Finally, when just focusing on the high skill
workers, the results remain relatively similar. Overall, these results are in line with a model
where fairness considerations across skill groups matter.
2.7 Robustness Checks
One concern, in line with a large literature on skill-biased or task-biased technological
change (Bound and Johnson, 1992; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011), is that changes in investment
drive these changes in wages. For instance, if new technologies are complements for high
skill workers (or the tasks they perform) and substitutes for low skill workers (or the tasks
they perform), changes in investments may change the productivity shifters A1 and A2 in
the way that we observe in the data. In order to assess whether these changes may be driven
by changes in investment, I run regression 2.10 with the log of total investment expenditures
as an outcome. Figure 2.6 shows the result from this regression and plots the effects of
domestic outsourcing events on this establishment outcome. Overall, there is no evidence of
changes in investment levels, as levels are fairly stable across the event study window and not
statistically significant. As a result, there is no evidence of a sudden change in investments.28
A second concern is the parametric assumptions imposed in equation 2.12. Specifically,
the level shifter according to education level before and after the domestic outsourcing event
may mask changes that are not well described by a level shift. In order to allow for more
flexibility, I estimate the dynamice time path by education group non-parametrically before
and after the domestic outsourcing event (but maintain the group of high and medium skill




δ∆I{t− t∗j(i) = ∆} ×
2∑
e=1
αe × Educationi(e)t + γXij(i)t + ξi + θt + εjt (2.13)
28Unfortunately, it is not possible to get a breakdown in investments into what is being invested in.
97
Figure 2.5 highlights that, with this flexible approach, the assumption of a level shift across
the different skill groups is reasonable, as wages for low skill workers seem to decrease more or
less immediately, while wages for high skill workers seem to increase more or less immediately.
The standard errors increase compared to the more parametric version, but the overall effects
of outsourcing on wages are clear. Furthermore, there are no pre-trends for either skill group,
strenghtening the identification assumption.
Finally, additional (omitted) robustness checks confirm that the results are not driven by
workers with imputed wages, or part-time workers.
2.8 Conclusion
This paper investigates the effects of domestic outsourcing events on workers that stay
in the outsourcing establishment. Most research so far has focused on what happens to
wages of those workers that get outsourced at the industry or establishment level. While
these studies find substantial wage losses for workers that are being outsourced (Dube and
Kaplan, 2010; Goldschmidt and Schmieder, 2015), this paper finds that outsourcing events
also have substantial effects on the wages of workers that stay in the establishment. These
findings indicate that employers set wages for workers that likely depend on the wages of
their coworkers. This finding is underpinned by additional findings, that show the wage
increase high skill workers receive in the aftermath of outsourcing events depends on the
extent to which the establishment becomes more skill intensive.
These empirical facts can be interpreted through a model that incorporates fairness con-
siderations into wage setting, allowing for wages of workers to depend on the wages of their
colleages. In particular, I model fairness considerations as affecting effort, as proposed by
Akerlof and Yellen (1988). The reference wage builds on empirical work (see, e.g. Rees
(1993); Card et al. (2012)) that fairness considerations primarily affect workers that are paid
less than their coworkers. I use skill groups to distinguish between high and low wage work-
ers in the establishment and postulate that effort of low skill workers depends on the wage
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dispersion between low and high skill workers within the establishment.
The model predicts that wages for high skill workers will increase if more low than high
skill jobs are outsourced. Additionally, the wages of low skill workers will move in the
opposite direction: when the wages of high skill workers go up, those for low skill workers go
down and vice versa. Finally, the wage increase that high skill workers obtain is correlated
with the change in skill intensity at the establishment. If the ratio of high to low skill workers
increases after the outsourcing event, the wage increase for high skill is expected to be higher.
There are several interesting areas for future research. First, a better understanding
which occupations – both for high and low skill workers – are being outsourced is a feasible
and interesting avenue for future research. Second, there are several interesting other aspects
to fairness that might make for interesting future research. For instance, what is the effect of
fairness norms on labor market flows, search behavior, and productivity in the labor market
– especially in settings where flows across firms or effort on the job can be measured better.
Finally, a better understanding of how fairness norms are shaped (e.g. what is the relevant
reference group workers think about when deciding what is fair) would also be a fruitful area
for future research.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Establishments
Outsourcing Category
Catering Cleaning Security Logistics
Year Before Outsourcing
Median log Daily Wage (e) 4.314 4.275 4.316 4.256
(0.329) (0.332) (0.335) (0.358)
Middle/High School 0.158 0.137 0.160 0.127
Middle/High School + Vocational 0.675 0.675 0.670 0.683
Technical College / College 0.095 0.074 0.104 0.096
Missing 0.072 0.104 0.087 0.093
Total Employment 508.9 270.1 344.9 212.0
(1,158.0) (717.0) (532.4) (573.3)
CBA 0.793 0.665 0.750 0.675
Missing 0.035 0.023 0.034 0.026
Part-Time 0.192 0.177 0.206 0.172
log per capita Profit 6.032 6.875 6.470 6.592
(8.866) (8.031) (8.465) (8.231)
Missing 0.388 0.234 0.378 0.277
Observations 1,537 3,407 2,117 2,322
Not Outsourcing
Median log Wage 4.207 4.193 4.193 4.200
(0.429) (0.443) (0.439) (0.441)
Middle/High School 0.129 0.130 0.131 0.132
Middle/High School + Vocational 0.665 0.663 0.662 0.661
Technical College / College 0.077 0.094 0.092 0.094
Missing 0.113 0.112 0.116 0.113
Total Employment 179.8 182.7 184.0 196.3
(827.6) (857.2) (877.6) (866.5)
CBA 0.566 0.560 0.560 0.570
Missing 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.020
Part-Time 0.210 0.215 0.212 0.217
log per capita Profit 6.217 6.118 6.161 6.191
(8.354) (8.408) (8.372) (8.363)
Missing 0.211 0.214 0.204 0.216
Observations 183,221 171,929 181,924 181,924
Notes: Mean of each variable with standard deviation in parentheses. Statistics are calculated
in year before outsourcing for outsourcing establishments and across all observations for estab-
lishments that do not outsourced in the sample period. All columns exclude East Germany
prior to 1996.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for Workers Remaining in the Establishment
Outsourcing Category
Catering Cleaning Security Logistics
At Outsourcing
Mean log Daily Wage (e) 3.844 3.830 3.786 3.888
(0.480) (0.472) (0.500) (0.535)
Age 41.750 41.729 41.478 42.158
(10.019) (10.100) (10.156) (10.077)
Female 0.362 0.363 0.411 0.449
Nongerman 0.068 0.067 0.079 0.048
Part-Time 0.135 0.117 0.138 0.172
Education
Middle/High School 0.165 0.175 0.181 0.133
Middle/High School + Vocational 0.723 0.712 0.705 0.715
Technical College / College 0.112 0.113 0.114 0.152
Missing 0.029 0.036 0.056 0.050
Job Tenure 10.525 10.513 9.527 9.151
(7.395) (7.547) (7.039) (7.331)
Establishment Tenure 11.379 11.395 10.241 9.975
(7.493) (7.618) (7.123) (7.588)
Observations 253,448 311,844 259,916 135,484
Never Outsourced
Mean log Daily Wage (e) 3.897 3.915 3.900 3.897
(0.569) (0.560) (0.569) (0.573)
Age 41.658 41.578 41.639 41.587
(10.113) (10.105) (10.106) (10.141)
Female 0.369 0.361 0.372 0.387
Nongerman 0.071 0.069 0.071 0.071
Part-Time 0.141 0.132 0.142 0.146
Education
Middle/High School 0.162 0.154 0.164 0.159
Middle/High School + Vocational 0.706 0.714 0.705 0.706
Technical College / College 0.132 0.132 0.131 0.135
Missing 0.045 0.041 0.044 0.043
Job Tenure 9.819 9.852 9.929 9.877
(7.432) (7.441) (7.478) (7.454)
Establishment Tenure 10.585 10.622 10.712 10.674
(7.556) (7.565) (7.600) (7.579)
Observations 28,842,142 27,943,626 29,200,157 28,719,570
Notes: Mean of each variable with standard deviation in parentheses. The top panel reports statistics that are calculated for each type
of outsourcing separately, and covers workers that work in an establishment that outsources catering, cleaning, security or logistics
(CCSL) services, but are not employed in the outsourced category. These statistics are reported the year before outsourcing. The
second panel reports statistics that are calculated for each type of outsourcing separately, and covers workers that are not employed
in the occupation of interest or in the related business service industry. The sample covers workers that are between 20 and 60 years
old, and whose log earnings are between 2 and 6.5 for both the top and the bottom panel. All columns exclude East Germany prior
to 1996.
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Table 2.3: Event Study coefficients Interacted with Change in Share Low over High Skill
Dependent Variable: ln(wij(i)t)
(1) (2) (3)
High Skill ×Outsourcing 0.0641∗∗∗
(.0084)
High Skill ×Outsourcing 0.0167∗ 0.0189∗
×∆SkillRatio (0.0100) (0.0106)
Low Skill ×Outsourcing -0.0058∗
×∆SkillRatio (0.0032)
I{t− t∗ < −5} -0.0044 0.0084 0.0085
(0.0142) (0.0155) (0.0155)
I{t− t∗ = −5} -0.0033 0.0065 0.0065
(0.0105) (0.0112) (0.0112)
I{t− t∗ = −4} -0.0050 0.0037 0.0037
(0.0077) (0.0081) (0.0081)
I{t− t∗ = −3} -0.0129 -0.0051 -0.0050
(0.0089) (0.0101) (0.0101)
I{t− t∗ = −2} -0.0085 -0.0034 -0.0033
(0.0089) (0.0094) (0.0094)
I{t− t∗ = −1} -0.0113 -0.0094 -0.0094
(0.0101) (0.0107) (0.0107)
I{t− t∗ = 1} -0.0125 -0.0054 -0.0107
(0.0068) (0.0088) (0.0074)
I{t− t∗ = 2} -0.0198∗∗ -0.0142 -0.0196∗∗
(0.0083) (0.0097) (0.0084)
I{t− t∗ = 3} -0.0247∗∗ -0.0208∗ -0.0262∗∗
(0.0099) (0.0114) (0.0103)
I{t− t∗ = 4} -0.0228∗∗ -0.0210∗∗ -0.0263∗∗∗
(0.0091) (0.0103) (0.0092)
I{t− t∗ = 5} -0.0232∗∗ -0.0222∗ -0.0276∗∗
(0.0113) (0.0125) (0.0115)
I{t− t∗ > 6} -0.0312∗∗ -0.0336∗∗ -0.0388∗∗
(0.0147) (0.0165) (0.0158)
Notes: These coefficients provide event study coefficients for the different models where the outcome
of interest is the log of worker wages. The event study regression controls for sales, an indicator for
whether sales is missing, a second-order polynomial in (establishmet) tenure, and worker and year fixed
effects.
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Establishments Deciding to Outsource


















(b) Fraction of Establishments Outsourcing
Notes: The top panel shows the fraction of establishment that decide to engage in outsourcing, broken up
by relevant occupational category. The bottom panel shows the fraction of establishments that are currently
engaging in outsourcing. Source: author’s calculations.
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Years relative to Outsourcing Decision
Effect of Outsourcing log(Occupations)
(b) Effect on log(Occupations) at outsourcing establishments
Notes: These graphs plot event study coefficients where the outcome of interest is the log of the number
of employees (upper panel) and occupations (lower panel) in the establishment. The event study regression
controls for region, establishment and year fixed effects.
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Years relative to Outsourcing Decision
Effect of Outsourcing on Skill Ratio
Notes: This graph plots the event study coefficients where the outcome of interest is the log of the skill
ratio (number of high skill workers over number of low skill workers) in the establishment. The event study
regression controls for region, establishment and year fixed effects.
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Years relative to Outsourcing Decision
Low Skill Medium Skill High Skill
Effect of Outsourcing on Wages of Remaining Workers
(b) Effect on wages at the establishments by skill group
Notes: These graphs plot event study coefficients where the outcome of interest is the log of worker wages,
with the upper panel using the regression specification 2.11 and the lower panel uses the regression speci-
fication 2.12. The event study regression controls for age, gender, education, and worker, region, and year
fixed effects.
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Years relative to Outsourcing Decision
Low Skill High Skill
Nonparametric Specification
Effect of Outsourcing on Remaining Workers
Notes: These graphs plot event study coefficients where the outcome of interest is the log of worker wages
using the non-parametric regression equation 2.13. The event study regression controls for age, gender,
education, and worker, region, and year fixed effects.
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Years relative to Outsourcing Decision
Effect of Outsourcing on Establishment Investments
Notes: This graph plots the event study coefficients where the outcome of interest is the log of investments at
the establishment level. The event study regression controls for region, establishment and year fixed effects,
and sets missing values for investment equal to zero, while controlling for a dummy variable that takes on
value 1 if the investment outcome is missing in that year and zero when not missing.
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CHAPTER III
Measuring Instructor Effectiveness in Higher
Education
3.1 Introduction
Professors and instructors are a chief input into the higher education production process,
yet we know very little about their role in promoting student success. There is growing
evidence that teacher quality is an important determinant of student achievement in K12,
with some school districts identifying and rewarding teachers with high value-added. Yet
relatively little is known about the importance of or correlates of instructor effectiveness in
postsecondary education. Such information may be particularly important at the postsec-
ondary level, in which administrators often have substantial discretion to reallocate teaching
assignments not only within a specific class of instructors (e.g., tenured faculty), but across
instructor types (e.g., adjuncts vs. tenured faculty).
There are a number of challenges to measuring effectiveness in the context of higher
education. Unlike in K12, there are rarely standardized test scores to use as an outcome.
Furthermore, to the extent that college courses and majors intend to teach a very wide variety
of knowledge and skills, it is harder to imagine an appropriate outcome as a conceptual
matter. The issue of non-random student sorting across instructors is arguably more serious
in the context of higher education because students have a great deal of flexibility in the
choice classes and the timing of these classes. Finally, one might have serious concerns
about the attribution of a particular skill to a specific instructor given the degree to which
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knowledge spills over across courses in college (e.g., the importance of calculus in intermediate
microeconomics or introductory physics, the value of English composition in a history classes
where the grade is based almost entirely on a term paper, etc.) For many reasons, the
challenge of evaluating college instructors is more akin to the problem of rating physicians
(Staiger, 2018).
This paper tackles these challenges to answer two main questions. First, is there variation
in instructor effectiveness in higher education? We examine this in a highly standardized
setting where one would expect minimal variation in what instructors actually do. Second,
how does effectiveness correlate with teaching experience and salary? This informs whether
teaching assignment and personnel policies could be used to increase effectiveness and insti-
tutional productivity. We examine these questions using detailed administrative data from
the University of Phoenix (UPX), the largest university in the world, which offers both online
and in-person courses in a wide array of fields and degree programs. We focus on instructors
in the college algebra course that is required for all students in BA degree programs and
that often is a roadblock to student attainment.
This context provides several advantages. Our sample includes more than two thousand
instructors over more than a decade in campuses all across the United States. This allows
us to generate extremely precise estimates, and to generalize to a much larger population
than has been the case in previous studies. Most students in these courses take a common,
standardized assessment that provides an objective outcome by which to measure instructor
effectiveness. And, as we describe below, student enrollment and course assignment is such
that we believe the issue of sorting is either non-existent (in the case of the online course)
or extremely small (in the case of face-to-face or FTF courses).
These institutional advantages possibly come at some cost, however, to generalizability.
The UPX does not match the “traditional” model of higher education, in which tenured
professors at selective institutions teach courses they develop themselves and have non-
instructional responsibilities (such as research). UPX is a for-profit institution with con-
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tingent (i.e., non-tenured, mostly part-time) faculty that is focused solely on instruction,
and the courses are highly standardized, with centrally prepared curriculum materials and
assessments (both online and face-to-face sections). While our findings may not generalize
to all sectors of higher education, we believe they are relevant for the growing for-profit
sector and possibly less-selective 4-year and community colleges that also have many con-
tingent instructors. A limitation of prior research is that it focuses on selective non-profit
or public institutions, which are quite different from the non-selective or for-profit sectors.
It is in these settings with many contingent faculty and institutions whose primary purpose
is instruction (rather than, say, research) where productivity-driven personnel policies could
theoretically be adapted.
We find substantial variation in student performance across instructors. A 1 SD increase
in instructor quality is associated with 0.30 SD increase in grades in the current course and a
0.20 SD increase in grades in the subsequent course in the math sequence. Unlike some prior
work (Carrell and West, 2010), we find a positive correlation between instructor effectiveness
measured by current and subsequent course performance overall and for face-to-face courses.
The variation in instructor effectiveness is larger for in-person courses, but still substantial
for online courses. These broad patterns and magnitudes are robust to extensive controls
to address any possible non-random student sorting, using test scores that are less likely to
be under the control of instructors, and other specification checks. These magnitudes are
substantially larger than found in the K12 literature and in the Carrell and West (2010) study
of the Air Force Academy, but comparable to the recent estimates from DeVry University
(Bettinger et al., 2015). Furthermore, instructor effects on future course performance has
little correlation with student end-of-course evaluations, the primary metric through which
instructor effectiveness is currently judged.
Salary is primarily determined by tenure (time since hire), but is mostly uncorrelated with
measured effectiveness or course-specific teaching experience, both in the cross-section and
for individual teachers over time. However, effectiveness grows modestly with course-specific
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teaching experience but is otherwise unrelated to time since hire. Given the disconnect
between pay and effectiveness, the performance differences we uncover translate directly
to differences in productivity from the University’s perspective. These large productivity
differences imply that personnel decisions and policies that attract, develop, allocate, moti-
vate, and retain faculty are a potentially important tool for improving student success and
productivity at the University of Phoenix. Our study institution – like almost all others –
measures faculty effectiveness through student end-of-course evaluations, despite only min-
imal correlation between evaluation scores and our measures of effectiveness. Thus current
practices are not doing a great job of identifying or supporting effective instructors. Though
policy-makers and practitioners have recently paid a lot of attention to the importance of
teachers in elementary and secondary school, there is surprisingly little attention paid to the
importance of instructors or instructor-related policies and practices at the postsecondary
level.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. We discuss prior evidence on college
instructor effectiveness and our institutional context in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 introduces
our administrative data sources and our analysis sample. Section 3.4 presents our empirical
approach and examines the validity of our proposed method. Our main results quantifying
instructor effectiveness are presented in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 examines how instructor
effectiveness correlates with experience. Section 3.7 concludes by discussing the implications
of our work for institutional performance and productivity.
3.2 Prior Evidence and Institutional Context
3.2.1 Prior Evidence
There is substantial evidence that teacher quality is an important determinant of student
achievement in elementary and secondary education (Rockoff, 2004; Rivkin, Hanushek and
Kain, 2005; Rothstein, 2010; Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff, 2014). Many states and school
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districts now incorporate measures of teacher effectiveness into personnel policies in order to
select and retain better teachers (Jackson, Rockoff and Staiger, 2014). Yet little is known
about instructor effectiveness in postsecondary education, in part due to difficulties with
outcome measurement and self-selection. Standardized assessments are rare and grading
subjectivity across professors makes outcome measurement difficult. In addition, students
often choose professors and courses, so it is difficult to separate instructors’ contribution to
student outcomes from student sorting. As a consequence of these two challenges, only a
handful of existing studies examine differences in professor effectiveness.
Several prior studies have found that the variance of college instructor effectiveness is
small compared to what has been estimated for elementary teachers. Focusing on large,
introductory courses at a Canadian research university, Hoffmann and Oreopoulos (2009b)
find the standard deviation of professor effectiveness in terms of course grades is no larger
than 0.08. Carrell and West (2010) examine students at the U.S. Air Force Academy, where
grading is standardized and students have no choice over coursework or instructors. They
find sizeable differences in student achievement across professors teaching the same courses,
roughly 0.05 SD, which is about half as large as in the K12 sector.
Interestingly, instructors that were better at improving contemporary performance re-
ceived higher teacher evaluations but were less successful at promoting “deep-learning,” as
indicated by student performance in subsequent courses. Braga, Paccagnella and Pellizzari
(2014) estimate teacher effects on both student academic achievement and labor market
outcomes at Bocconi University. They also find significant variation in teacher effectiveness,
roughly 0.05 SD both for academic and labor market outcomes. They find only a modest
correlation of instructor effectiveness in academic and labor market outcomes.
Two recent studies have concluded that instructors play a larger role in student success.
(Bettinger et al., 2015) examine instructor effectiveness using data from DeVry University,
a large for-profit institution in which the average student takes two-thirds of her courses
online. They find a variance of instructor effectiveness that is substantially larger than prior
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studies in higher education. Specifically, they find that being taught by an instructor that is
1 SD more effective improves student course grades by about 0.18 to 0.24 SD. The estimated
variation is 15% lower when courses are online, even among instructors that teach in both
formats. Among instructors of economics, statistics, and computer science at an elite French
public university, Brodaty and Gurgand (2016) find that a 1 SD increase in teacher quality is
associated with a 0.14 or 0.25 SD increase in student test scores, depending on the subject.
A few studies have also examined whether specific professor characteristics correlate with
student success, though the results are quite mixed.1 Using institutional-level data from a
sample of U.S. universities, Ehrenberg and Zhang (2005) find a negative relationship be-
tween the use of adjuncts and student persistence, though they acknowledge that this could
be due to non-random sorting of students across schools. Hoffmann and Oreopoulos (2009b)
find no relationship between faculty rank (including adjuncts and tenure-track faculty) and
subsequent course enrollment. Two other studies find positive effects of adjuncts. Study-
ing course-taking among students in public four-year institutions in Ohio, Bettinger and
Long (2010) find adjuncts are more likely to induce students to take further courses in the
same subject. Using a sample of large, introductory courses taken by first-term students at
Northwestern University, Figlio, Schapiro and Soter (2015) find that adjuncts are positively
associated with subsequent course-taking in the subject as well as performance in these sub-
sequent courses. In their study of the U.S. Air Force Academy, Carrell and West (2010)
find that academic rank, teaching experience, and terminal degree are positively correlated
with follow-on course performance, though negatively related to contemporary student per-
formance.
There is also evidence that gender and racial match between students and instructors
influences students’ interest and performance (Bettinger and Long, 2005; Hoffmann and Ore-
opoulos, 2009a; Fairlie, Hoffmann and Oreopoulos, 2014). Finally, Hoffmann and Oreopoulos
(2009b) find that students’ subjective evaluations of professors are a much better predictor
1Much of this evidence is reviewed in Ehrenberg (2012).
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of student academic performance than objective professor characteristics such as rank. This
echoes the finding of Jacob and Lefgren (2008) that elementary school principals can identify
effective teachers, but that observed teacher characteristics tend to explain little of teacher
effectiveness.
A limitation of this prior research is that it focuses largely on selective non-profit or
public institutions, which are quite different from the non-selective or for-profit sectors that
constitute a large and growing share of the postsecondary sector. It is in these settings with
many contingent faculty and institutions whose primary purpose is instruction (rather than,
say, research) where productivity-driven personnel policies could theoretically be adapted.
Students at these types of institutions also have lower rates of degree completion, so facili-
tating these students’ success is thus particularly important policy goal. The one prior study
examining a setting similar to ours (Bettinger et al’s 2015 study of Devry University) focuses
on differences in student performance between online and in-person formats, with very little
attention paid to instructors. The simultaneous consideration of multiple outcomes and how
the exploration of how effectiveness varies with salary and teaching experience is also novel
in the postsecondary literature.
3.2.2 Context: College Algebra at The University of Phoenix
We study teacher effectiveness in the context of the University of Phoenix, a large for-
profit university that offers both online and face-to-face (FTF) courses. UPX offers a range
of programs, including AA, BA and graduate degrees, while also offering à-la carte courses.
We focus on core mathematics courses, MTH208 and MTH209 (College Mathematics I and
II), which are a requirement for most BA programs. Below we describe these courses, the
process through which instructors are hired and evaluated, and the mechanism through
which students are allocated to instructors.2 As highlighted above, the context of both the
institution and the coursework does not translate to all sectors of higher education: the
2This description draws on numerous conversations between the research team and individuals at the
University of Phoenix.
115
faculty body is largely contingent and employed part-time and admissions is non-selective.
3.2.2.1 MTH208 and MTH209
BA-level courses at UPX are typically five weeks in duration and students take one
course at a time (sequentially), in contrast to the typical structure at most universities. The
MTH208 curriculum focuses on setting up algebraic equations and solving single and two-
variable linear equations and inequalities. Additionally, the coursework focuses on relating
equations to real-world applications, generating graphs, and the use of exponents. MTH209 is
considered a logical follow-up course, focusing on more complicated, non-linear equations and
functions. Students in our sample take MTH208 after completing about eight other courses,
so enrollment in the math course sequence does signify a higher level of commitment to
the degree program than students in the most entry-level courses. However, many students
struggle in these introductory math courses and they are regarded by UPX staff as an
important obstacle to obtaining a BA for many students.
Students can take these courses online or in-person. In the face-to-face sections, students
attend four hours of standard in-class lecture per week, typically held on a single day in
the evening. In addition, students are required to work with peers roughly four hours per
week on what is known as “learning team” modules. Students are then expected to spend
16 additional hours per week outside of class reading material, working on assignments and
studying for exams.3
Online courses are asynchronous, which means that a set of course materials is provided
through the online learning platform, and instructors provide guidance and feedback through
online discussion forums and redirect students to relevant materials when necessary. There is
no synchronous or face-to- face interaction with faculty in the traditional sense, but students
are required to actively participate in online discussions by substantively posting six to eight
times per week over three to four days. One instructor defined a substantive post as having
3There have been recent reductions in the use of learning team interactions in the past two years, but
these changes occurred after our analysis sample.
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substantial math content:
Substantial math content means you are discussing math concepts and problems. A sub-
stantive math post will have at least one math problem in it. Simply talking “around” the
topic (such as, “I have trouble with the negative signs” or “I need to remember to switch the
signs when I divide by a negative coefficient”) will not be considered substantive. (Morris,
2016).
Online participation is the equivalent of the four hours of classes for the FTF sections.4
There are differences between the two course modes in terms of curriculum and grading
flexibility. Both courses have standardized course curricula, assignments, and tests that are
made available to the instructors. Grading for these components is performed automatically
through the course software. However, FTF instructors sometimes provide students with
their own learning tools, administer extra exams and homework, or add other components
that are not part of the standard curriculum. In contrast, online instructors mainly take
the course materials and software as given, and interaction with students for these teachers
is mainly limited to the online discussion forum. In both online and FTF courses, teachers
are able to choose the weights they assign to specific course components for the final grade.
As discussed below, for this reason we also use student performance on the final exam as an
outcome measure.
3.2.2.2 Hiring and Allocation of Instructors
The hiring and onboarding process of teachers is managed and controlled by a central
hiring committee that is hosted at the Phoenix, AZ campus, though much input comes from
local staff at ground campuses. First, this committee checks whether a new candidate has an
appropriate degree.5 Second, qualified candidates then go through a five-week standardized
4The posting requirements actually changed over time - for the majority of the time of the study, the
requirement was four days a week, two substantive posts per day (i.e., eight posts). In the past several years,
it went to six times per week, on at last three days (effectively, allowing for two single post days).
5For MTH208 sections, for instance, a minimum requirement might be having a master’s degree in
mathematics, or a master’s degree in biology, engineering or similar coursework, along with a minimum
number of credits in advanced mathematics courses and teaching experience in mathematics.
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training course they need to pass. This includes a mock lecture for FTF instructors and a
mock online session for online instructors. Finally, an evaluator sits in on the first class or
follows the online course to ensure the instructor performs according to university standards.
Salaries are relatively fixed, but do vary somewhat with respect to degree and tenure.6 We
should note that the actual hiring process for instructors may deviate from this description
for certain campuses or in time periods when positions are particularly difficult to fill.
The allocation of instructors to classes is essentially random for online classes. About 60
MTH208 sections are started weekly and the roster is only made available to students two or
three days before the course starts, at which point students are typically enrolled. The only
way to sidestep these teacher assignments is by dropping the course altogether and enrolling
in a subsequent week. This differs from most settings in other higher education institutions,
where students have more discretion over what section to attend. For FTF sections, the
assignment works differently, since most campuses are too small to have different sections
concurrently and students may need to wait for a few months if they decide to take the next
MTH208 section at that campus. While this limits the ability of students to shop around
for a better teacher, the assignment of students to these sections is likely to be less random
than for online sections. For this reason, we rely on value-added models that control for a
host of student-specific characteristics that may correlate with both instructor and student
course performance.
3.2.2.3 Evaluation and Retention of Instructors
UPX has in place three main evaluation tools to keep track of the performance of in-
structors. First, instructors need to take a yearly refresher course on teaching methods,
and an evaluator will typically sit in or follow an online section every year to ensure the
quality of the instructor still meets the university’s requirements. Second, there is an in-
6For instance, all else equal, instructors with a Ph.D. can expect a higher salary than instructors with
a master’s degree. Additionally, tenure in this context refers to the date of first hire at the University
of Phoenix. Salary differences are larger among new instructors, and tend to diminish at higher levels of
experience.
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house data analytics team that tracks key performance parameters. These include average
response time to questions asked through the online platform, or indicators that students
in sections are systematically getting too high (or too low) overall grades. For instance, if
instructors consistently give every student in a section high grades, this will raise a flag, and
the validity of these grades will be verified. Finally, additional evaluations can be triggered
if students file complaints about instructor performance. If these evaluation channels show
the instructor has not met the standards of the university, the instructor receives a warning.
Instructors that have received a warning are followed up more closely in subsequent courses.
If the instructor performance does not improve, the university will not hire the person back
for subsequent courses.
3.3 Data
We investigate variation in instructor effectiveness using data drawn from administrative
UPX records. This section describes these records, the sample selection, and descriptive
statistics. While the data we analyze has very rich information about the experiences of
students and instructors while at the University of Phoenix, information on outside activities
is limited.
3.3.1 Data Sources
We analyze university administrative records covering all students and teachers who
have taken or taught MTH208 at least once between July 2000 and July 2014. The raw
data contains information on 2,343 instructors that taught 34,725 sections of MTH208 with
a total of 396,038 student-section observations. For all of these instructors and students,
we obtain the full teaching and course-taking history back to 2000.7 Our analysis spans 84
campuses (plus the online campus). There is typically one campus per city, but some larger
7The administrative records are not available before 2000 because of information infrastructure differences,
leading to incomplete teaching and course-taking spells for professors and students respectively.
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metropolitan areas have multiple physical locations (branches) at which courses are offered.8
3.3.1.1 Instructors
We draw on three information sources for instructor level characteristics. A first dataset
provides the full teaching history of instructors that have ever taught MTH208, covering
190,066 class sections. Information includes the campus and location of instruction, subject,
the number of credits, and start date and end date of the section.
For each instructor x section observation, we calculate the instructor’s teaching load for
the current year, as well as the number of sections he or she had taught in the past separately
for MTH208 and other courses. This allows us to construct a variety of different experience
measures, which we use in the analysis below. As the teaching history is censored before the
year 2000, we only calculate the cumulative experience profile for instructors hired in the
year 2000 or later.
The second dataset contains self-reported information on ethnicity and gender of the
instructor, along with complete information on the date of first hire, the type of employment
(full-time or part-time) and the zip code of residence.9 A unique instructor identifier allows
us to merge this information onto the MTH208 sections.10 A third dataset contains the
salary information for the instructor of each section, which can be merged onto the MTH208
sections using the unique section identifier.
3.3.1.2 Students
Student-level information combines four data sources: demographics, transcript, assess-
ment, and student end-of-course evaluations. The demographics dataset provides informa-
tion on the zip code of residence, gender, age of the student, program the student is enrolled
8There are more than 200 physical locations (branches) corresponding to these 84 campuses.
9This instructor dataset also contains information on birth year and military affiliation, though these
variables have high non-response rates and are therefore not used for the analysis.
10The instructor identifier is, in principle, unique. It is possible, however, that an instructor shows up
under two different identifiers if the instructor leaves the university and then returns after a long time. While
this is a possibility, UPX administrators considered this unlikely to be a pervasive issue in their records.
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in, program start, and program end date.11 A unique student identifier number allows us to
merge this information onto the course-taking history of the student.
Transcript data contains complete course-taking history including the start and end date
of the section, campus of instruction, grade, and number of credits. Every section has
a unique section identifier that allows for matching students to instructors. Additionally,
student-level information includes course completion, course grade, earned credits, along
with a unique student identifier that allows for merging on the student demographics.
For sections from July 2010 to March 2014, or roughly 30 percent of the full sample, we
have detailed information on student performance separately by course assignment or assess-
ment, which includes everything from individual homework assignments to group exercises
to exams. We use this data to obtain a final exam score for each student when available.
Because the data does not have a single, clear code for final exam component across all
sections, and instructors have discretion to add additional final exam components, we use a
decision rule to identify the “best” exam score for each student based on the text description
of the assessment object. Approximately 11% of observations have a single score clearly tied
to the common computer-administered final assessment, 77% have a single assessment for
a final exam (but we cannot be certain it is from the standardized online system), and the
remainder have final exam assessments that are a little more ambiguous. Discussions with
UPX personnel indicated that the vast majority of instructors use the online standardized
assessment tool with no customization, but unfortunately this is not recorded in the admin-
istrative data. Nonetheless, results excluding this latter group are quite similar to analysis
with the full sample. Our approach is outlined in Appendix B.
While the analysis focuses on course grades and final test scores, it also considers future
performance measures, such as grades and cumulative grade point average earned in the 180
or 365 days following the MTH208 section of interest. Given the linear, one-by-one nature
11Similar to the instructor dataset, demographic data are self-reported. While information on gender and
age is missing for less than 1% of the sample, information on ethnicity, veteran status, and transfer credits
exhibit much larger non-response rates and are therefore not used for the analysis.
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of the coursework, these measures capture the effect instructors have on moving students
towards obtaining a final degree.
Finally, for sections taught between March 2010 and July 2014, we obtained student end-
of-course evaluations. Students are asked whether they would recommend the instructor on
a ten point scale. Recommendation scores of 8 or above are considered “good” and are the
primary form that the evaluations are used by the University of Phoenix administration.
We follow this practice and use a binary indicator for whether the recommendation score
is at least 8 as our primary evaluation measure. End of course evaluations are optional
for students so have a relatively low response rate. Only 37% of students provide a course
evaluation score for MTH208, which is less than half of the students that have a final exam
test score for MTH208. While non-random missing evaluations could create bias in our
estimates of teacher effectiveness, this bias is also present in the evaluations as used by the
institution. Our goal is to see how evaluations as currently used in practice correlate with
more objective measures of teacher effectiveness.
3.3.1.3 Census Data
In addition to the UPX administrative school records, we use several census data resources
to get additional variables capturing the characteristics of students’ residential neighbor-
hoods. In particular, we obtain the unemployment rate, median family income, the percent-
age of family below the poverty line, and the percentage with a bachelor degree or higher of
students’ home zip code, from the 2004-2007 five-year ACS files.
3.3.2 Sample Selection
Starting from the raw data, we apply several restrictions to obtain the primary analysis
sample. We restrict our analysis to the 33,200 MTH208 sections that started between Jan-
uary 2001 and July 2014. We then drop all students with missing data for final grade or
unusual grades (0.1% of students) as well as students who do not show up in the student
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demographics file (0.3% of remaining students).12 We then drop all cancelled sections (0.02%
of the sections), sections with fewer than 5 enrolled students who had non-missing final grade
and did not withdraw from the course (11.4% of the remaining sections) and sections for
which the instructor is paid less than $300 (5.2% of remaining sections). We believe the
final two restrictions exclude sections that were not actual courses, but rather independent
studies of some sort. We also drop sections for which the instructor does not show up in the
teacher demographics file, which is 3.5% of the remaining sections.
To calculate instructor experience, we use an instructor-section panel that drops observa-
tions where there is no salary information (about 3% of sections), the section was cancelled
(0.04%), and with less than 5 students (21.7% of the remaining sections) or for which the
instructor is paid less than $300 (8.6% of the remaining sections). As above, these final two
restrictions are meant to exclude independent study type courses or other unusual courses
that may enter differently into the teacher human capital function.13 We then calculate sev-
eral experience measures based on this sample. We calculate measures of experience such as
number of courses taught in the previous calendar year and total cumulative experience in
MTH208 specifically and in other categories of classes. The complete cumulative experience
measures are only fully available for instructors that were hired after 2000, since the teaching
history is not available in prior years.
Finally, we drop data from nine campuses because none of the instructors we observe
in these campuses ever taught in another physical campus or online. As discuss below, in
order to separately identify campus and instructor fixed effects, each campus must have at
least one instructor that has taught in a different location. Fortunately, these nine campuses
represent only 2 percent of the remaining sections and 4 percent of remaining instructors.
12We keep students with grades A-F, I/A-I/F (incomplete A-F) or W (withdraw). Roughly 0.1% of scores
are missing or not A-F or I/A-I/F (incomplete), and we drop these. These grades include AU (audit), I
(incomplete), IP, IX, OC, ON, P, QC and missing values.
13There are three instructors that are first employed part-time and then employed full-time. As the part-
time spells are longer than the full-time spells, we use the part-time demographics only. This restriction
only impacts the employment type and date of first hire, as the other demographics are the same for the two
employment spells for all three instructors.
123
The final analysis sample consists of 339,844 students in 26,384 sections, taught by 2,243
unique instructors. The sub-sample for which final exam data is available includes 94,745
students in 7,232 MTH208 sections taught by 1,198 unique instructors. We calculate various
student characteristics from the transcript data, including cumulative grade point average
and cumulative credits earned prior to enrolling in MTH208, as well as future performance
measures. In the rare case of missing single student demographic variables, we set missing
to zero and include an indicator variable for missing.
3.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
We report key descriptive statistics for the final analysis sample, spanning January 2001 to
July 2014, in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2. We report these statistics for all sections, and for FTF
and online sections separately. Table 3.1 reports section and instructor characteristics for
the 26,384 MTH208 sections, while Table 3.2 reports student background characteristics and
student performance measures. About half of all sections are taught online, and instructors
are paid about $950 for teaching a course, regardless of the instruction mode.14 Instructors
are majority white and male and have been at the university just under five years.15 They
typically have taught more than 40 total course sections since joining the faculty, of which 15
were MTH208 and 10 were MTH209. Instructors teaching online sections tend to specialize
more in teaching MTH208 compared to their counterparts teaching FTF sections. Class size
is about 13 students and is slightly larger for FTF than online sections. Tables C.1 and C.2
in the appendix report descriptive statistics for the sample for which test scores are available
(July 2010 – March 2014). The test score sample is quite similar to the full sample, though
the instructors are typically more experienced.
Table 3.1 provides an overview of student characteristics and performance. The students
enrolled in these sections tend to be female, around 35 years old, and typically have taken 23
14The earnings measures are deflated using the national CPI. For each year, the CPI in April was used,
with April 2001 as the base.
15Though omitted from the table, nearly 100% of instructors are part-time.
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credits with a GPA of 3.35 prior to beginning MTH208. Students in online sections tend to
have earned somewhat fewer credits than their counterparts in FTF sections, and are more
likely to have taken MTH208 before. Most students, both in FTF and online sections, are
enrolled in a business or general studies program.
Students across both modes of instruction are equally likely to earn a grade of A (about
32%) or B (about 27%) and have similar final exam scores (70%) when available. Consistent
with prior work, online students are more likely to withdraw from and less likely to pass
MTH208 than students in FTF sections. In terms of student performance after taking
MTH208, we find that FTF students are more likely to go on and take MTH209.16 Students
earn about 10.5 credits in the six months following the MTH208 section, with a two-credit gap
between FTF and online students. Participation in end-of-course evaluations is similar across
formats, though FTF students generally report a greater level of instructor satisfaction.
3.4 Empirical Approach
Our main aim is to characterize the variation in student performance across instructors
teaching the same courses. Consider the standard “value-added” model of student achieve-
ment given in equation (3.1):
Yijkt = β1Xi + β2Zjkt + φt + δc + θk + eijkt (3.1)
where Yijkt is the outcome of student i in section j taught by instructor k during term t.
The set of parameters θk quantify the contribution of instructor k to the performance of
their students, above and beyond what could be predicted by observed characteristics of
the student (Xi), course section (Zjkt), campus(δk) or time period (φt). The variance of θk
across instructors measures the dispersion of instructor quality and is our primary parameter
of interest. We are particularly interested in how the distribution of θk varies across outcomes
16Conditional on taking MTH209, both online and FTF students typically take this class about a week
after the MTH208 section.
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and formats, and how effectiveness covaries across outcomes.
Estimation of the standard value-added model in (3.1) must confront three key issues.
First, non-random assignment of students to instructors or instructors to course sections
could bias value-added models. In the presence of non-random sorting, differences in perfor-
mance across sections could be driven by differences in student characteristics rather than
differences in instructor effectiveness per se. Second, outcomes should reflect student learning
rather than grading leniency or “teaching to the test” of instructors. Furthermore, missing
outcomes may bias instructor effects if follow-up information availability is not random.
Third, our ability to make performance comparisons between instructors across campuses
while also controlling for cross-campus differences in unobserved factors relies on the presence
of instructors that teach at multiple campuses. We address each of these in turn below.
3.4.1 Course and Instructor Assignment
In many education settings, we worry about non-random assignment of instructors to
sections (and students) creating bias in VA measures (Rothstein, 2009; Chetty, Friedman
and Rockoff, 2014). In general, we believe that there is relatively little scope for sorting
in our setting. Students do not know much about the instructor when they enroll, and
instructors are only assigned to specific sections about two days before the start of the
course for online sections. Students who have a strong preference with regard to instructor
can choose to drop the course once they learn the instructor’s identity, but this would mean
that they would likely have to wait until the start of the next session to take the course,
at which point they would be randomly assigned to a section again. According to UPX
administrators, there is no sorting at all in online courses, which is plausible given the very
limited interaction students with have with instructors in the initial meetings of the course.
UPX admits the possibility of some sorting in FTF courses, but believe this is likely minimal.
To explore the extent of sorting, we conduct two types of tests. First, we test whether
observable instructor characteristics correlate with the observable characteristics of students
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in a section. To do so, we regress mean student characteristics on instructor characteristics,
where each observation is a course section.17 Table 3.3 reports the estimates from three
regression models which differ in terms of the type of fixed effects that are included. Once
we include campus fixed effects, there are very few systematic correlations between student
and instructor characteristics and any significant relationships are economically insignificant.
To take one example, consider incoming student GPA, which is the single biggest predictor of
student success in MTH208. Whether the instructor was hired in the last year is statistically
significantly related to incoming student GPA once campus fixed effects are included, yet
this difference is only 0.012 grade points, or 0.3% of the sample mean. Similar patterns are
seen for all other observable student and instructor characteristics we examine. Furthermore,
this pattern attenuates further when campus-year fixed effects are included. In results not
reported here, but available upon request, we continue to find no significant relationship
between instructor and student characteristics for subsamples limited to only online sections
and to sections with final exam scores.
In addition, we follow the procedure utilized by Carrell and West (2010) to test whether
the distribution of student characteristics across sections are similar to what you would
get from random assignment within campus and time. In a first step, we take the pool of
students in a campus-year cell, randomly draw sections of different sizes (based on the actual
distribution), and compute the statistic of interest for these random sections. Similar to test
1, the statistics of interest are average age, fraction male, average prior credits, and average
prior GPA. By construction, the resulting distribution of these section-level characteristics
is obtained under random assignment of students to sections. In a second step, we take
each actual section and compare the actual student average of each baseline characteristic to
the counterfactual distribution for the relevant campus-year combination by calculating the
p-value. For instance, we take a section, compute the average age, and compute the fraction
17An alternate approach would be to regress each student characteristic on a full set of course section
dummies along with campus (or campus-year) fixed effects, and test whether the dummies are jointly equal
to zero. This is equivalent to jointly testing the equality of the means of the characteristics across class
sections.
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of counterfactual sections with values smaller than the actual value. For each campus-year
combination, we therefore obtain a number of p-values equal to the number of sections held
at that campus-year combination. In a final step, we test for random assignment by testing
the null hypothesis that these p-values are uniformly distributed. Intuitively, we are equally
likely to draw any percentile under random assignment, which should result in these p-
values having a uniform distribution. If, for instance, we have systematic sorting of student
according to age, we would find we are more likely to find low and high percentiles, and the
p-values would not exhibit a uniform distribution.
Similar to Carrell and West (2010), we test the uniformity of these p-values using the
Chi-square goodness-of-fit test, and a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test with a 5% significance level.
We draw counterfactual distributions at the campus-year level, leading to 763 tests of the
null hypothesis of uniformity of the p-values. We find that the null hypothesis is rejected
in 56 cases using the Chi-square goodness-of-fit test, and in 51 cases using the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test, which is about 6-7%. Given that the significance level of these tests was 5%, we
conclude that these tests do not reject the null hypothesis of random assignment of students
to sections for these specific observables.
3.4.2 Outcomes
Unlike the elementary and secondary setting in which teacher effectiveness has been
studied extensively using standardized test scores, appropriate outcomes are more difficult
to identify in the higher education context. Our unique setting, however, allows us to use
a standardized testing framework in a higher education institution. Following prior studies
in the literature, we examine not only contemporaneous course performance as measured
by students’ course grades, but also enrollment and performance (measured by grades) in
subsequent courses in the same subject.
An important limitation of grades as a measure of course performance is that they reflect,
at least in part, different grading practices. This may be particularly worrisome in the context
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of FTF courses at UPX because many students have the same instructor for MTH208 and
MTH209. Thus lenient or subjective grading practices in 208 may be correlated with the
same practices in MTH209, meaning that the MTH209 grade is not an objective measure of
long-run learning from MTH208. For a subset of our sample, we are able to examine student
performance on the final examination for MTH208 and/or MTH209. It also is informative
to compare test-based measures to grade-based measures simply because the grade-based
measures are easier for the universities to implement. It is informative to know how far from
the more “objective” measures using course grades deviates. In order to maximize sample
coverage we first look at course grades and credits earned, but then also look at final exam
scores (for a smaller sample).
A practical challenge with both grade and test score outcomes is that they may not be
observed for students that do not persist to the final exam in MTH208 or who do not enroll
in MTH209. Our main analysis imputes values for these outcomes where missing, though we
also assess the consequences of this imputation. Our preferred method assumes that students
who chose not to enroll in MTH209 would have received a failing grade and those without
test scores would have received a score at the tenth percentile of the test score distribution
from their MTH208 class. Generally results are not sensitive to imputation method used.
We also look directly at the likelihood of enrolling in MTH209 or of having non-missing final
exam scores as outcomes.
Persistence is less susceptible to these concerns. Given that roughly one-quarter of the
sample either withdraw or fail MTH208, and an equal fraction fail to take MTH209 at any
point, it is interesting to look at whether students eventually take MTH209 as an outcome.
The number of credits accumulated in the six months following MTH208 is another outcome
we examine that is also less susceptible to instructor leniency and missing value concerns.
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3.4.3 Cross-Campus Comparisons
A third challenge in estimating instructor effectiveness is that unobservable differences
between students across campuses may confound instructor differences. This is the rationale
for controlling for campus fixed effects in equation (3.1). But separately identifying campus
and instructor effects requires that a set of instructors teach in multiple campuses.18 For
example, if an instructor’s students do particularly well, it is impossible to say whether
this reflects the contribution of the instructor herself or unobserved campus phenomenon,
such as the campus-specific facilities or student peers. Observing instructors across multiple
campuses permits the separation of these two phenomenon and permit instructors across
campuses to be ranked on a common scale. This is analogous to the concern in studies
that attempt to simultaneously estimate firm and worker effects as well as the literature
that measures teacher value-added at the K12 level. Most prior work on postsecondary
instructors has focused on single campus locations and thus not confronted the cross-campus
comparison problem. The existence of the online courses, and the fact that a sizeable fraction
of instructors teach both online and at a physical campus, provides the “connectedness” that
allows us to separately identify campus and instructor effects. Appendix Table C.3 reports
the degree of “switching” that exists across campuses in our data. About 8 percent of the
exclusively FTF instructors teach in more than one campus, and about 21 percent of the
online instructors also teach at a FTF campus.
3.4.4 Implementation
We implement our analysis with a two-step procedure. In the first step, we first estimate
the standard value-added model in (3.1) with OLS including a host of student characteris-
tics, campus fixed effects, and instructor FEs (θk). Including θk’s as fixed effects permits
correlation between θk’s and x characteristics (including campus FEs), generating estimates
18Including fixed effects for each of the 200 physical locations requires instructors that teach at multiple
locations within each campus. Within-campus switching is more common than cross-campus switching, and
thus location fixed effects are only slightly more challenging to implement than campus fixed effects.
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of β1, β2, φt, and δc that are purged of any non-random sorting by instructors (Chetty,
Friedman and Rockoff, 2014). However, the estimated θk’s are noisy, so their variance would
be an inaccurate estimate of the true variance of the instructor effects. We then construct





Yijkt − β̂1Xi − β̂2Zjkt − φ̂t − δ̂c
)
(3.2)
The section-level residuals Ỹjkt combine the instructor effects (θk) with any non-mean-
zero unobserved determinants of student performance at the student- or section-level. Our
fully-controlled first-stage model includes student characteristics (male, age, incoming GPA,
incoming credits, indicator for repeat MTH208, number of times taking MTH208, 12 program
dummies, years since started program), section averages of these individual characteristics,
student zip code characteristics (unemployment rate, median family income, percent of fam-
ilies below poverty line, percent of adults with BA degree in ZIP code, plus missing ZIP)
and total section enrollment. We control for aggregate temporal changes in unobserved stu-
dent characteristics or grading standards by including calendar year and month fixed effects.
Campus fixed effects control for any unobserved differences in student characteristics across
campuses. Since the campus includes several physical locations for very large metro areas,
as a robustness we replace campus fixed effects with effects for the specific physical location
at which the class is taught. Finally, we also examine models with various subsets of these
control variables and large sets of interactions between them.
In the second step, we use the mean residuals to estimate the variance of the instructor
effects θk as random effects with maximum likelihood.
19 For a single outcome, not distin-
guishing by mode, the model is simply Ỹjkt = θk + ẽjkt. The error term ẽjkt includes any
section-specific shocks and also any non-mean-zero student-level unobserved characteristics,
19Second stage models are estimated with maximum likelihood using Stata’s mixed command. To ensure
that estimated variances are positive, this routine estimates the log of the standard deviation of random
effects as the unknown parameter during maximization. Standard errors of this transformed parameter are
computed using the inverse of the numerical Hessian, then converted back to standard deviation units.
131
both of which are assumed to be independent across instructors and time. Our preferred
approach stacks outcomes and lets effectiveness vary by outcome with an unrestricted co-
variance matrix. For instance, for two outcomes (o = grade in MTH208, grade in MTH209)
we estimate
Ỹ ojkt = θ
M208
k (M208ojkt) + θ
M209
k (M209ojkt) + ẽojkt (3.3)
where M208ojkt and M209ojkt are indicators for MTH208 and MTH209 outcomes, respec-
tively.20 The key parameters of interest are SD(θM208k ), SD(θ
M209





The benefit of stacking outcomes and estimating multiple outcomes simultaneously is that
the correlation across outcomes is estimated directly. As noted by Carrell and West (2010),
the estimate of Corr(θM208k ,θ
M209
k ) from (3.3) will be biased in the presence of shocks common
to all students in a given MTH208 section if those shocks have a positive correlation across
outcomes. For instance, groups of students that are high performing in MTH208 (relative
to that predicted by covariates) are also likely to do well in MTH209, independent of the
MTH208 instructors’ ability to influence MTH209 performance. For this reason, our pre-
ferred specification also includes section-specific shocks (random effects µM208jkt and µ
M209
jkt )
with an unrestricted covariance matrix.
Ỹ ojkt = θ
M208
k (M208ojkt) + θ
M209
k (M209ojkt) + ẽojkt (3.4)
The Corr(µM208ojkt ,µ
M209
ojkt ) captures any common shocks in MTH208 that carry over into MTH209
performance (regardless of instructor), such as unobserved student characteristics or similar-
ities of environment between the classes (such as the same peers). The distribution of θM208k
and θM209k is still estimated by systematic differences in student performance across sections
taught by the same instructor, but now the correlation between these two effects nets out
what would be expected simply due to the fact that individual students’ performance in the
20All models also include a constant and an indicator for one of the outcomes to adjust for mean differences
in residuals across outcomes, which is most relevant when we estimate the model separately by mode of
instruction.
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two courses are likely to be correlated. Note that since the instructor and section effects are
random effects (rather than fixed), their distributions are separately identified. Including
section-specific random effects has no bearing on the instructor effects, but does impact the
estimated correlation between contemporary and follow-up course effectiveness. Analogous
models are estimated separately by mode of instruction.
3.5 Results on Instructor Effectiveness
3.5.1 Main Results for Course Grades and Final Exam Scores
Table 3.4 reports our main estimates of the variances and correlations of MTH208 in-
structor effects for both grade and test score outcomes, overall and separately by mode of
instruction. This base model includes our full set of student and section controls in the first
stage, in addition to campus fixed effects. The odd columns report results without correlated
section effects.
For the full sample, a one-standard deviation increase in MTH208 instructor quality
is associated with a 0.30 and 0.20 standard deviation increase in student course grades in
MTH208 and MTH209, respectively. In course grade points, this is a little larger than one
grade step (going from a “B” to “B+”). Thus MTH208 instructors substantially affect
student achievement in both the introductory and follow-on math courses. These estimates
are statistically significant and quite a bit larger than effects found in prior research in
postsecondary (e.g. Carrell and West (2010)) and elementary schools (Kane, Rockoff and
Staiger, 2008). In Section 1.7, we return to the institutional and contextual differences
between our study and these that may explain these differences.
We also find that instructor effects in MTH208 and MTH209 are highly positively corre-
lated (correlation coefficient = 0.70). Including section-specific shocks that correlate across
outcomes reduces (to 0.60) but does not eliminate this positive correlation. This tells us that
MTH208 instructors that successfully raise student performance in MTH208 also raise per-
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formance in follow-on courses. Thus we do not observe the same negative tradeoff between
contemporaneous student performance and “deep learning” highlighted by Carrell and West
(2010).
Columns (4) and (6) split the full sample by whether the MTH208 section was held at
a ground campus (face-to-face) or the online campus. Though slightly more than half of
sections are held at ground campuses, they make up three-quarters of the instructors in the
full sample. The assignment of students to online sections is de facto randomized, while
results from ground sections are more generalizable to non- selective two and four-year in-
stitutions and community colleges. Instructor quality is slightly more variable at ground
campuses than online (0.31 SD vs. 0.24 SD for MTH208), but with a much larger difference
by format when measuring follow-on course performance (0.24 SD vs. 0.04 SD). There are a
number of reasons that online instructors may have less variation in quality than face-to-face
instructors. First, ground instructors have more discretion over course delivery and are more
likely to modify the curriculum. Ground instructors also have more direct interaction with
students. Both of these factors may magnify differences in their effectiveness in a ground
setting. Second, personnel management is centralized for online sections, while many aspects
of hiring, evaluation, and instructor training are done by individual campuses for ground sec-
tions. Finally, since faculty are not randomly assigned to section formats (FTF vs. online),
variance differences across formats could reflect differences in instructor characteristics. For
instance, if teaching experience relates to effectiveness and ground campuses have a greater
variance of instructor experience, then this will be reflected in the variance of instructor
quality. Furthermore, if there is less non-random sorting of students to instructors (condi-
tional on our extensive control variables) in online sections than in ground sections, this will
inflate the estimated variance of instructors at ground campuses. Interestingly, instructor
quality in contemporaneous and follow-on course performance are more positively correlated
for face-to-face sections than for online sections, though estimates for the latter are quite
imprecise and not terribly robust across specifications.
134
Course grades are problematic as a measure of student achievement to the extent that
systematic differences across instructors reflect different grading policies or standards rather
than student learning. We address this by examining student performance on normalized
final course exams.21 Panel B of Table 3.4 restricts analysis to sections that start between
June 2010 and March 2014, for which we have such exam scores.22 For FTF sections, the
variance of instructor effects is actually larger when using final exam score rather than course
grades: 0.49 compared with 0.31. This is consistent with less effective teachers grading
more easily than more effective teachers. In contrast, in online sections, the variance of
instructor effects is smaller when using final exam score, consistent with less effective teachers
grading more harshly. Effectiveness is also highly positively correlated (correlation = 0.61)
between contemporaneous and follow-on course exam performance. The weak correlation
between contemporaneous and follow-on course performance for online MTH208 sections is
also observed with final exam scores (in fact the point estimate of the correlation is negative),
though it is imprecisely estimated and generally not robust (in magnitude or sign) across
alternative specifications.
One way to interpret the magnitudes is to compare them to outcome differences by
student characteristics. On the standardized final exam score, for instance, students that
are ten years older score 0.15 SD lower and a one grade-point difference in GPA coming into
the class is associated with a 0.46 SD difference in exam scores. So having an instructor
that is 1 SD more effective produces a test score change that is larger than the gap between
25 and 35 year-olds and comparable to the performance gap between students entering the
class with a 3.0 vs. a 2.0 GPA. So at least compared to these other factors which we know
are important – age and prior academic success – instructors seem to be a quite important
factor in student success.
21Since exams differ in maximum point values across sections and for MTH208 and MTH209, the outcome
is the fraction of points earned (out of the maximum). This fraction is then standardized to mean zero and
standard deviation one for the individuals with scores across the entire sample.
22Though not shown in the table, estimates for grade outcomes on the restricted sample of sections with
exam scores are nearly identical to those for the full sample in Panel A. Thus any differences between Panels
A and B are due to the outcome differences, not the difference in sample.
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One candidate explanation for the high positive correlation between instructor effects in
contemporaneous and follow-on courses in the FTF setting is that many students have the
same instructors for MTH208 and MTH209 at ground campuses. Fully 81% of students in
ground sections have the same instructor for MTH208 and MTH209, while fewer than 1%
of students taking MTH208 online do. This difference in the likelihood of having repeat
instructors could also possibly explain differences between online and face-to-face formats.
Having the same instructor for both courses could generate a positive correlation through
several different channels. First, instructor-specific grading practices or tendency to “teach-
to-the-test” that are similar in MTH208 and 209 will generate correlated performance across
classes that does not reflect true learning gains. Alternatively, instructors teaching both
courses may do a better job of preparing students for the follow-on course.
To examine this issue, Table 3.5 repeats our analysis on the subset of MTH208 face-to-
face sections where students have little chance of having the same instructor for MTH209.
We focus on situations where the instructor was not teaching any classes or MTH208 again
in the next three months and where few (<25%) or no students take MTH209 from the
same instructor. While instructor quality may influence some students’ choice of MTH209
instructor, it is unlikely to trump other considerations (such as schedule and timing) for
all students. Thus we view these subsamples as identifying situations where students had
little ability to have a repeat instructor for other reasons. Though the number of sections
is reduced considerably and the included instructors are disproportionately low-tenure, the
estimated instructor effects exhibit a similar variation as the full sample, both for course
grades and exam scores. The correlation between MTH208 and 209 instructor effects is
reduced substantially for grades and modestly for test scores, but remains positive and
significant for both, even with the most restricted sample.23
23These specifications all include correlated section shocks across outcomes, though they are not reported in
the table. Excluding section shocks makes the instructor effects more positively correlated across outcomes.
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3.5.2 Robustness of Grade and Test Score Outcomes
Table 3.6 examines the robustness of our test score results to different first stage models.
Our preferred first-stage model includes numerous student characteristics, section averages
of these individual characteristics, total section enrollment, campus fixed effects, instructor
fixed effects, calendar year fixed effects, and month fixed effects. Even models with only time
controls (columns 1) exhibit patterns that are qualitatively similar to our base model, with
substantial instructor quality variation, particularly for face-to-face sections. In fact, the
extensive controls have little impact on estimates of instructor quality, suggesting minimal
systematic non-random sorting of students to instructors based on observed characteristics
(and possibly unobserved characteristics too). Even including incredibly flexible student-
level controls (5) or fixed effects for each physical location of the class (6) has minimal
impact on our estimates.24 The only consequential controls we include are campus fixed
effects when combined with instructor fixed effects, which increase the estimated variance
of instructor effects on MTH208 and MTH209 exam scores and reduce their correlation.
For online sections, estimates of instructor effects do not change at all across first stage
specifications, but the estimated correlation across current and future course outcomes is
not robust and very imprecisely estimated.
Table 3.7 addresses sample selection by assessing the robustness of our estimates to dif-
ferent ways of imputing missing outcomes, overall and separately by instructional mode. For
grade outcomes, estimated instructor effects are quite similar regardless of whether MTH209
grades are imputed if a student does not take MTH209. Our preferred method for test scores
assumes that students without test scores would have received a score at the tenth percentile
of the test score distribution from their MTH208 class. The results are generally quite sim-
ilar, qualitatively and quantitatively, across imputation methods (including no imputation
by only using test scores for the select sample of students with test scores). These results
suggest that the substantial differences across instructors and the positive (overall and for
24There are approximately 200 physical locations included in the sample, in contrast to the 75 campuses.
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FTF sections) correlation across contemporary and follow-up course outcomes is not driven
by non-random selection of students into test score and follow-up course outcomes.
3.5.3 Student Evaluations and Other Outcomes
Though course grades and final exam performance are two objective measures of student
learning that can be used to assess instructor quality, end-of-course student evaluations are
the primary mechanism for assessing instructor quality at the University of Phoenix and
most other institutions. At UPX, end-of-course evaluations are optional; fewer than 50% of
students that have a MTH208 final exam score (our proxy for being engaged in the course
at the end of the class) also have a completed evaluation. Students are asked how much
they would recommend the instructor to another student, on a 1 to 10 scale. Scores equal
to 8 or above are considered “good” by the University and we adopt this convention as well,
constructing an indicator for whether the student rated the instructor at least an 8 on the 10
point scale. Table 3.8 presents estimates of model (4) with this evaluation score included pair-
wise along with four different learning outcomes. We also include section-specific shocks that
are permitted to correlate between learning and evaluation outcomes. The variance of these
section shocks captures section-to-section variability that is not explained by instructors.
We do not impute evaluation scores when missing, as our goal is to assess how well the
course evaluation system – as it is currently used – captures our more objective measures of
instructor effectiveness.25
As with learning outcomes, there is substantial variability across instructors: a one-
standard-deviation increase in instructor quality is associated with a 0.219 percentage point
increase in the fraction of student evaluations that are positive. This variability is smaller,
though still large, among online instructors and is also comparable to the section-to-section
variability (0.233). Interestingly, evaluation scores are most positively correlated with grades
25There is the additional complication that it is not entirely clear how missing evaluations should be
imputed. In contrast, we are comfortable assuming that students with missing final exam scores (because
they dropped out) are likely to have received low exam scores had they taken the exam.
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in the current course, suggesting that instructors are rewarded (through higher evaluations)
for high course grades or that students experiencing temporary positive grade shocks at-
tribute this to their instructor. Correlations with subsequent course performance and test
scores is much weaker (and even negative for MTH209 test scores). Collectively this suggests
that end-of-course evaluations by students are unlikely to capture much of the variation in
instructor quality, especially for more distant or objective outcomes.
Table 3.9 presents estimates of instructor effects for several different outcomes, both for
the full sample and the restricted sample for which test scores are available. There is sub-
stantial instructor variability in students’ likelihood of taking MTH209 and in the number of
credits earned in the six months following MTH208. Both of these are important indicators
of students’ longer-term success at UPX. A one-standard-deviation increase in MTH208 in-
structor quality is associated with a five percentage point increase in the likelihood a student
enrolls in MTH209 (on a base of 76%), with the variability twice as large for face-to-face
MTH208 sections as it is for online ones. A similar increase in instructor quality is associ-
ated with a 0.13 SD increase in the number of credits earned in the six months following
MTH208, again with face-to-face instructors demonstrating more than twice as much vari-
ability as online sections. Total credits earned after MTH208 is an important outcome for
students and the university which is unlikely to be manipulated by individual instructors.
In Appendix Table C.4 we report correlations between predicted instructor effects measured
with these different outcomes for the test score sample, overall and separately by format.26
Most of the outcomes are positively correlated overall and for face-to-face sections. Interest-
ingly, value-added measured by likelihood of taking MTH209 after MTH208 is only weakly
correlated with value-added measured by final exam scores. Thus instructors that excel in
improving student test scores are unlikely to excel at getting their students to enroll in the
26These correlation matrices are formed by predicting the BLUP instructor effects for different outcomes
one at a time and correlating these using section-level data. It would be more efficient to estimate all the
effects and the correlations simultaneously as we did for pairs of outcomes (e.g. grades in MTH208 and
MTH209 in Table 3.4), but these models did not converge. Consequently, these models do not include
section-specific shocks that correlate across outcomes. Thus the correlations reported in Table C.4 differ
from those in Table 3.4. Correlations are quite similar for the full sample.
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follow-up course.
3.6 Does Effectiveness Correlate with Experience and Pay?
Having demonstrated substantial variation in instructor effectiveness along several dimen-
sions of student success, particularly for face-to-face sections, we now consider how teaching
experience and pay correlates with effectiveness. Are more experienced instructors more
effective? Are more effective instructors paid more highly? While we do not attempt an ex-
haustive analysis of these questions, the answers have implications for whether instructional
resources are used productively and how overall effectiveness could be improved. Teaching
experience – both course-specific and general – may be an important factor in instructor
performance given results found in other contexts (e.g., Ost (2014); Papay and Kraft (2015);
Cook and Mansfield (2016)).
For this analysis, we focus on instructors hired since 2002 so that we can construct a
full history of courses taught across all courses and in MTH208 specifically, not censored by
data availability. This results in 18,409 sections (5,970 in the test score sample). Our main
approach is to regress section-level residuals Ỹjkt on observed instructor experience at the
time the section was taught:
Ỹjkt = f(ExpMTH208,t) + θk + ejkt (3.5)
Where f(.) is a flexible function of experience teaching MTH208. Our preferred model
includes instructor fixed effects, θk, isolating changes in effectiveness as individual instructors
gain experience. This model controls for selection into experience levels based on fixed
instructor characteristics, but does not control for time-varying factors related to experience
and effectiveness. For instance, if instructors tend to accumulate teaching experience when
other work commitments are slack, the experience effect may be confounded with any effects
of these other work commitments. We also include other dimensions of experience, such as
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number of sections taught of MTH209 and other courses. Papay and Kraft (2015) discuss
the challenges in estimating (3.5) in the traditional K12 setting, given the near collinearity
between experience and calendar year for almost all teachers. Many of these issues are
not present in our setting, since the timing of when courses are taught and experience is
accumulated differs dramatically across instructors. The non-standard calendar of UPX
thus facilitates the separation of experience from time effects.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 present estimates of (3.5) for a non-parametric version of f(.), regress-
ing section mean residuals on a full set of MTH208 experience dummies (capped at 20) along
with year, month, and (when noted) instructor fixed effects.27 Figure 3.1 depicts results for
course grade outcomes. Effectiveness increases very modestly the first few times instructors
teach MTH208, as measured by MTH208 and MTH209 course grades. Interestingly, includ-
ing instructor fixed effects stabilizes the effectiveness- experience profile, suggesting that less
effective instructors are more likely to select into having more MTH208 teaching experience.
Figure 3.2 repeats this analysis but for final exam test scores on the restricted test score
sample. Estimates are quite imprecise, but do suggest modest growth in MTH208 exam
scores as instructors gain experience. Improvement with experience is not as clear-cut for
MTH209 test score performance.
To gain precision, Table 3.10 presents estimates from parametric specifications for f(.),
while also including teaching experience in other courses and time since hire (in Panel C) .
We find that teaching MTH208 at least one time previously is associated with a 0.03 to 0.04
SD increase in effectiveness (measured by MTH208 grade), but that additional experience
improves this outcome very little. This holds even after controlling for additional experi-
ence in other subjects. Instructors’ experience impact on follow-on course grades is more
modest and gradual. Test score results are much less precise, but do suggest that instruc-
tor effectiveness increases with experience for final exams in contemporaneous courses and
(very modestly) in follow-on courses. We find that general experience in other subjects has
27Approximately one quarter of the sections are taught by instructors that have taught MTH208 more
than 20 times previously. Nine percent have not previously taught MTH208.
141
little association with effectiveness in MTH208 (not shown). Finally, we find no systematic
relationship between teaching experience and instructors’ impact on the number of credits
their students earn subsequent to MTH208. Whether the instructor was hired in the past
year and the number of years since first hire date has no association with most measures
of instructor effectiveness (after controlling for MTH208 experience), but is associated with
MTH208 test scores.
If pay was commensurate with effectiveness, then the substantial variation in measured
effectiveness across instructors would not necessarily translate to productivity or efficiency
differences (at least from the institution’s perspective). Our discussions with leaders at
University of Phoenix suggest that pay is not linked to classroom performance in any direct
way, but rather is tied primarily to tenure and experience. We directly examine correlates of
instructor salary quantitatively in Table 3.11. Consistent with this practice, effectiveness (as
measured by section-level mean residuals in MTH209 grades) is uncorrelated with pay, both
in the cross-section and within instructors over time.28 However, years since first hire is the
one consistent predictor of the salary instructors are paid for MTH208 courses. Instructors
receive approximately $44 more per course for each year of tenure (approximately 4% higher
pay) after fixed instructor differences are accounted for. Overall and course-specific teaching
experience have no association with instructor salary.
3.7 Conclusion and Discussion
In this study, we document substantial differences in effectiveness across instructors of
required college algebra at the University of Phoenix. A one-standard-deviation in instructor
quality is associated with a 0.20 SD increase in course grades and a 0.41 SD increase in final
exam scores in the follow-on course, as well as a 0.13 SD increase in the number of credits
earned within six months. Variation is much smaller for online sections, yet still measurable
28It is possible that noise in our estimates of section-specific effectiveness attenuates our estimate of the
relationship between effectiveness and pay. We are currently examining this issue, though we note that a
finding of no relationship is consistent with the institution’s stated pay policy.
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and larger than that found in other contexts. Putting these magnitudes in context, having
an instructor that is 1 SD more effective produces a test score change that is larger than the
gap between 25 and 35 year-olds and comparable to the performance gap between students
entering the class with a 3.0 vs. a 2.0 GPA. Instructors are clearly an quite important factor
in student success.
It is worth considering what institutional factors may contribute to such large differences
across instructors, particularly in contrast to other settings. Prior work in postsecondary
has focused on selective and research-oriented public and non-profit universities, courses
taught by permanent or tenure-track faculty, institutions operating in a single geographic
location, and serving “traditional” students. Our setting focuses on a non-selective for-profit
institution where the teaching force is contingent and employed part-time, the student body
is diverse, the performance of the teaching force is solely based on teaching and instruction,
and courses and testing procedures are highly standardized. It is possible that instructors
are a more important factor in the success of “non-traditional” students or that there is more
variation in instructor quality among contingent and adjunct faculty than among permanent
or tenure-track faculty. The one prior study that finds instructor variation comparable to
ours (Bettinger et al., 2015) shares all of these traits with our study institution. Having
a better understanding of the importance of faculty at less selective institutions and in
settings where most faculty are contingent is important, as these institutions serve a very
large (and growing) share of postsecondary students in the U.S.. Finally, it is possible that
the fast course pace – five weeks – could magnify the consequences of behavioral differences
across instructors. A delay in providing student feedback – even just a few days – could be
devastating to students in a five-week course.
This substantial variation across instructors suggests potential to improve student and
institutional performance via changes in how faculty are hired, developed, motivated, and
retained. Institutions like UPX reflect the sector-wide trend towards contingent faculty (e.g.
adjuncts and lecturers), which aimed to save costs and create flexibility (Ehrenberg, 2012).
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Debate about whether adjuncts are better or worse for instruction than permanent fac-
ulty obfuscates the feature that contingent arrangements create opportunities for improving
student performance via personnel policies that are not available when faculty are perma-
nent. However, instructor evaluation and compensation systems have not kept up with these
changes; our study institution has an evaluation system (student course evaluations) that
is similar to that at elite research universities and a salary schedule that varies only with
tenure and credentials. Of course the potential for improvement through changes in person-
nel policies – and how these policies should be designed – depends critically on the supply of
instructors available (e.g. Rothstein (2015)). Online and ground campuses likely face quite
different labor markets for instructors, the former drawing on instructors across the country,
suggesting that personnel policies should differ between them. Better understanding the
labor market for postsecondary faculty – particularly at less selective institutions – is an
important area for future attention.
Finally, we have focused on the role of individual faculty in promoting the success of
students. In fact, differences in instructor effectiveness is one potential explanation for
cross-institution differences in institutional performance and productivity that has yet to be















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for Students (Full Sample)
Face-to-Face











Male 0.359 0.480 0.373 0.484 0.341 0.474
Age 34.816 9.097 34.264 9.127 35.538 9.008
Baseline GPA (0-4) 3.348 0.538 3.348 0.518 3.347 0.563
Credits earned prior to start of Math 208 23.386 18.363 25.714 18.451 20.337 17.791
Took Math 208 before 0.104 0.306 0.0772 0.267 0.140 0.347
Number of times MTH 208 taken 1.109 0.385 1.084 0.325 1.142 0.448
BS (general studies) 0.211 0.408 0.208 0.406 0.214 0.410
BS in Nursing 0.0496 0.217 0.026 0.159 0.081 0.272
BS in Accounting 0.003 0.057 0.002 0.045 0.005 0.069
BS in Business 0.503 0.500 0.587 0.492 0.393 0.488
BS in Criminal Justice Administration 0.035 0.183 0.047 0.213 0.018 0.133
BS in Education 0.022 0.145 0.013 0.112 0.033 0.179
BS in Health Administration 0.034 0.182 0.034 0.181 0.034 0.182
BS in Human Services 0.033 0.179 0.023 0.150 0.046 0.210
BS in Information Technology 0.028 0.166 0.027 0.162 0.030 0.172
BS in Management 0.041 0.199 0.022 0.148 0.066 0.248
Non-degree program 0.014 0.117 0.002 0.042 0.030 0.169
BS in other Program 0.015 0.122 0.009 0.092 0.024 0.152
Time since program start date (years) 1.160 1.399 1.203 1.334 1.105 1.478
Grade in Math 208 2.457 1.395 2.534 1.333 2.355 1.467
A / A- 0.319 0.466 0.323 0.468 0.314 0.464
B+ / B / B- 0.268 0.443 0.275 0.446 0.258 0.438
C+ / C / C- 0.174 0.379 0.192 0.394 0.151 0.358
D+ / D / D- 0.073 0.260 0.077 0.267 0.066 0.249
F 0.045 0.207 0.038 0.191 0.054 0.226
Withdrawn 0.122 0.327 0.095 0.293 0.156 0.363
Passed Math 208 0.834 0.372 0.867 0.340 0.790 0.407
Math 208 Final exam score available 0.242 0.429 0.282 0.450 0.191 0.393
Math 208 final exam % correct (if available) 0.708 0.241 0.697 0.246 0.729 0.230
Took Math 209 0.755 0.430 0.824 0.380 0.664 0.472
Grade in Math 209 (if took it) 2.620 1.246 2.714 1.160 2.464 1.363
A / A- 0.318 0.466 0.328 0.470 0.300 0.458
B+ / B / B- 0.294 0.456 0.304 0.460 0.279 0.449
C+ / C / C- 0.201 0.401 0.217 0.412 0.174 0.379
D+ / D / D- 0.074 0.261 0.074 0.262 0.073 0.260
F 0.032 0.176 0.021 0.145 0.049 0.215
Withdrawn 0.068 0.251 0.046 0.209 0.104 0.305
Math 209 Final exam score available 0.200 0.400 0.249 0.433 0.136 0.342
Math 209 final exam % correct (if available) 0.691 0.246 0.690 0.245 0.693 0.250
Credits earned in following 6 months 10.461 5.315 11.401 5.053 9.230 5.397
Have course evaluation 0.117 0.321 0.118 0.323 0.115 0.320




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































MTH208 MTH209 6 months
Panel A. Full Sample
SD (instructor effect) - overall 0.073 0.051 0.126
(n = 26,384) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
SD instructor effect - FTF 0.080 0.062 0.154
(n = 13,791) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
SD instructor effect - online 0.059 0.031 0.059
(n = 12,593) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Panel B. Test Score Sample
SD (instructor effect) - overall 0.072 0.059 0.130
(n = 7,267) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
SD instructor effect - FTF 0.077 0.069 0.150
(n = 4,707) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007)
SD instructor effect - online 0.056 0.032 0.040
( n = 2,560) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011)
Notes: Random effects models are estimated on section-level residuals. First stage models
include instructor, campus, year, and month fixed effects in addition to individual controls,
section average controls, and ZIP code controls. Residuals are taken with respect to all these
variables other than instructor fixed effects. Individual controls include male, age, incoming
GPA, incoming credits, indicator for repeat MTH208, number of times taking MTH208, 12
program dummies, years since started program. Section average controls include section
averages of these same characteristics plust total enrollment in section. ZIP controls include
the unemployment rate, median family income, percent of families below poverty line, percent
of adults with BA degree in ZIP code from 2004-2007 ACS (plus missing ZIP). Robust
standard errors clustered by instructor in parentheses. First stage model with full controls.
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Table 3.10: Correlates of Instructor Effectiveness
Outcome: Section-level mean residual for
Credits
MTH208 MTH209 MTH208 MTH209 Earned
grade grade test test 6 months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Linear, Only MTH208 Experience, Instructor FEs
Taught MTH208 previously 0.0384*** 0.006 0.069** 0.019 -0.016
(0.011) (0.011) (0.034) (0.038) (0.010)
Times taught MTH208 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001)
B. Piecewise, Only MTH208 Experience, Instructor FEs
Times taught MTH208 = 1 0.031*** -0.002 0.067* 0.020 0.000
(0.012) (0.012) (0.036) (0.042) (0.012)
Times taught MTH208 = 2 to 5 0.041*** 0.008 0.078* 0.045 -0.020*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.040) (0.044) (0.011)
Times taught MTH208 = 6 to 10 0.040*** 0.008 0.137** -0.001 -0.005
(0.016) (0.015) (0.054) (0.056) (0.014)
Times taught MTH208 = 11 to
15
0.041** 0.001 0.169** 0.043 -0.001
(0.020) (0.018) (0.066) (0.068) (0.017)
Times taught MTH208 = 16 to
20
0.040* -0.009 0.159** 0.077 0.017
(0.024) (0.020) (0.079) (0.081) (0.019)
Times taught MTH208 > 20 0.035 -0.005 0.131 0.113 0.043*
(0.028) (0.023) (0.089) (0.096) (0.023)
C. Linear, Control for MTH209 experience, other math,
non-math experience linearly, time since hire, Instructor FEs
Taught MTH208 previously 0.028** -0.005 0.059 -0.045 -0.025**
(0.014) (0.013) (0.048) (0.055) (0.012)
Times taught MTH208 0.000 0.000 -0.008 -0.003 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001)
Taught MTH209 previously 0.015 0.014 -0.014 0.081* 0.015
(0.015) (0.013) (0.054) (0.049) (0.012)
Times taught MTH209 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.009** -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001)
Years since first hire date 0.002 -0.005 0.019 0.038 0.023
(0.016) (0.016) (0.048) (0.056) (0.016)
First hire more than one year ago 0.017 0.017 0.084*** -0.001 0.0014
(0.012) (0.012) (0.032) (0.033) (0.011)
Notes: Section mean residuals are regressed on teaching experience, instructor fixed effects, and year and month
fixed effects. Sample restricted to 18,409 sections (5970 for test scores) taught by instructors hired since 2002. First
stage model include instructor, campus, year, and month fixed effects in addition to individual controls, section
average controls, and ZIP code controls. Residuals are taken with respect to all these variables other than instructor
fixed effects. Individual controls include male, age, incoming GPA, incoming credits, indicator for repeat MTH208,
number of times taking MTH208, 12 program dummies, years since started program. Section average controls
include section averages of these same characteristics plust total enrollment in section. ZIP controls include the
unemployment rate, median family income, percent of families below poverty line, percent of adults with BA degree
in ZIP code from 2004-2007 ACS (plus missing ZIP). Students who did not enroll in MTH209 were assigned a zero
(failing) and students that did not possess a test score for 208 or 209 were assigned the 10th percentile of the test
score from their 208 section. Robust standard errors clustered by instructor in parentheses. First stage model with
full controls. All sections, faculty hired since 2002.
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Table 3.11: Correlates of Instructor Salary
Outcome: Total Salary Paid for MTH208 Section ($1,000)
(mean=1.077)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Section-level mean residual -0.005 0.003 0.006 0.007 0.006
for MTH209 grade (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Years since first hire date 0.030*** 0.027*** 0.044*** 0.046***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
First hire more than one year ago 0.010*** 0.008** 0.006 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Total sections taught previously 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Taught MTH208 previously 0.002
(0.004)
Times taught MTH208 -0.001**
(0.000)
Times taught MTH209 0.000
(0.000)
Times taught other math courses -0.000
(0.000)
Times taught nonmath courses 0.000
(0.000)
Constant 1.038 0.919 0.907 0.953 0.951
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.013)
R-squared 0.265 0.536 0.565 0.713 0.714
Fixed effects None None Campus Instructor Instructor
Notes: Sample restricted to 18,080 sections taught by instructors hired since 2002.All specifications also include
year and month fixed effects. Section-level residuals include the full set of individual and section controls and
campus fixed effects, imputing zero MTH209 grades for students that did not enroll. Robust standard errors















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix to Quantifying Sources of Persistent
Prescription Behavior: Evidence from Belgium
A.1 Institutional Setting
A.1.1 The Belgian Healthcare Market
The health care market in Belgium is financed through a withheld tax (at a rate of
13.07%) which applies to gross wages. This tax is used for health, disability, and unemploy-
ment insurance. Additional funds to finance shortfalls are earmarked and financed through
specific taxes (e.g. tobacco taxes) or other financing means. The health care market is orga-
nized through a heavily regulated insurance market in which the Mandated Health Insurance
is sold.
A.1.2 The Minimum Prescription Rate (MPR)
This section provides some additional descriptive numbers on the introduction of the
MPR. Below is an overview of the average prescription rate of generics going back to 2004
which is based on data provided by the NIHDI in Belgium. The micro-data I employ is not
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available going back to before 2004, but these data do provide some insight as to what the
impact of the MPR was.


















Notes: data used for this graph were provided by NIHDI, and plots the overal prescription rate of generics
between 2000 and 2010.
Overall, the graph suggests that there is a steady increase in the use of generics (for
instance, because of the arrival rate of generics as patents expire), but that this steady
increase was relatively stable before the introduction of the MPR.
Finally, I also show a graph similar to Figure 1.4 but dividing the data into physicians
in the top and bottom quartile of the baseline prescription rate of generics. Comparing
these numbers to Figure 1.4 shows that physicians further from the threshold (e.g. bottom
quartile) are much more likely to increase the prescription rate of generics in the wake of the
policy mandate.
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Figure A.2: Descriptive Graphs: Prescription and Switching Rate of Generics































































Physicians above Median Physicians below Median
Fraction of Transactions for which Generic is Prescribed





























































Physicians above Median Physicians below Median
Chronic Longstanding
Fraction of Transactions for which Generic is Prescribed
Notes: This data is a graph of the average prescription rate of generics for different types of patients (chronic
starters and longstanding). I show the averages across physicians that are above/below the median (middle
panel). Overall, the figures display a sudden increase upon announcement of the mandate, with physicians
far from the threshold responding more.
A.1.3 Licensing of “Free Professions”
Practicing physicians in Belgium are subject to an employment regime of “free profes-
sions”, a regime that refers to non-merchant occupations that perform intellectual or non-
manual labor services both for a direct customer and the society as a whole. Other examples
of free professions include, among others, veteranarians, accountant, pharmacists, architects,
nurses. For a more complete discussion on exact status definitions, see 2005/36/EG Direc-
tory of the European Parliament and the European Council. People with a medical degree
might choose not to practice medicin and pursue other career paths that are not “free occu-
pations” in diverse sectors. A notable exception is practicing physicians that are affiliated
with universities and university hospitals: they are typically directly employed by the state
and are therefore in paid employment, although they do need to fulfill licensing require-
ments. These physicians are typically specialists and not primary care physicians.Access
to “free professions” is regulated through occupational licensing programs that operate in
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similar ways to similar programs in other countries in the European Union or the United
States. Upon licensing, primary care physicians are typically self-employed in a solo-practice,
or self-employed in a cooperative group practice.
A.1.4 Prescription Filling and Processing
The central document in this process is the prescription written out by a physician (see
Figure 1.1 for an example). The bar code in the top left identifies the physician (who is
forced to order his prescription books at a central provider who prints the bar code). The
physician writes the specific product name in the field denoted by box 5 in Figure 1.1b.
The patient then takes this prescription to a pharmacist who provides the drug as written
on the prescription and scans the product barcode upon dispensing. Pharmacists in this
period were required to follow the physician’s prescription, although some changes to this
procedure have been made. The patient then inserts their electronic health insurance cards
(identifying their health insurance records) and pays for the prescription drug. Unless the
prescription drug is a particular drug (e.g. because of cost) or the patient is on an increased
reimbursement plan, the patient pays the full price. The patient then uses a “vignet” (akin
to a sticker with identifying information on the patient) which is then submitted to their
mutual fund who reimburses the patient.
Typically, a patient visits their physician to obtain a prescription. Prescriptions are valid
for three months from the date of prescription (which is posted in box 8 in Figure 1.1b).
It is possible for a physician to allow for this start date to be in the future, e.g. when
the physician wants to provide a prescription in February and June while not requiring the
patient to return. This future start date is denoted in box 9. However, physicians typically
prefer patients to come back for a visit when needing a new prescription, as they receive
only a fee for a visit (not for a prescription).
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Prescriptions on INN (Active Ingredient)
There was a program that was introduced in 2005 at the time of the mandate that allowed
physicians to prescribe on INN (International Nonproprietary Names). However, the fraction
of prescription that used these was low (around 1-2%) and the take-up rate was the lowest
among primary care physicians, for whom it was well below 1%. This program has become
more popular in recent years though.
A.1.5 Pricing and Price changes
The Belgian healthcare system uses a reference pricing system (RPS) for prescription
drugs, detailed in further detail in Appendix A.1.5, which was introduced in 2001 (Farfan-
Portet et al., 2012; Cornelis, 2013).1 An RPS consists of two elements. The first element is
the set of clusters, or groups of prescription drugs that are considered equivalent from the
perspective of the policymaker. Belgium has a “generic RPS” or an “RPS at the molecular
level,” where all drugs that have the exact same active ingredient (i.e. are bio-equivalent)
form one cluster (Vrijens et al., 2010; Farfan-Portet et al., 2012).2
The second element is the Reference Price (RP ), which is the maximum price manufac-
turers of generic drugs can charge within a cluster.3 The RPS then fixes the reimbursement
within a cluster to be the RP multiplied by the copay rate. As a result, the insurer reim-
burses a fixed amount, regardless of the prescription decision. If a drug is priced above the
RP , the difference between the price and this fixed reimbursement is therefore fully borne by
the patient. Generics and branded drugs that charge the RP are considered “cheap”, while
1Similar systems are used in other countries. Dylst, Vulto and Simoens (2012), Simoens (2012) and
Farfan-Portet et al. (2012) provide a more complete discussion on this system and differences across the
countries that have implemented such systems.
2In contrast, therapeutic equivalence – defined at the ATC4 level – only requires drugs to treat similar
conditions. Bio-equivalence implies that brand-name simvastatin Zocor would be in a cluster with generic
simvastatins, but not atorvastatins (such as Lipitor or generic equivalents). All these drugs would be in the
same cluster when using therapeutic equivalence.
3This reference price is based on a well-defined estimate of the production cost of the brand-name mul-
tisource drug.
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multisource drugs that charge more than the RP are considered “expensive”.4 Reference
prices were decreased by four percent across all prescription drugs with generic competition
in June 2005.5
Figure A.4 provides a graphical overview of how it works. The Reference Price is based
on the “ex-factory” price, a well-defined estimate of the production cost of the brand-name
drug.6 This price applies to the entire cluster and is used for calculating the levels of
reimbursement and copay. The minimum level of copay is the Reference Price multiplied
by the copay rate, the reimbursement amount for any drug in the cluster is the difference
between the Reference Price and this minimum level of copay. For instance, if the copay
rate is 25%, the reimbursement amount that the insurer pays for any drug in the cluster is
75% × RP, while the copay for patients is Price− 75%×RP .7
As shortly touched on before, Reference Prices were decreased by four percent across all
prescription drugs with generic competition in June 2005. This decreased the price level,
both for generic and brand name drugs. However, under the influence of the mandate,
there was an incentive for brand name drugs to decrease their prices further in order to fall
under the mandate. Figure A.3a plots the coefficients of an event-study regression at the




βmI{t− t∗ = m}+ ξp + εpt (A.1)
where t∗ is June 2005 and ξp are product fixed effects. The coefficients βm trace the dynamic
path of prices around June 2005. I cluster standard errors at the manufacturer level and
4On-patent drugs are considered expensive.
5Appendix A.1.5 shows that the price gap between generic and brand name drugs remained constant.
Nevertheless, certain brand name drugs did change status to cheap. As this appendix shows, most of these
changes happened after the mandate was announed and were unexpected by physicians.
6This is not the price that was charged when the drug was on-patent, but is rather a cost estimate of
manufacturing, transportation, packaging, and other factors. The Reference Price is typically set a certain
percentage below the “ex-factory” price. See Vrijens et al. (2010) for more details.
7These copayment rates did not change over the sample period and therefore do not affect the empirical
analysis. Drugs are only reimbursed for pre-specified uses, that do not necessarily include all possible uses
mentioned in the prescription drug leaflet.
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set M to 10. On-patent drugs did not change prices. Overall, these results suggest that
the price gap between generic and brand name prescription drug remained fairly stable over
the study period. Nevertheless, the levels of copays and reimbursements have changed by
about four percent for generics and brand name drugs with generic competition. As a result,
the price gap between both drug groups is relatively stable. Figure A.3b shows the average
(smoothed) price gap between off-patent branded and generic prescription drugs, and we
indeed find that the average price gap does exhibit some variation, but is not strongly
affected by the introduction of the change in the Reference Pricing System.
Figure A.3: Stylized Facts: Changes in Prices
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Graphs by Product Group
Notes: Figure A.3a shows the regression coefficients βm from regression equation A.1 for three distinct
product groups: on-patent drugs (unaffected), branded off-patent drugs, and generic drugs. Figure A.3b
shows the smoothed copay differential between branded off-patent and generic prescription drugs at the
product group level (as defined in table 1.1). These numbers are smoothed and show some variation over
tim, but no systematic change in the effect of the mandate.
The limited effect of the changes in the RP system are supported in Figure A.3b, that
plots the differential between the price of brand name and generic drugs for selected main
product groups. Most price changes at the product group level are within a two to four
percent change, and are therefore relatively small. This graph was computed as follows: the
average price of generic and brand name products is computed at the level of the active
165
ingredient. Then, to purge the data of level differences, I regress these price differences on
an active ingredient fixed effect and compute the average price differential for each product
group in each month. Figure A.3b presents the Lowess-smoothed version of these differences.
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Figure A.4: Determination of Status Prescription Drug.
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 ...
Reference Price Cluster 2 (RP2)
Status of Drugs in Cluster 2
Copay of Drugs in Cluster 2
Cluster Reimbursement on all Drugs:
(1− c)×RP2 where c is copay rate.
Price ≤ RP2 Price > RP2
Generic Drug
Brand Name Drug
Generic Not on Market
Cheap Expensive
Copay for Patient: Price - Cluster Reimbursement
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A.2 Data
The flow of the data collection is shown graphically in Figure A.5. The source of the
data is the pharmacy, where the prescription and patient health care card are read and
provide information on the physician and patient identifier are recovered. The pharmacy
then sells the prescription drug and scans the product’s bar code upon dispensing. The
copay is directly identified (and stored) when the patient inserts their health care. As a
result, if a patient does not fill out the slip and recover the reimbursement, this is not in the
data.
After the prescription is read in at the pharmacy, the data are then uploaded and made
available to a billing service provider, who aggregates and delivers this data to the relevant
mutual fund on a quarterly basis.8 These data are heavily scrutinized and reviewed for
quality and accuracy at all steps in this process. For instance, certain checks on the copay
and reimbursement are made. The mutual funds receive the verified data and reimburse their
patients. As these mutual funds still need to reimburse, these mutual funds have access to
patient identifiers.
In a final step, these data are shared with the NIHDI, who use it for risk-adjustment for-
mulas and reimbursement of the mutual funds. While information is still at the patient-level,
mutual funds anonymize the data before sending them along to NIHDI as NIHDI in princi-
ple does not require knowledge of patients’ identities to reimburse mutual funds. Physician
identifiers still uniquely identify physicians for the NIHDI, as they use this information to
provide feedback reports to physicians and use this for general follow-up and control.
As noted in Figure A.5, the different mutual funds have also organized themselves to
create the InterMutualistic Agency (IMA) where patient identifiers are still available and
used for research purposes. As a result, this graph provides a clear overview of the data I
use (and the advantages of this data).














































































































































































































































































































































































A.2.1 Sample selection NIHDI.
I drop transactions for which a negative DDD is recorded, as this is indicative of data
error (10,860 observations or 0.025 percent of the sample). Additionally, I drop transactions
referring to prescription drugs that have ATC codes starting either with “A02” (acid reflux
medication) or “G” (mostly birth control pills), since administrative reporting for these
prescription drugs was not consistent throughout. However, results are robust to keeping
these groups in the sample. These transactions represent about 8.56 percent of the original
sample. I drop all transactions in 2009 (representing 7,000,844 observations or about 18
percent of the remaining sample) as an increase in the MPR was announced for 2010. Finally,
observations with negative prices (61 or 0.0001 percent of the remaining sample) are dropped.
The final sample consists of 31,775,509 transactions.
A.2.2 Sample selection IMA.
The IMA dataset consist of 25,449,736 transactions covering about 152,589 patients and
44,872 physicians, of which 300 physicians form the “core” sample for whom I have the full
transaction history for all patients over 35 years old. I drop transactions where the physician
prescribes a preparation made by a pharmacist rather than a manufactured prescription drug
(N=1,173,648 or 4.6%), prescription drugs for which no product information is available
(N=283,073 or 1.2%) and transactions for which the patient ID could not be linked to the
census information (N=9,728 or 0.04%). This yields 23,983,287 transactions, that reduces
to a sample of 6,440,115 when I focus on the core sample of 300 physicians.
For starters, I also exclude product groups for which a generic was not yet introduced.
This is primarily analeptics (ATC code N06) and Calcium Channel blockers (C08). They
both go off-patent in July 2004, and are then added in to the sample.
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A.2.3 Market Descriptives.
I first use the NIHDI to provide an overview of several market characteristics. It is not
necessary to differentiate between chronic starters and longstanding patients in the sections
below, and – being a 10% random sample of physicians – the NIHDI dataset provides a better
overview of the market. Figure A.6 provides information about the market for prescription
drugs in Belgium over the sample period, with panel A.6a providing prescription shares of
the different product groups over time: the prescription shares of the main product groups
have stayed relatively constant over time. Panel A.6b displays the growth (measured in
DDD) of the different product groups, normalized to be one in the first month of the sample
period (January 2004). This picture higlights that there is a steady growth in some of the
product groups, and the MPR and other policy interventions do not seem to have altered
growth rates of prescription volume.
In a second step, I discuss the market for active ingredients. I first describe the extent
to which an active ingredient is dispensed in different administration methods. Figure A.7
describes this in larger detail. The histogram reports the number of administration meth-
ods (at the active ingredient level) on the horizontal axis, and reports the share of active
ingredients on the vertical axis. Taking a look at unweighted data, about 75% of products
have one single administration method, and about 20% have at most 2. As a result, most
products are dominated by a single administration method. When adjusting for the number
of daily doses that are being prescribed, this number becomes even more stark. About 99%
of active ingredients are then dominated by a single administration method. Those active
ingredients for which more than one administration method can be found is typically in the
Antirheumatics class (results not reported).
In a third step, I investigate the number of manufacturers that dominate the market
at the active ingredient level. The histogram in Figure A.8 shows the extent to which the
larger manufacturers dominate the (generic) market. The horizontal axis shows the rank
of the manufacturer according to market size (for the generic prescriptions being sold).
171
In other words, the leftmost bin reports the average market share for the largest generic
manufacturers. The number of manufacturers can be relatively large. There are some generic
markets with up to eleven competitors. However, the market is largely captured by the larger
manufacturers. Especially when weighing by quantity, the top two generic manufacturers
typically account for about 85 to 90% of the generic market.
A.2.4 Sample Selection and Definitions
In order to answer the research questions in this research paper, it is necessary to dis-
tinguish between, on the one hand, non-chronic and chronic drugs, and, on the other hand,
starters and longstanding patients. Figure A.9 shows how I do this. I start 6.5 million trans-
actions written by my core sample of 300 physicians (the 4.1 million refers to the sample
when restricting my sample to data points between 2004 and 2007). I divide the chronic and
non-chronic drugs as decribed in the main paper. I then define starters as those patients
who were prescribed their first prescription less than 90 days ago. I define starters at the
active ingredient level. To be more specific, a patient who switched from astorvastatin to
simvastatin is defined as a new patient. This is a reasonable defintion, as a central concern in
the paper is whether a patient may be confused when being switching at the active ingredient
level. However, the results are robust to changing this to the therapeutic level.
The figure clearly highlights the censoring problem I encounter in January 2004. There-
fore, I only start defining chronic starters starter 1 April 2004. All patient prescriptions
noted before this date are defined at chronic longstanding. I motivate this cut-off by looking
at the arrival rate of chronic starters, displayed in Figure A.9b. Changing the cut-off from
90 to 60 (or 120) days does not substantially affect the results in my papers (results not
displayed).
When a patient is prescribed an active ingredient more than 3 months ago, the patient
moves from the green field to the orange field. As a result, including longstanding patients
whose initial choice was affected by the mandate (the grey field in the figure) may lead to
172
a misinterpretation on the probability that a longstanding patient is switched. Therefore,
these observations are discarded from the sample. Finally, these issues do not arise when
looking at non-chronic drugs, therefore the full sample of these drugs can simply be retained.
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Figure A.6: Market for Product Groups in Belgium
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Market Growth of Different Product Groups
Notes: Author’s calculations from NIHDI data sample using product group definitions in
table 1.1.
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Notes: Author’s calculations from NIHDI data sample












Rank of Manufacturer (in Market Size)
Unweighted Weighted DDD
Dominance of Generic Manufacturer
Notes: Author’s calculations from NIHDI data sample
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A.3 Additional Descriptives and Reduced Form Evidence
A.3.1 Additional Descriptives
This section describes several key features of the prescription behavior of physicians
in 2004 (before the mandate was announced). The data reveal substantial variation in the
fraction of generics a physician prescribes, as highlighted in Figure 1.3. As often documented
in this literature, differences in patient characteristics or disease profiles do not explain this
variation in prescription behavior. Table A.1 statistically tests for differences in patient
composition across high and low prescribers and documents that there are no statistically
significant or economically meaningful differences in patient mix across these two physician
types.
It is possible that physicians face patients with similar demographics, but different disease
profiles. If the availability of generics differs across health conditions, the patient mix a
physician sees could explain differences in prescription behavior. In order to investigate this,
I group active ingredients into larger product groups that represent large, salient prescription
drug groups. Table 1.1 provides an overview. These are typically dominated by one or two
active ingredients for which a generic is available (e.g. amlodipine for Calcium Channel
Blockers). The aggregation therefore mostly has the advantage that it groups several smaller
active ingredients that are prescribed infrequently, while indicating the prescription behavior
of physicians across larger, more important active ingredients.
Figure A.10 plots the market share of different product groups (y axis) in relation to
the physicians baseline prescription ranking (x axis). The fraction of prescription drugs
physicians write within product groups are remarkably stable across this ranking. Differences
in the availability of generics across product groups are therefore unlikely to explain the
differences in prescription rates of generics.
In order to test whether physicians consistently prescribe brand name across different
active ingredients, I zoom in on the prescription behavior of physicians across different
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product groups. For each physician, I compute the 2004 generic prescription rate within a
product group, and then investigate the correlation of these prescription rates across product
groups.9 A correlation coefficient close to one suggests that physicians whose prescription
rate of generics is above the average in one product group, are likely to prescribe above the
average prescription rate in the other product group. A correlation coefficient close to zero
suggests prescribing an above-average fraction of generics is not predictive of the physician’s
prescription behavior in the other product group. Figure A.11 reports this information
through a heatmap, where fields in the color yellow denote correlations closer to one, and
fields in the color dark blue denote correlations closer to zero (or negative). The correlation
coefficients across product groups are typically positive, and range from 0.2 to 0.4, with
some values up to 0.5. The overall picture that emerges is one where the prescription rate
of generics in one product group is somewhat predictive of the behavior in another group.
The correlations, however, are not suggestive of clear high-prescribing and low-prescribing
physicians.
9In order to focus on the choice between an off-patent brand name drug and a generic, I compute
these correlations only for active ingredients where a generic was available. In particular, I focus on active
ingredients for which generics were available before the announcement of the mandate percentage in June
2005.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 0.205*** 0.202*** 0.586*** 0.551*** 0.543*** 0.506***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.051) (0.043) (0.064) (0.057)
Increased 0.001 0.001 -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 -0.008
Reimbursement (0.002) (0.002) (0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018)
Female -0.001 -0.001 -0.010 -0.010 -0.016 -0.016
(0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
Starter 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.005 0.011 0.011
(0.002) (0.001) (0.013) (0.012) (0.017) (0.017)
Age (in 2004) 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Polypharmacy (in 2004) 0.000 -0.001 -0.002
(0.000) (0.003) (0.004)
Age (in 2004)
∈ [35, 50) 0.002 0.018 0.023
(0.003) (0.028) (0.036)
∈ [50, 60) 0.000 0.006 -0.001
(0.002) (0.022) (0.029)
∈ [60, 70) 0.002 0.009 0.017
(0.002) (0.018) (0.024)
∈ [70, 80) 0.001 0.011 0.007
(0.002) (0.015) (0.019)
Polypharmacy (in 2004)
0 0.001 0.025 0.006
(0.003) (0.025) (0.034)
1− 2 0.000 0.005 0.004
(0.003) (0.022) (0.029)
3− 4 -0.001 0.000 -0.007
(0.002) (0.017) (0.024)
5− 6 -0.002 0.013 -0.011
(0.002) (0.017) (0.023)
N 466,843 466,843 466,843 466,843 275,927 275,927
N Clusters 300 300 300 300 300 300
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The dependent variable for these regression is
the prescription of cheap drugs in 2004 (Columns 1 and 2), whether the physician is in the
top (1) or bottom (0) median of cheap prescribers in 2004 (Columns 3 and 4), and whether
the physician is in the top (1) or bottom (0) quartile of cheap prescribers in 2004 (Columns 5
and 6). The analysis sample restricts attention to cases where a generic is available. Standard
errors are clustered at the physician level.
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Notes: This graph shows the prescription shares of 11 different product groups (as defined
in table 1.1 in order to aggregate active ingredients and facilitate interpretation). The x-axis
ranks physician by baseline prescription rate from lowest quintile (left) to highest quintile
(right). The figure shows that physicians at different quintiles have patients with similar
disease profiles.
180
Figure A.11: Within-Physician Correlations of Generic Prescription Rates across Product
Groups
Notes: This graph uses NIHDI data to calculate the prescription rate of generics for the
major active ingredients highlighted across 10 product groups (as shown in table 1.1). I then
compute the correlation of this prescription rate across product groups. A high and positive
correlation therefore indicates that a physician that prescribes a high share of generics is
also very likely to prescribe a high share of generics in other product groups. A near-zero
correlation suggests the prescription behavior of a physician for one product group is not
predictive of its behavior in another product group.
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A.3.2 Distribution and Change in Prescription Rates
While the distribution before 2004 cannot be plotted, Appendix A.3.1 plots the average
prescription rate of generics and shows the prescription behavior of physicians is relatively
stable. Figure A.12 shows a smoothed histogram of the prescription rate of generics for
active ingredients for which a generic was available, both before and after the announcement
of the mandate. The prescription rates are computed at the physician by product group level
(as defined above), and weighted by daily doses. First, the histogram highlights that very
few physicians prescribe exclusively brand name or generic prescription drugs even within
product groups, but rather prescribe a mixture of both generics and brand name drugs
(both before and after the announcement of the mandate). Second, the histogram shows an
overall increase in the prescription rate of generics, with a particularly change at low generic
prescription rates; in line with the objectives of the mandate, there is a stark decrease in
physicians prescribing shares of generics within product groups below 20 percent.
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Notes: This graph uses IMA data and bins the average prescription rate of a physician by product group
combination, both before and after the announcement of the mandate. The “before” graph shows that
physicians tend to mix within product groups, and do not simply prescribe only generics or only brand name
drugs (5% of physician by product group combinations do prescribe a zero share). The “after” graph shows a
clear increase in the use of generics, particularly in the bottom, that pushes the histogram towards generics.
However, there is still no clear bunching on either extremes.
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A.3.3 Robustness Checks
Non-Chronic Drugs and Flexible controls. Prescriptions for non-chronic drugs serve
as a reasonable robustness check for the physician response to chronic starters. Switching
costs do not apply to non-chronic drug users, and therefore physicians are likely to treat
these patients as chronic starters. The figures below indeed confirm that the response for
non-chronic drugs mirrors that of chronic starters. Additionally, including additional flexible
controls for demographics does not substantially change the results.
Physician Biases. The results below in Figure A.13 show that including physician by
therapeutic class essentially leads to the same results as those presented in the paper. Using
product group fixed effects, however, leads to estimates that are similar in direction, but are
somewhat different in magnitude. For completeness, the regression coefficients (excluding
the β coefficients) are list in table A.2.
Table A.2: Robustness Checks Level of Fixed Effects
Chronic Starters Chronic Longstanding
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Copay Differential -0.034 0.117 -0.21 0.005 0.008 -0.004
(0.016) (0.019) (0.018) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Increased Reimbursement (IR) -0.013 -0.012 -0.011 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Copay Differential ×IR 0.028 0.042 -0.021 0.009 0.012 -0.001
(0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Female 0.002 0 0.002 0 0 0
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Generict−1 0.876 0.901 0.92
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
N 242,019 242,019 242,019 951,707 951,707 951,707
N Clusters 300 300 300 300 300 300
Physician × Chemical FE X X X X X X
Notes: Coefficients are estimated using the strategy discussed in section 1.5.4.3.
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Figure A.13: Descriptive Graphs: Prescription and Switching Rate of Generics
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A.3.4 Physician Shopping
This section investigates whether patients respond to the mandate by “shopping” for
physicians who are willing to prescribe brand name drugs despite the mandate. As patients
take, on average, 3 to 4 chronic prescription drugs, it might actually be costly for them to
switch physicians when they are switched on one specific drug (as it risks changes in the
other drugs the patient takes). Additionally, patients tend to prioritize convenience when
choosing providers (e.g. distance). However, they might also consider provider personality or
practice style. Even though brand awareness is low and patients may not necessarily select
physicians they see according to the number of generics they prescribe, these prescription
patterns might be correlated with the physician’s personality traits that matter to patients.
As a result, this section investigates in more detail whether physician shopping is a concern.
Figure A.14 plots the probability that a patient sees a different physician from the one
they saw during their previous visit. Overall, there is a reasonably high amount of switching,
as patients regularly see a physician on call or when their regular physician is on holiday (with
clear bumps in the summer months). However, we see no evidence of physician shopping:
patients of high prescribers are not less likely to switch in the aftermath of the policy mandate
and vice versa. As a result, this does not point to evidence of physician shopping in response
to the mandate.
I also test this concern in a regression framework. If patients resort to physician shopping,
I expect to uncover two patterns in the data. First, longstanding patients who visit a low
prescriber are likely to switch. Second, starters are now more likely to look for a high
prescriber if they prefer receiving brand name drugs. As a result, we expect high prescribers
to see an increase in the fraction of starters after the policy mandate goes into effect –
especially since physicians primarily change their habits for starters.
The regression results in Table A.3 below show that there is no evidence of physician
shopping the data. Column 1 highlights that physician close to the threshold (above the
median of the 2004 generic prescription rate distribution) are not more likely to see starters
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Notes: This graph plots the probability (at the prescription level) that a patient’s current prescription is
written by a physician that did not write the patient’s previous prescription.
than physicians far from the theshold. Column 2 shows that longstanding patients visiting
physicians far from the threshold (as defined in Column 1) exhibit no increase in switching
physicians compared to those visiting physicians close to the threshold.





N Clusters 300 300




Notes: Column 1 reports the coefficients of a regression in which a binary indicator of
whether the prescription was written for a starter is regressed on physician by chemical
fixed effects, a post indicator (taking on value 1 in months after June 2005), an indicator
for whether the physician is a high prescriber or not, and an interaction between these
two indicators. Column 2 reports the coefficients of a regression in which a binary
indicator taking on value one if a patient sees a different physician between prescriptions
is regressed on the same two indicators and interaction used in the regression in Column
1. Additionally, the lagged generic choice is also used as a control.
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A.3.5 Robustness Checks to Quality of Dispensed Drugs
Some additional robustness checks regarding the quality of drugs being dispensed are
posted below. I use an empirical strategy that is similar in spirit to equation 1.2, but uses
several different outcomes. There are a couple of concerns beyond the use of on-patent drugs.
At the active ingredient level, manufacturers have introduced prescription drugs that release
the active ingredients in more gradual ways (also known as “extended release” formulations),
there may be differences in the potency of drugs that are being prescribed. Additionally,
changes in the administration method may matter as they may affect the extent, speed or
quality with which the active ingredient is absorbed. Finally, there is a certain class of drugs
for which small changes in dosis or small differences in how the body absorbs the active
ingredient can have severe consequences in effectiveness or side effects. These drugs are
typically referred to as Narrow Therapeutic Index drugs, with Warfarin being a particularly
famous example.
The graphs in Figure A.15 below show event study coefficients for four key outcome
variables for chronic starters. The graph in panel Figure A.15a shows that the prescription
rate of extended release formulations does not change over the sample period. The graph in
panel Figure A.15b shows that the potency of drugs was not affected by the announcement
or the introduction of the policy mandate. The graph in panel Figure A.15d shows active
ingredients are typically dominated by one single administration method, and, therefore,
changes in administration method are only a minimal worry. The graph in panel Figure
A.15c shows, similarly, that the use of NTI drugs was not substantially affected by the
introduction of the policy mandate. The coefficients are listed in table A.4.
A.3.6 Robustness Checks to Effect of Switching Prescription Drugs on Medi-
cation Adherence.
This section gathers some additional evidence on the effect of switching a patient’s pre-
scription drugs on his or her medication adherence. Table 1.6 collects several results that
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Table A.4: Robustness Checks Quality Dispensed Drugs
Chronic Starters Chronic Longstanding
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Copay Differential 0.007 0.015 0.007 0.015
(0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010)
Increased Reimbursement (IR) 0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.003
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005)
Copay Differential ×IR -0.026 -0.001 -0.026 -0.001
(0.010) (0.018) (0.010) (0.018)
Female -0.002 -0.035 -0.002 -0.035
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
N 242,019 242,019 242,019 242,019
N Clusters 300 300 300 300
Physician × Chemical FE X X X X
Notes: Coefficients are estimated using the strategy discussed in section 1.5.4.3.
strengthen the interpretation of the IV results discussed in the paper. I focus on the full
sample, exploiting differences between physicians with a baseline prescription rate above or
below the median of the distribution of baseline generic prescription rates.
Column 1 repeats the exercise of the Instrumental Variable strategy in the text, but
estimates the causal effect of switching on medication adherence before being switched. This
addresses the concern that the effect might be spurious, or that the switching is driven by a
change in medication adherence. As the results show, switching has no effect on pre-switch
adherence.
Another concern is that the medication adherence results are the result of patients that
have hoarded prescription drugs in the past. Patients may exhibit poor medication adherence
and therefore have multiple prescription drug doses at home. Upon being switched, they
first decide to use up this stock of prescription drugs before filling their generic prescription
drugs (either because they do not like the switch or suddenly realize they have a stock of
prescription drugs at home). This would imply that the use of prescription drugs does not
actually change, but that patients substitute to using a stock of prescription drugs they have
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Figure A.15: Robustness Checks for Quality of Drugs Dispensed
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at home. While this results in a decrease in measured medication adherence, there is no
change in “actual” medication adherence.
Column 2 and 3 address this concern by splitting the data into patients that exhibited
high levels of medication adherence (Column 2) and patients that exhibited low levels of
medication adherence before the introduction of the mandate (Column 3). Patients that
exhibit low levels of medication adherence are likely to have stocks of prescription drugs lying
around at home, while those who exhibit high levels of medication adherence are unlikely to
have a large stock of prescription drugs at home. As a result, if hoarding is driving the IV
estimates, I expect to find that a change in prescription drugs primarily changes medication
adherence for patients exhibiting low levels of medication adherence.
Column 2 and 3 show that the point estimate of the effect of switching a patient’s
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prescription drug is indeed somewhat larger for patients exhibiting a low level of medication
adherence, but that, by an large, the effect is fairly similar. These findings therefore suggest
that the evidence for hoarding as the primary driver of changes in medication adherence is
small.
Table A.5: The effect of switching a patient on medication adherence
IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Variable Adherencet−1 Adherencet
Switch 0.020 -0.209* -0.266***
(0.160) (0.112) (0.066)
Robust 1st Stage F-
test
205.64 24.77 41.47
N 514,316 515,409 310,040
N Cluster 293 294 296
Controls X X X
Month × ATC FE X X X
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Instruments in column 1
through 3 are Low Prescriber×Post and Lagged Choice×Post. Patient-
level controls are gender, whether the patient receives an increased reim-
bursement, and whether the patient received a generic at the previous
visit. Baseline controls for the instruments (whether the patient sees a
high or low prescriber, and lagged choice interacted with low prescriber)
are also included. Month by active ingredient fixed effects are added to
control for idiosyncratic time shocks to overall adherence. Standard errors
are clustered at the patient level.
A.3.7 Robustness Checks to Patient Heterogeneity
The graphical results highlight that older patients using multiple prescription drugs are
less likely to be switched. As these are risk factors for confusion and possible drug-drug
interactions, these results line up with the results in Table 1.7.
Overall, Column 1 and 2 suggest the prescription rate increases by about 7 and 1.5
percentage points for chronic starters and longstanding patients respectively, similar to the
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results documented in section 1.4.1. Interacting Ljpt×Postt with different demographic char-
acteristics of the patient provides a useful framework to investigate which patient observables
predict which longstanding patients are switched at higher or lower rates.
First, I investigate whether whether the duration of use is an important predictor of
longstanding patients being switched. One may, for instance, hypothesize that patients
exhibit brand loyalty to the specific prescription drug they use, especially since boxes in
Belgium differ across brand name and generic drugs. Column 3 in Table 1.7 provides the
results from a formal test of this hypothesis by comparing the switching rate of patients
that have been “longstanding” for only a couple of months to those that have been for at
least a year. In particular, I compare patients that started using prescription drugs in a
therapeutic class in the year between April 2004 and April 2005 (“recent longstanding”) and
patients that were using a prescription drug within a therapeutic class at least since April
2004 (“legacy longstanding”).10 The coefficient estimate on the interaction term suggest that
recent longstanding patients are indeed somewhat more likely to be switched than legacy
longstanding patients. However, the effect is rather small, especially comparing the effect
size between starters and longstanding patients. Therefore, the results suggest that there is
an immediate lock-in effect.
Second, I investigate whether this immediate lock-in effect could result from risks of
confusing patients or adverse interactions with other prescription drugs. Patients that take
multiple prescription drugs might experience negative interactions between different active
or inactive ingredients when a prescription drug is changed, or might get confused more
easily when one (or multiple) prescription drugs change appearance. Older patients might
also get confused more easily when prescription drugs change appearance, especially if it is
used to follow their treatment plan. In particular, I investigate whether a patient’s age or
10I use April 2005 as cut-off since these patients are “longstanding” by the time the mandate is announced.
The April 2004 cut-off is a natural result of the censoring inherent in my dataset. This censoring makes it
impossible to contrast patients that have been longstanding for at least 2 years to those who have been at
least 3 years. However, the small differences between the longstanding patients of less than a year to those
of more than a year alleviates those concerns substantially.
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polypharmacy profile (ie. the number of prescription drugs the patient takes on a regular
basis) recorded in 2004 predict the probability of a longstanding patient being switched.
Columns 4 and 5 in Table 1.7 indeed uncover differences in switching rates that are consistent
with these hypotheses. Older patient cohorts are less likely to be switched compared to
younger patient cohorts: a longstanding patient in their forties or fifties in 2004 is about
50% more likely to be switched than a patient in their eighties in 2004. More strikingly,
patients that had no history of polypharmacy were about twice as likely to be switched than
a longstanding patient taking five or more drugs on a regular basis.
193
A.3.8 Machine Learning Algorithm
Equation A.2 provides a simple framework to think about how to predict the change in
switching from brand name drugs to generic drugs. The change in probability that patient
j is switched from a branded to a generic version of prescription drug p at time t is set up
as a function of patient characteristics xjpt, without imposing a predefined functional form
on f(.).
∆Switchjpt = f(xjpt) (A.2)
It is possible to parameterize this with functional forms, as I did in the previous section,
or to use more flexible feature selection or machine learning methods to see which variables
predict switching. I pursue the second strategy in this section. Details of regression tree and
random forest algorithms are provided in A.3.8.
Regression Tree. Regression trees use a single decision tree to predict who is switched,
but the statistics package made available by the data provider does not apply regression
trees on the change in an outcome variable. Therefore, I compute switching rates before and
after the mandate and bin these by age, gender polypharmacy, type of longstanding patient
(recent or long) and whether the patient is on an increased reimbursement scheme or not.
As this is now a continuous rather than a binary measure, it is necessary to use a regression
tree rather than a decision tree model.
Random Forest. Random Forests allow for the flexible approach of decision trees, but
minimize the risk of overfitting the data. They do so by allowing for multiple regression or
decision trees, and then average out over the different predictions to get a final prediction.
The upside of this method is that it is more robust, but the downside is there is no clear
deicision rule that can be backed out. I use the methodology proposed by Su et al (2009)
and Radcliffe and Surry (2011) to see how variable predict the change in the probability of
being switched in response to the mandate announcement.
The random forest algorithm builds on the Random Forest literature going back to
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Breiman (2001). The uplift algorithm used in this paper builds on algorithms proposed
in Su et al. (2009) and Radcliffe and Surry (2011). In this algorithm, the training data
is used to both generate the trees and estimate the uplift inside the different leaves. This
differentiates this approach from the “honest” sampling approach as proposed in Athey and
Imbens (2016) and Athey et al. (2019). In this sampling approach, the training data is split
into a sample that generates the trees, and a separate sample where the uplift of different
leaves is estimated. This has the added value that confidence intervals on the uplift can be
computed, which is not possible with the algorithm proposed here. As the machine learning
algorithm in this paper is mostly a robustness check, the uplift algorithm is sufficient for
these purposes.
Once the trees have been generated, the selection of which decision rules to retain build
on the selection rule in Radcliffe and Surry (2011). In essence, at each possible split, the
following interaction regression is run.
Genericijpt = α + βPostt + γUpjpt + ηPostt × Upjpt (A.3)
In this regression Genericijpt is an indicator taking on value 1 if a generic is prescribed and
value 0 if not. The indicator Postt takes on value 1 after the mandate is announced, and
0 before. Finally, Upjpt is an indicator variable indicating that splits the observations at a
certain node (e.g. patients over 55 years old against those younger than 55 years old). These
splits were randomly created during the first step of the random forest, so the goal of these
regressions is to retain those splits where the predictive power of the split is sufficiently high.
As a result, those splits where the parameter η has a (absolute value of the) t-stat that is
sufficiently large will be retained. Further details regarding the specific outcomes in this
paper are to be added.
Table A.6 provides an overview of the results. Whereas the magnitudes of the numbers
are not comparable across methods, a higher number suggests a variable is more important
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for predicting the outcome of interest. The results from both the regression tree and random
forests model confirm the more parametric results from the previous section. In particu-
lar, a patient’s polypharmacy levels and age are important features that predict whether a
physician will switch them from a brand name to a generic prescription drug. Whether the
patient is a recent switcher or not is not that important and carries about the same weight
as the gender of a patient, and is less important than whether a patient receives an increased
reimbursement rate.
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Table A.6: Predicting Generic Switching Using Feature Selection Methods
(1) (2) (3)




Variable Importance (Higher is more Informative)
Polypharmacy 3.139 2,102 2,076
Age 4.369 1,673 4,608








Days Unable to work
(2004)
706
Days Disabled (2004) 702
N 15,697 1,059,820 1,059,820
Notes: The results in column 1 of this table are based on binned regression tree methods,
where variables are binned as described in section 1.4.5. The outcome in column 1 is
the change in the switching rate from brand name to generic drugs and the model
is a regression tree. Variable importance is measured using the outcome “Variable
Importance” (higher is more predictive). The results in column 2 through 4 of this
table use the sample of prescription drugs dispensed for longstanding patients. The
model is an random forest with uplift (Radcliffe and Surry, 2011). This model predicts
which characteristics predict a change in the outcome variable for some treatment,
which in my setting is the announcement of the mandate (Postt = 1 or 0.). Variable
importance here is measured by the number of decisions rules over the different trees
(higher is more predictive).
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APPENDIX B
Appendix to Fairness Considerations in Wage Setting:
Evidence from Domestic Outsourcing Events in
Germany
B.1 Data Processing
B.1.1 Data Creation and Variable Construction
I draw on two main datasets. In a first step, I collect the relevant survey responses from
the Betriebspanel data files over the different years and save the yearly survey datasets. The
specific survey questions are discussed in subsection 3 of this appendix section. In a second
step, I read in establishment-level LIAB data for every year, with detailed information. I
drop observations for which there is a missing establishment or person identifier, and restrict
the sample to include only people ages 20 to 60 years old. At this point, I define part-
time workers and drop wages that fall above the top coding limit in any given year and
perform the data imputation method, discussed in subsection 2 of this appendix section.
After imputing these wages, I save a worker-level file with information on the employment
and demographics of the worker, and then collapse this file to an establishment-level file.
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I merge the survey responses to these establishment level files. In a third step, I append
all the worker-level datasets and establishment level datasets in order to obtain the panel
structure. The establishment level dataset is used to define the outsourcing events, therefore
they contain information on total number of workers in the different occupations, and other
necessary variables that enable me to create outsourcing event indicators. Two variables
need special attention:
1. Education: Originally, the education variable takes on seven values: middle school
(1), middle school with a vocational degree (2), high school (3), high school with a vo-
cational degree (4), technical university (5), university (6), and missing (.z). I combine
middle school and high school (1 and 3) as the number of people with high school de-
grees was very small for certain outsourcing events, and overall in the workforce. This
was problematic both for data review of summary statistics and estimation purposes.
2. Part-time: The part-time indicator is based off of the stib variable. Workers are
coded as working part-time when this variable takes on value 8 or 9, as is the standard
when working with this data.
B.1.2 Imputation
As mentioned in the text, I follow standard imputation techniques closely, but not exactly:
I miss two variables that Card, Heining and Kline (2013) use in their imputation method.
The imputation algorithm is as follows. I first divide the age variable into 4 age bins (20-30
years; 31-40 year; 41-50 years; 51-60 years). I then run several tobit specifications within each
year for all year, gender, education group, part-time, and age bin combinations. This yields
23× 2× 7× 2× 4 = 2, 576 separate tobit models. The variable in the tobit models are: age,
the fraction of censored wages in the establishment of employment, an indicator whether the
establishment employs more than 10 people, an indicator whether the establishment is a one-
person establishment, the fraction of full-time workers at the establishment of employment
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(along with a quadratic of this variable), and, finally, the mean of the uncensored wages
within the establishment of employment. I then impute wages building on the estimated
tobit model, and using a random uniform draw u for each censored observation. In particular,
I follow Card, Heining and Kline (2013) and drop censored values, imputing the upper tail
by setting it equal to yimp = X
′β + σ̂Φ−1(k + u × (1 − k)) where yimp stands for imputed
value, X is the vector of observables associated with the observation, and σ̂ represents the
estimated standard deviation of the tobit model. Φ−1 stands for the inverse normal, u is the
random uniform draw, k = Φ[(c−X ′β)/σ̂], and c is the value at which wages are censored.
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B.2 Details on measuring domestic outsourcing
B.2.1 Industry and Occupation Codes
The occupation codes are consistent throughout the sample period. The industry codes
have 4 3-digit variables: the digit codes based on the 1973, 1993, 2003, or 2008 codes. Focus-
ing on the first three covers all workers, so I report the industry codes for these classifications
only. I code an establishment being part of a certain business service industry if either of
these industry variables takes on a relevant value. For instance, if an establishment is a
business service firm only under the 1973 classification code, but not for any of the other
classifications, I classify it as a business service establishment. The overview of the occupa-
tion codes can be found on the next page in table B.1, while the overview of the industry
codes can be found on the page after that, in table B.2. These largely follow Goldschmidt
and Schmieder (2015), but not fully, as I don’t have five-digit industry codes to my disposal.
B.2.2 Descriptive facts on outsourcing
The first three facts describe the stability of CCSL employment at the establishments
level, using a fixed effects regression where the employment for each occupation at the es-
tablishment level is regressed on a set of establishment fixed effects. Since the population
of interest here is establishments that employ these occupations, all establishments not em-
ploying the occupation of interest are dropped from the sample.1 The first panel of table
B.3 shows that simple establishment fixed effects explain the majority (about 90 to 95%)
of the variation in the employment level of these occupations. Since these numbers may be
hard to interpret, I impose an AR(1) structure on the error to test the persistent of em-
ployment, presented in the second panel of figure B.3. An autocorrelation coefficient close
to one provides evidence that employment within the establishment is highly persistent and
stable. As the second panel of table highlights, the autocorrelation for all occupations is
1Adding in the establishments that do not employ these occupations, or have outsourced these occupa-
tions, would mechanically increase the persistence of employment of these occupations.
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about 0.75, indicating the employment level is relatively stable. The third panel repeats
this exercise, but for employment shares rather than employment levels. While the fixed
effects still explain a majority of the variance, the estimated autocorrelation coefficients are
substantially lower. The finding that employment levels are more stable than employment
shares indicate that employment of these occupations does not increase one-to-one with the
size of the establishment. For instance, a manufacturing plant may need only one security
agent, regardless of whether it employs one hundred or two hundred workers.
Another way to consider the stability of these occupations is by considering the turnover
rates at the establishment level. Figure B.1 shows this graphically: they plot the turnover
rates at the establishment level with the share of the workforce leaving on the horizontal
axis, and the frequency on the vertical axis.2 As the pictures show, cleaning and security
jobs in particular seem to be very stable, but also catering and logistics show spikes around
zero. Finally, the bottom panel of table B.3 shows the rate at which establishments end up
rehiring the occupation after outsourcing, sometimes dubbed “insourcing”.3 For all CCSL
occupations, this probability is fairly small and hovers around 8%.
2As the object of interest here involves the stability of turnover rates before establishments engage in
outsourcing or contracting out, the outsourcing events are precluded from this sample. Including them would
mechanically generate a spike at -1. The turnover rates are calculated for all establishments that either have
positive employment for the specific occupation or have not engaged in outsourcing of the occupation just
yet. The rationale here is similar to that of the fixed effects regressions discussed above.
3In contrast to the four descriptive facts above, these probabilities are based on the sample of establish-
ments that decided to outsource. Employment in the occupation of interest was positive at some point in
time, but has fallen to zero due to outsourcing. I then compute the probability of seeing positive employment






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B.3: Descriptives of Employment
Outsourcing Category
Catering Cleaning Security Logistics
Variance Decomposition of Employment Levels
Variance % Variance % Variance % Variance %
Between 45.143 0.993 26.068 0.871 18.358 0.948 48.375
0.905
Within 3.912 10.048 4.287 15.641
Variance Decomposition of Employment Levels with AR(1) Error
ρ 0.731 0.823 0.739 0.752
Variance % Variance % Variance % Variance %
Between 54.466 0.997 28.068 0.956 22.205 0.982 54.565 0.955
Within 2.912 6.000 2.971 11.782
Variance Decomposition of Employment Shares with AR(1) Error
ρ 0.303 0.467 0.497 0.409
Variance % Variance % Variance % Variance %
Between 0.110 0.930 0.085 0.879 0.053 0.899 0.119 0.925
Within 0.030 0.032 0.018 0.034
Probability of Insourcing after Outsourcing
P (Insource) 0.0615 0.0912 0.0807 0.0849
Notes: Panel one through three report a variance decomposition based on a regression of
employment levels or shares on establishment fixed effects, where the estimation sample only
includes establishments with strictly positive employment in the occupation of interest. The
between variance is accounted for by differences between establishments, the within variance
is accounted for by differences within establishments. The percentage reports the fraction
of variance that is explained between firms. Panel two through three additionally impose
an AR(1) model on the error term and report a point estimate for the autocorrelation
coefficient. Standard errors are not reported yet, as Stata does not readily report these,
but will be calculated for future versions of this paper. Panel four reports the probability
of seeing positive employment in the occupation of interest in any given year, after the
establishment has outsourced this category according to my outsourcing measure.
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Turnover rate in Logistics Services
(d) Logistics
Notes: Frequency graphs for the turnover rate in the different occupations of interest.
The sample for which these turnover rates are calculated include only establishments with
strictly positive employment in the occupation of interest, and do not include the year when
the employment in the relevant occupation drops to zero.
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B.3 Proofs





























































Define the employment ratio of high skill to low skill workers as η = L2(w2)
L1(w1)
and the































σ ξa︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡b(w2,w1)

Then maintaining the assumption on L′k and Lk for k ∈ {1, 2} and applying a first-order








































A more detailed and precise Taylor approximation could state this in terms of changes
in wages, rather than in changes in the skill ratio, however this is left out of the
4The assumption that L1 = L′1 and L2 = L′2 allow to have b not depend on these magnitudes.
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APPENDIX C





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table C.2: Descriptive Statistics for Students (Test Score Sample)
Face-to-Face











Male 0.384 0.486 0.419 0.493 0.323 0.468
Age 34.319 9.411 33.57 9.3 35.601 9.46
Baseline GPA (0-4) 3.206 0.576 3.195 0.565 3.227 0.594
Credits earned prior to start of Math 208 24.533 17.534 25.256 16.69 23.296 18.827
Took Math 208 before 0.112 0.316 0.089 0.285 0.152 0.359
Number of times MTH 208 taken 1.124 0.407 1.103 0.36 1.16 0.475
BS (general studies) 0.164 0.371 0.159 0.366 0.173 0.378
BS in Nursing 0.044 0.206 0.017 0.131 0.09 0.287
BS in Accounting 0.009 0.094 0.005 0.071 0.015 0.123
BS in Business 0.382 0.486 0.467 0.499 0.236 0.425
BS in Criminal Justice Administration 0.1 0.3 0.124 0.33 0.058 0.234
BS in Education 0.028 0.166 0.013 0.115 0.054 0.226
BS in Health Administration 0.091 0.288 0.092 0.288 0.09 0.287
BS in Human Services 0.044 0.204 0.036 0.186 0.057 0.232
BS in Information Technology 0.043 0.203 0.046 0.21 0.038 0.191
BS in Management 0.055 0.228 0.027 0.162 0.103 0.304
Non-degree program 0.013 0.114 0.003 0.056 0.031 0.172
BS in other Program 0.025 0.155 0.009 0.095 0.051 0.221
Time since program start date (years) 1.234 1.596 1.197 1.425 1.297 1.85
Grade in Math 208 2.385 1.361 2.405 1.324 2.352 1.422
A / A- 0.283 0.451 0.275 0.447 0.296 0.457
B+ / B / B- 0.277 0.448 0.283 0.451 0.267 0.442
C+ / C / C- 0.189 0.392 0.203 0.402 0.167 0.373
D+ / D / D- 0.092 0.289 0.099 0.299 0.08 0.272
F 0.052 0.221 0.05 0.217 0.055 0.227
Withdrawn 0.106 0.308 0.09 0.286 0.135 0.342
Passed Math 208 0.842 0.365 0.861 0.346 0.81 0.392
Math 208 Final exam score available 0.854 0.354 0.894 0.308 0.785 0.411
Math 208 final exam % correct (if available) 0.707 0.241 0.696 0.246 0.728 0.23
Took Math 209 0.779 0.415 0.833 0.373 0.686 0.464
Grade in Math 209 (if took it) 2.467 1.249 2.524 1.187 2.347 1.361
A / A- 0.265 0.442 0.265 0.442 0.265 0.441
B+ / B / B- 0.296 0.457 0.307 0.461 0.273 0.445
C+ / C / C- 0.22 0.414 0.233 0.423 0.192 0.394
D+ / D / D- 0.102 0.302 0.107 0.309 0.091 0.288
F 0.04 0.195 0.031 0.174 0.057 0.232
Withdrawn 0.067 0.25 0.049 0.215 0.105 0.306
Math 209 Final exam score available 0.67 0.47 0.758 0.428 0.518 0.5
Math 209 final exam % correct (if available) 0.69 0.245 0.691 0.243 0.688 0.251
Credits earned in following year 10.947 5.348 11.561 5.078 9.897 5.628
Have course evaluation 0.369 0.483 0.342 0.474 0.416 0.493
Course evaluation: Recommend instructor 0.661 0.473 0.694 0.461 0.614 0.487
210
Table C.3: How much switching is there between online and FTF campuses?
Total FTF campuses taught at
0 1 2 3 4 Total
Never online 0 1,498 110 10 1 1,619
Taught online 534 126 14 3 0 677
Total 534 1624 124 13 1 2,296
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































C.2 Final Exam Score Determination
For sections from July 2010 to March 2014, we have detailed information on student
performance separately by course assignment or assessment, which includes everything from
individual homework assignments to group exercises to exams. We use this data to obtain a
final exam score for each student when available. Because the data does not have a single,
clear code for final exam component across all sections, and instructors have discretion to
add additional final exam components, we use a decision rule to identify the “best” exam
score for each student based on the text description of the assessment object. Ideally, this
measure would capture computer-administered tests, since instructors do not have discretion
over these. We therefore define a quality measure, ranging from 1 (best) to 4 (worst),
that indicates how clean we believe the identification of these test scores to be. Once a
student in a certain section gets assigned a test score, it is marked and not considered in
later steps, so students get assigned a single quality measure and the assigned test score
is of the highest quality available Group 1 consists of the computer-administered common
assessments available to all UPX instructors. To identify these assessments, we flag strings
that contain words or phrases associated with the computer testing regime (e.g., “Aleks”,
“MyMathLab” or “MML”) as well as words or phrases indicating a final exam (e.g., “final
exam,” “final examination,” “final test”). If a student has an assessment that meets these
criteria, we use the score from this assessment as the student’s final exam score.1 Specifically,
we use the fraction of test items answered correctly as our measure of student performance.
Roughly 11% of student-sections in our test score subsample have a final exam score with
this highest level of quality, both for MTH208 and MTH209 test scores. Some students
have a single assessment with a word or phrase indicating a final exam (e.g., “final exam,”
1In extremely rare cases (less than 4 percent of the sample), students will have more than one assessment
that meets these criteria, in which case we sum the attained and maximal score for these components, and
calculate the percentage score. This is, in part, because for many cases, there was no grade component that
could be clearly identified as the test score (e.g. a student may have “Aleks final exam: part 1” and “Aleks
final exam: part 2”). About 3.75% of these cases have two assessments that meet the criteria. The maximum
number of components for a student is five.
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“final examination,” “final test”), but no explicit indication that the exam was from the
standardized online system. If the assessment does not contain any additional words or
phrases indicating that the test was developed by the instructor (e.g., “in class,” “instructor
generated,” etc.), we are reasonably confident that it refers to the standardized online system.
Hence, we use this assessment score as the student’s final exam, but we consider these
assessments as Group 2 for the purpose of exam quality. Another 77 percent of student-
sections fall into this category for the MTH208 and MTH209 sections. The third group looks
at strings such as “test,” “quiz,” and “course exam.” While quizzes and tests may sometimes
refer to weekly refresher assessments, these strings identify final test scores reasonably well
after having considered decision rules 1 and 2. About 9% of the student-sections fall into this
category for both section types. The fourth and final group selects a grade component as a
final test score if the title includes both “class” and “final.” Another 2 percent of the sample
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